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Summary 
 
Price is the most critical factor in determining the way markets function. In a perfect 
market a price shock is transmitted to other vertically or horizontally connected 
markets within a given period of time. However, when markets do not function 
perfectly the speed and the magnitude of price transmission may be hampered. State 
controlled agricultural commodity markets prevent efficient price transmission, as a 
result, producer prices cannot not reflect world prices. Many developing countries 
have implemented measures to improve price transmission through agricultural 
market liberalisation policies and providing incentives for farmers. However, instead 
of prices being transmitted symmetrically, monopoly or oligopoly markets, 
government policies and high transaction costs may lead to asymmetric price 
transmission. The lead firms in commodity value chains tend to become reluctant to 
pass on prices that squeeze their margins. As a result, producers may not benefit 
from consumer price increases and similarly, consumers may not benefit from 
producer price decreases.  
 
This study takes a look at these issues in the analysis of coffee producer prices for 
Zambia and Tanzania. Coffee is an important export commodity in both of these 
countries and contributes significantly to the creation of foreign exchange and 
employment even if the total production is relatively low. Both countries have 
liberalised their coffee markets during the economic reforms of the late 1990s to 
differing extents. The effects of these reforms on coffee price transmission, price 
volatility and on coffee supply response are examined in this study. 
 
This dissertation consists of four papers that investigate various aspects of coffee 
markets for Zambia and Tanzania. First, the study investigates coffee value chains in 
both countries, paying attention to the governance structure and its implications for 
producer prices. Second, price transmission between coffee world prices and 
producers’ prices in Tanzania and Zambia is examined. The third paper examines 
price volatility in both countries and assesses the impacts of trade liberalisation 
policies on price volatility. The fourth paper analyses coffee supply response to 
coffee prices in Zambia.  
 
 x 
Results for Zambia indicate improved price transmission after the implementation of 
economic reforms. As expected, the transmission is asymmetric where price 
decreases are passed on quicker than price increases. In the case of Tanzania, 
results do not show any improvements after the economic reforms. Similar results are 
obtained from the volatility study where economic reforms led to an increase in coffee 
price volatility in Zambia, with negative shocks inducing more volatile prices than 
positive shocks. However, in Tanzania the inconsistent market reforms have had no 
significant effects on coffee price volatility. The study of coffee supply response for 
Zambia shows that in the long-run, coffee prices have negative although insignificant 
impacts on supply. This could be related to the fact that as a perennial crop supply 
tends to reach the market when prices are on the decline. However, in the short-run, 
coffee supply response changes are only significant for price decreases, indicating 
that coffee supply falls faster than it rises with respect to price changes. On the other 
hand, supply responds negatively to a stronger local currency and to price of maize, 
the main competing crop. However, the 1990s economic reforms in Zambia have had 
positive effect on coffee supply.  
 
These findings have important policy implications as they reveal a short and efficient 
value chain and governance structure that enables the producers to receive larger 
shares of the final coffee price. In addition, the results discuss favourable policies for 
improving transmission from world markets to producer prices over the post 
economic reform period although the transmission remains asymmetric. An efficient 
price transmission may work to the disadvantage of the growers in the short-run as 
prices become exposed to volatile world prices, but in the long-run, it may yield the 
desired outcome. The findings also show the importance of a liberalised currency for 
increased coffee supply. 
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Zusammenfassung 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Der Preis ist der entscheidendste Einflussfaktor, wenn es darum geht zu verstehen, 
wie Märkte funktionieren. Handelt es sich um eine perfekte Marktsituation, so wird ein 
Preisschock eines Marktes innerhalb einer gegebenen Zeitspanne auf andere 
vertikal oder horizontal miteinander verbundene Märkte übertragen. Wenn Märkte 
jedoch nicht perfekt funktionieren, kann die Geschwindigkeit und das Ausmaß von 
Preistransmission behindert werden. Agrarmärkte, die staatlich kontrolliert werden, 
können Preistransmission zum Teil vorbeugen, was dazu führt, dass die 
Produzentenpreise nicht den Weltpreisen entsprechen. Viele Entwicklungsländer 
haben darum Maßstäbe eingeführt, um  die Preistransmission zu verbessern, indem 
Agrarmärkte liberalisiert und Anreize für die Landwirte geschaffen werden. 
Nichtsdestotrotz führen zum einen Monopole und Oligopole in der 
Wertschöpfungskette, zum anderen hohe Transaktionskosten zu einer 
asymmetrischen anstatt zu einer symmetrischen Preistransmission. Die führenden 
Firmen in der Wertschöpfungskette tendieren dazu, nur widerwillig die Preise zu 
überliefern, die ihre Gewinnspanne in die Enge treiben. Demzufolge können weder 
die Produzenten  von den steigenden Konsumentenpreisen, noch die Konsumenten 
von den reduzierten Produzentenpreisen  profitieren.  
 
Diese Studie behandelt diese Thematik, indem die Produzentenpreise von Kaffee in 
Sambia und Tansania untersucht werden. Kaffee stellt ein wichtiges Exportprodukt in 
diesen beiden Ländern dar und trägt signifikant dazu bei, dass es Fremdwährung 
und Arbeitsplätze gibt, auch wenn die gesamte Kaffeeproduktion in diesen Ländern 
relativ niedrig ist. In beiden Ländern fand eine unterschiedlich stark ausgeprägte 
Liberalisierung der Kaffeemärkte  im Zuge der ökonomischen Reformen in den 
späten 90er Jahren statt. In dieser Studie werden die Auswirkungen dieser Reformen 
auf die Preistransmission bei Kaffee,  die Preisvolatilität und die 
Angebotsentwicklung von Kaffee untersucht. 
 
Diese Doktorarbeit besteht aus vier Teilen, die verschiedene Aspekte der Märkte für 
Kaffee in Sambia und Tansania behandeln. Zuerst wird die Wertschöpfungskette von 
Kaffee in den beiden Ländern genauer betrachtet. Dabei wird insbesondere ein Auge 
 xii 
auf die jeweilige Regierungsstruktur  geworfen und es werden die daraus 
resultierenden Auswirkungen hinsichtlich der Produzentenpreise erörtert. Als 
nächstes wird die Preistransmission  von  den Weltpreisen zu den 
Produzentenpreisen für Kaffee in Tansania und Sambia analysiert. Im dritten Teil 
wird die Preisvolatilität der beiden Länder  untersucht und es werden die 
Auswirkungen der Liberalisierung des Handels auf die Preisvolatilität berechnet. Der 
vierte Teil ermittelt die Angebotsentwicklung von Kaffee in Sambia. 
 
Die Ergebnisse für Sambia zeigen eine verbesserte Preistransmission nach den 
ökonomischen Reformen. Wie erwartet ist diese Preistransmission asymmetrisch, 
wobei Preissenkungen schneller übertragen werden als Preissteigerungen. Im Falle 
Tansanias  lassen die Ergebnisse keinerlei Verbesserungen der Preistransmission 
nach den ökonomischen Reformen erkennen. Ähnliche Resultate zeigen die 
Untersuchungen der Preisvolatilität. Die ökonomischen Reformen führten zu einem 
Anstieg der Preisvolatilität von Kaffee in Sambia, wobei negative Schocks volatilere 
Preise verursachten als positive Schocks. Im Gegensatz dazu haben die 
inkonsistenten Marktreformen in Tansania keinerlei signifikante Auswirkungen auf die 
Preisvolatilität von Kaffee gehabt. Die Studie über die Reaktion des Kaffeeangebotes 
in Sambia zeigt, dass Kaffeepreise auf lange Sicht einen negativen, wenn auch nicht 
signifikanten Einfluss auf das Angebot haben. Dies könnte daran liegen, dass Kaffee 
einen beständigen Ertrag liefert, sodass das Angebot den Markt genau dann erreicht, 
wenn die Preise fallen. Jedoch ist auf kurze Sicht die Reaktion des Kaffeeangebotes 
nur bei Preissenkungen signifikant, was darauf hindeutet, dass das Kaffeeangebot 
bezüglich Preisänderungen schneller fällt als dass es steigt. Auf der anderen Seite 
reagiert das Angebot negativ auf eine stärkere lokale Währung und auf den Preis von 
Mais, der als Hauptkonkurrenzprodukt betrachtet werden kann. Jedoch hatten die 
ökonomischen Reformen der 1990er Jahre in Sambia einen positiven Einfluss auf 
das Kaffeeangebot.  
 
Aus den Ergebnissen lassen sich insofern wichtige politische Implikationen ableiten, 
als dass sie eine kurze und effiziente Wertschöpfungskette und eine 
Regierungsstruktur offenbaren, die es den Produzenten ermöglicht,  größere Anteile 
des endgültigen Kaffeepreises zu erhalten. Des Weiteren werden mit Hilfe der 
Ergebnisse wünschenswerte politische Maßnahmen diskutiert. Diese beschäftigen 
 xiii 
sich mit einer verbesserten Transmission von den Weltpreisen hin zu den 
Produzentenpreisen im Zuge der Zeitspanne nach den ökonomischen Reformen, 
obwohl die Preistransmission asymmetrisch bleibt. Auch wenn eine effiziente 
Preistransmission den Landwirten kurzfristig Nachteile erbringt, da die 
Produzentenpreise volatilen Weltpreisen ausgesetzt sind, so kann sie langfristig 
dennoch das erwünschte Ergebnis erzielen. Ferner zeigen die Ergebnisse wie 
wichtig hohe und stabile Preise und eine stabile Währung hinsichtlich eines 
gesteigerten Kaffeeangebotes sind.  
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Chapter 1 
 
General Introduction 
___________________________________________________________________ 
1.1 Problem Setting and Motivation 
 
Coffee is a commodity of critical economic importance in many African countries, 
such that even countries like Zambia and Tanzania that have very small shares of the 
world market depend highly on it for foreign exchange and rural employment. Coffee 
remains the most traded commodity by poor countries with a global annual export of 
438,000 metric tonnes in 2010 (FAO, 2010). Export values ranged between $5 billion 
and $12 billion between 1997 and 2005 (ICO, 2007). Over 2.25 billion cups of coffee 
are consumed per day (approximately 800 billion cups per year) by 40 per cent of the 
world’s population mainly in the industrialized countries. It is also estimated that more 
than 25 million people are directly employed in the coffee sector worldwide (Ponte, 
2004). However, despite its economic importance, the performance of the industry in 
the producing countries and the impact on the incomes and welfare of the producers 
has been unsatisfactory (Oxfam, 2002a). Past research shows that the more 
dependent the country is on coffee exports the lower the per capita income (Fitter 
and Kamplinsky, 2002). Actually, coffee producer prices showed the greatest fall 
during the last 20 years, as prices of major agricultural commodities fell between 50 
and 86 per cent (Slob, 2006).  
 
During the same period, global coffee markets have transformed rapidly. The 
emergence of new consumption patterns such as ‘ethical consumerism’ have not 
only increased demand for specialty and high quality coffee, but also given rise to 
new governance structures along value chains. Large transnational corporations 
increasingly coordinate and control production and processing in an effort to satisfy 
changing consumer preferences. However, firm consolidation at roasting and retailing 
stages of the coffee value chains has given rise to oligopoly and monopsony powers, 
with a few firms setting standards and virtually determining producer prices (Ponte, 
2002a). Conversely, aggregated producer power which was reflected in coffee 
marketing boards in most producing countries, has weakened substantially following 
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the abolishment of marketing boards as part of market liberalisation policies. 
Kaplinsky (2004) argues that bargaining power shifted from the poor producers to 
international traders and roasters.  
 
Market liberalisation has also led to more efficient pass through of prices from world 
prices to producer prices in almost all coffee producing countries, however, the 
transmission is mostly asymmetric, such that price decreases are transmitted faster 
than price increases (Krivonos, 2004). The improvement in price transmission has, 
nevertheless, exposed producers to the high volatility of world prices. Empirical 
research by Fortenbery and Zapata (2004) confirms that price risk for coffee is even 
higher for smaller export countries (like Zambia) than in the overall sector. The 
authors argue that the choice of an effective price risk management strategy can be 
challenging for low-volume producing countries because they lack the capacity to 
influence prices.  
 
Valid concerns have been raised regarding the changing power structure in the 
coffee industry including the increasing market power of international traders, the 
asymmetries in the price transmission, the declining producer prices and the 
extensive short-term producer price volatility (Kaplinsky; 2004, Oxfam, 2002a; Bacon, 
2004; Slob, 2006). Many researchers are concerned about the effects of these 
factors on the livelihoods of the producers as well as on long-term coffee production. 
In countries like Zambia and Tanzania, investment in coffee production declined 
considerably in the last decade, a probable consequence of declining and volatile 
prices. In some cases farmers have resolved to uprooting coffee trees replacing them 
with food crops like maize (Baffes, 2005). In Tanzania’s case, coffee revenue 
declined from $200 million in the late 1980s to less than $50 million in the 2004 
(Pirotte et. al, 2006). For Zambia, exports declined substantially from 6,700 metric 
tonnes in 2004 to less than 2,000 metric tonnes by 2009 (see Figure 1.1 and Figure 
1.2). Several large coffee estates in Zambia have closed down, leaving a large rural 
population out of seasonal or permanent employment. At the global level, coffee 
production has been increasing at declining rates of 0.5 percent between 1998 and 
2010 from 1.7 percent rate in the previous decade (FAO, 2010). Roasters and 
retailers are unable to find enough quantities of some coffee varieties needed for 
certain coffee blends.  
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Figure 1.1: Tanzania coffee production export and value  
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Source: Own Presentation based on Data from FAO and TCB 
 
Figure 1.2: Coffee production, exports and value for Zambia 
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Source: Own Presentation based on data from Zambia Coffee Growers Association (ZCGA) 
 
Value chain approach has become an increasingly useful approach to gain a 
comprehensive view of the structure and barriers in commodity markets. As a result, 
the body of literature on Global Value Chains (GVC) has expanded considerably in 
the last two decades. Much empirical and conceptual analysis has focused on chain 
governance and producer upgrading (Gereffi, et. et, 2005; Schmitz, 2004; Ponte 
2004; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2005), market power and distribution of gains (Talbot, 
1997a; Pelupessy, 2001; Fitter and Kaplinsky, 2001; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001; 
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Gilbert, 2006; Swinnen et. al, 2007), standards (Ponte, 2004) and more recently, fair 
trade (Slob, 2006; Kamplinsky, 2006). This study relates to this body of literature in 
examining the effects of value chain and governance structures on producer prices. 
Further, the study examines coffee price transmission, volatility and supply response 
in order to provide a wider perspective of understanding nature and effects of 
producer price changes.  
 
While many studies have examined the international coffee market structure 
including supply and demand elasticity, empirical evidence on asymmetric coffee 
price transmission and volatility is limited. Krivonos (2004) and Warako (2008) 
examine asymmetric price transmission in the coffee market using the Houck (1977) 
model, where dummy variables for price increases and price decreases are 
introduced. This method can be misleading in cases where agents do not adjust 
prices immediately but only do so when the price change reaches a certain threshold.  
In reality, price adjusting costs, such as menu or communication costs, prevent 
agents from adjusting continuously until the price difference between two markets 
reach a certain threshold. A similar argument can be applied to supply response 
analysis, where for example, changes in prices must reach a certain threshold before 
inducing a change in supply of a commodity. This study applies Threshold 
Autoregression (TAR) class of models that enable the identification of thresholds in 
the analysis of asymmetric price transmission. Von Cramon and Meyer (2000) 
applied TAR models to commodity price transmission, but they used zero as a 
threshold.  TAR model with threshold equal to zero does not display a significant 
degree of asymmetry, and ignore the possibility that the threshold could be different 
from zero (Enders, 2004). Enders (2004) also mentions that, a non-zero threshold 
has more advantages in that it captures strategic behaviours and adjustment costs 
that are rarely observed with small changes.  
 
Most price transmission studies also overlook the possibility of structural breaks in 
unit root hypothesis testing. Several researchers including Perron (1989), Zivot and 
Andrews (1992), Lumsdaine and Papel (1997), Lee and Strazicich’s, (2003) and 
Narayan and Smyth (2005) found evidence of false non-rejection of the null 
hypothesis in the traditional Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) 
after applying structural break unit root models to systems which are actually 
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stationary with structural breaks. Glynn et al. (2007) discussed two advantages of 
applying structural break unit root testing: First, it prevents test results that are biased 
towards non-rejection.  Second, since the procedures can identify when the possible 
presence of structural break occurred, it provides valuable information for analysing 
whether a structural break on a certain variable is associated with a particular 
government policy, economic crisis, regime shifts or other factors. Besides, structural 
breaks can lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis of symmetric transmission 
more often than appropriate (von Cramon-Taubadel and Meyer, 2000). These are 
some of the critical overlooked aspects in price transmission studies that are 
addressed in this study.  Overall, this study expands the existing literature on 
agricultural commodity prices by taking into account value chain structures, threshold 
price movements and endogenous structural breaks in order to contribute to more 
effective and efficient policy formulation.  
 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
 
The aim of this study is to examine coffee producer price movements for Zambia and 
Tanzania, and to establish the effect of those price changes on coffee supply. To this 
effect, four specific objectives have been identified: 
 
i. Investigate coffee value chains and governance structures and the 
implications on producer price changes in the two countries.  
ii. Evaluate the effects of trade policy changes on world-to-producer price 
transmission, taking into account threshold price movements. 
iii. Measure and explain coffee price volatility with respect to coffee market 
liberalisation policies.   
iv. Examine supply response of coffee to price movements in Zambia. 
Compared to Tanzania, Zambia’s coffee production declined significantly in 
the last five years.  
 
The first objective is addressed using a global value chain analysis approach with a 
focus on governance structures at both the international and the local market levels. 
The second objective is tackled using threshold cointegration and error correction 
models. The issue is whether coffee prices from world markets are symmetrically 
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transmitted to producers, and how the economic reforms have changed the nature of 
the price transmission.  GARCH models are used to address the third objective with 
due attention to asymmetric volatility using threshold GARCH models. The fourth 
objective is also dealt with using threshold cointegration and error correction models 
in order to take into account potentially asymmetric effects of coffee prices on coffee 
supply. 
 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
 
A key challenge facing most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is achieving sustainable 
economic growth sufficient enough to reduce or even eliminate poverty. Given the 
abundant land and a tropical climate suitable for most agricultural production, 
sustainable economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa can be achieved through 
enhanced agricultural production and exports. Stable prices that enable farmers to 
efficiently plan production are essential for sustainable success of the agricultural 
industry. Given that the coffee value chain is buyer-driven, most growers are 
basically price takers. It is, therefore, important that policy makers and farmers in the 
producing countries understand how the value chain they feed into operates, how 
this influences producer prices, how producer prices respond to changes in other 
markets, and how this affects supply. Understanding these factors become critical for 
the development of policy interventions – especially those related to price risk 
management strategies.  
 
This study is novel in several aspects: First, it is the very first study to examine the 
coffee industry from an economic perspective in Zambia. Coffee has received very 
little attention from researchers and policy makers despite having potential for 
improving economic diversification in Zambia’s copper dominated economy. Second, 
this paper extensively employs the analysis of value chains and governance 
structure, which are critical elements in understanding efficiency and distributional 
effects. Third, although the literature on asymmetric price transmission has increased 
in the recent past, this is one of the few studies that apply threshold cointegration 
models to coffee price transmission. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
study that applies threshold cointegration to a supply response model. Moreover, this 
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is also the only study that uses structural break unit root tests in the analysis of coffee 
price transmission.  
 
1.4 Hypotheses 
 
To achieve the study objectives, various hypotheses concerning coffee price 
transmission and supply response have been formulated based on previous 
theoretical and empirical findings in the economic literature. The hypotheses are 
listed below: 
 
i. Market liberalisation policies induce closer cointegration relationships 
between coffee producer prices and world prices, but lead to high price 
volatility. 
ii. Considering the high concentration of firms in the international coffee 
markets, coffee price transmission from the world market to producers is 
asymmetric where agents pass on price decreases faster than price 
increases, such that negative shocks to coffee prices are more persistent 
than positive shocks.  
iii. Negative price shocks induce higher price volatility at producer level than 
at world market.  
iv. An increase in coffee prices lead to an increase in coffee supply, but the 
response is asymmetric, where supply responds more to negative price 
shocks than to positive price shocks 
 
1.5 Data Sources  
 
The main source of data was the International Coffee Organisation (ICO). The ICO 
was set up in London in 1963 under the auspice of United Nations because of the 
great economic importance of coffee. As the main inter-governmental organisation for 
coffee, one of the activities of ICO is providing information on the world coffee sector 
by means of statistics and market studies (ICO, 2010). The organisation collects 
average price data from member countries and compiles daily, monthly, quarterly and 
annually. Additional data was obtained from Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations (FAO), Zambia Central Statistics Office (ZCSO), Tanzania Central 
 8
Statistics Office (TCSO) and the Zambia Coffee Growers Association (ZCGA). 
Comprehensive background information on coffee production in Zambia and in the 
region was obtained during a research stay at the Coffee Board of Zambia and the 
ZCGA in September 2009.  
 
1.6 Coffee Production in Tanzania and Zambia- an Overview 
 
Tanzania is located in Eastern Africa bordering Kenya and Uganda in the north, 
Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique in the South and Congo DR, Rwanda and Burundi 
in the west. To the east lie the Indian Ocean and the islands of Pemba, Zanzibar and 
Mafia. Tanzania’s population is estimated to be 30 million, 80 per cent of which is 
engaged in agriculture. Agriculture remains the backbone of Tanzania’s economy 
accounting for 50 percent of GDP and 40 percent of the exports. As the largest sector 
in the economy, agriculture has a significant effect on national revenues, household 
incomes and poverty levels. The sector is dominated by small-holder farmers 
cultivating average farm sizes of 0.9 hectares to 0.3 hectares. Approximately 5.1 
million hectares (85 percent of the total arable land) is under food crop production 
composed of mainly maize, sorghum, wheat, millet, rice, beans, plantain (bananas), 
potatoes, and cassava.  Tanzania also produces a variety of agricultural export crops 
such as coffee, cotton, cashew nut, tobacco, sisal, tea and some horticultural crops.   
 
Coffee is the main export crop being the country’s second largest export after the 
mining industry. Tanzania is actually the fourth largest producer of coffee in Africa 
after Ethiopia, Uganda and Ivory Coast. Coffee, which was introduced as an estate 
crop in the 1920s, is now largely cultivated by Tanzania’s small-scale farmers. It is 
estimated that more than 400,000 small-holder farmers are responsible for growing 
94 percent of Tanzania’s coffee, and derive most of their livelihoods from coffee. 
Approximately, 160,000 hectares of land is under coffee cultivation in Tanzania’s 
main coffee growing areas of Kilimanjaro, Arusha, Mbeya, Kigoma and Kagera 
(Newmann, 2006). Robusta coffee, which makes up approximately 30 percent of 
Tanzania’s coffee production, is mainly grown in Kagera, while the rest of the regions 
grow Arabica. Up to 75 percent of Tanzania’s coffee is exported to Germany, 
Netherlands and Japan. Despite its connection to niche markets like Japan, 
Tanzania’s coffee has suffered from very low prices compared to other countries in 
 9
the region. Tanzania’s price trends in the last 20 years have been far below the world 
prices (see Figure 2.2 of Chapter 2). One of the consequences of low prices has 
been the abandonment of coffee production in preference to maize. As a result, the 
country’s coffee exports reduced significantly from 36 percent of the total exports in 
1985, down to 17 percent  in 2004 (Pirotte et. al., 2006).  
 
Turning to Zambia, the country is located in South-central Africa. Zambia is 
completely land locked and covers an area of 752,612 square kilometres. It is 
bordered by Botswana and Zimbabwe to the south, Malawi and Mozambique to the 
East, Tanzania to the north, Namibia and Angola to the south west and Congo to the 
North West. Zambia has a population of 12 million (2006 estimates), which is almost 
three times smaller than Tanzania’s population.  
 
Agriculture contributes only 18 per cent to GDP despite employing 60 per cent of the 
population. The economy of Zambia is heavily dependent on its mining activities 
(mainly copper), which constitute 78 per cent of all exports. The lack of economic 
diversity subjects Zambia to economic shocks arsing from fluctuating copper prices. 
Consequently, poverty levels remain high; with 63.8 per cent of the population living 
below the poverty line (2004 estimation).  
 
Coffee in Zambia is one of the crops that the Government introduced in the late 
1970s as a non-traditional export crop in order to implement the export diversification 
policy that aimed at moving away from complete reliance on copper exports.  
Specifically, the crop was introduced as an estate crop and is still largely produced by 
large-scale farmers, who also go into contractual arrangements with small-scale 
farmers. It is estimated that 99 percent of Zambia’s coffee comes from large-scale 
estates, while the 150 small-scale farmers only contribute 1 percent. Coffee is mainly 
grown in the Northern Province (close to Tanzania) in the high altitude rural districts 
of Kasama, Isoka, and Nakonde. Large estates are also found on the copper-belt 
province and in the southern province areas around Mazabuka District. Currently only 
3,100 ha of land is under coffee cultivation in Zambia, which is relatively small 
compared to other countries in Eastern and Southern Africa. 
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Although Zambia remains a very small coffee producing country contributing only 
0.02 percent to the world market, its coffee industry is probably the second 
agricultural industry with a large workforce employing between 17,000 and 15,000 
seasonal workers in the rural areas (ZCGA, 2007). In 1984, Zambia was allowed to 
become a member of the ICO on grounds that it would grow and export high quality 
washed Arabica coffee, which was by then in short supply (ZCGA, 2007). Zambia’s 
coffee production rose from about 1,600 metric tonnes in 1995/96 to almost 7,000 
metric tonnes in 2005/06, but then declined significantly to less than 2,000 metric 
tonnes in 2008/09 (see Figure 2.4 of Chapter 2). Various factors have been 
associated with the drastic decline in Zambia’s coffee supply including depressed 
world green coffee prices between 2000 and 2005, the lack of long term finance, the 
appreciation of the Kwacha (Zambian currency) and a drought in 2004. Given that 
the coffee trees take up to four years before the first harvest, the current low 
production could largely be a consequence of farmers’ low investment in planting and 
crop management during the price decline and drought periods. 
  
To conclude, the coffee industry in both countries seems to face a number of 
challenges. First, being a perennial crop, the revenue is not realised immediately 
compared to alternative cash crops like tobacco, cotton, beans, groundnuts, maize 
and horticultural production. Even when the plant becomes productive and remains 
so for fifteen to twenty-five years, farmers are unable to predict future prices. As a 
consequence, some tend to uproot the coffee plants replacing them with other crops. 
Second, since coffee is not produced for the local market, farmers rely on various 
supply chains to access the export markets in the high income countries. The 
consistence and reliability of these supply chains remains uncertain to the farmers. 
Further, poor infrastructure in the rural areas, where coffee is mostly produced, leads 
to high transaction costs making arbitrage difficult as well as hindering the flow of 
price information. There is also a lack of literature on the economic aspects of the 
commodity, particularly for Zambia because coffee is a relatively new and a very 
small sector; therefore, having no basis for policy formulation and farmers’ decision 
making.  
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1.7 Organization of the Thesis  
 
The next chapter describes the influence of value chains and chain governance 
structures’ on producer prices in Tanzania and Zambia. This chapter is generally 
descriptive relying on past studies as well as information gathered during the author’s 
four-week research stay at the Coffee Board of Zambia and the Zambia Coffee 
Growers Association. Chapter 3 examines price transmission between coffee 
producer prices for Tanzania and Zambia and world coffee producer prices over a 
period of 20 years using monthly price data. Chapter 4 is dedicated to price volatility 
analysis for the two countries. This chapter focuses on the influence of market 
policies on price volatility.  In order to have a wider view of volatility in other markets, 
the chapter compares the volatility at the producer level with the volatility at the retail 
level using coffee retail prices in Germany. Monthly price data is also used for this 
analysis. Chapter 5 examines coffee supply response to coffee price instability in 
Zambia.  Other variables that play a role in coffee supply such as prices of alternative 
crops, real exchange rates and economic reforms are also included. The chapter 
generally focuses on Zambia, which has high price instability and a large price range 
over the period under consideration. Chapter 6 concludes and makes some 
recommendations for policy formulation.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Policy reforms and Governance Structures in Coffee Value Chains: 
A study of Zambia and Tanzania 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract 
 
Coffee, one of the most governed commodity value chains, demonstrates a high 
asymmetric power structure which has raised contentious debate with regards to rent 
distribution, producer prices and consequently producer welfare. This paper, applies 
the concept of ‘Governance in Value Chains’ to understand how coffee value chains 
are coordinated and how this can have a strong bearing on small scale producer 
prices in Africa. The study notes that coffee producers in Zambia and Tanzania find 
themselves in captive relations, where lead firms (the roasters) set the rules under 
which the growers operate. The cost of switching to other buyers is high, and moving 
vertically up the value chains is hindered by barriers set by the actors at those levels. 
In theory, high coordination leads to unequal profit distribution along the chain, while 
a large number of intermediaries in such consumer-driven chains lead to lower 
producer prices. According to the findings of this study, the highly coordinated and 
more complex value chain in Tanzania’s coffee sector dominated by small-scale 
farmers, explains Tanzania’s low producer prices to a large extent. In contrast, a less 
complex value chain governance structure in Zambia’s case has enabled the farmers 
to receive high prices. The paper concludes that, the current two-tier private 
cooperative union structure for small-scale farmers in Tanzania, if well managed, can 
raise coffee incomes through value adding and a stronger bargaining power. This 
would result in more balanced power symmetry along the chains.  
 
Key Words:  Value Chains, Governance, Coffee Producer Prices, Zambia, Tanzania 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Coffee is an important foreign exchange earner in most African countries. In Zambia 
and Tanzania, like in many other producing countries, the coffee sector has 
undergone significant structural changes following economic liberalization. This has 
brought about shifts in the control and coordination of the value chains, 
fundamentally moving away from government controlled chains, through various 
marketing boards, to private sector driven chains through Transnational Co-
operations (TNC). Whilst these changes have led to more efficient markets in the 
case of Zambia, where 99 percent of the crop is produced by large-scale farmers, 
there has been disappointing sectoral performance in  Tanzania, where 94 percent of 
the crop comes from small holder farmers (Bargawi,2008).  
 
Market liberalization in Tanzania has induced a private sector influx in the coffee 
industry giving rise to the number of intermediaries in the value chain, each 
demanding a share of the export price. In some cases, the removal of marketing 
services by the cooperatives has left even the smallest farmer to deal with large TNC, 
and at the same time exposing producer prices to global price volatility (Kaplinsky, 
2006). In contrast, while coffee retail prices in the importing countries have been 
escalating, producer prices have not increased at the same rate, creating a widening 
gap which has raised wide concerns among researchers (e.g. Ponte, 2004; 
Kaplinsky, 2004; Slob, 2006). However, the effects of the new global and local value 
chain governance structures on coffee producer prices remains less investigated. As 
Schmitz (2001) explains; there is limited knowledge on how trade is organized and 
how this affects the producers.  
 
The current tendency towards firm concentration in the high income countries, the 
differentiation of products, the increased number of standards and the new marketing 
strategies have attracted attention in coffee value chain studies (see e.g. Ponte, 
2004: Slob, 2006). These factors have been associated with globalisation, which has 
seen TNC moving from local to global sourcing. Governance, which describes both 
power relations in commodity value chains and the institutions which mould and wield 
this power, has, therefore, become a distinctive feature in value chains (Moris and 
Kaplinsky, 2004). According to Swinnen et. al. (2007), “the governance of food 
markets and commodity chains is a crucial element for efficiency and distributional 
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effects, and that chain governance becomes endogenous in an environment of weak 
enforcement and imperfect markets.”  
 
The coffee value chain is among the highly governed commodity chains due to a 
number of factors. First, its market is highly concentrated especially at the trading 
and roasting stages, creating imperfect markets.1 Gilbert (2007) observes that, while 
the coffee value chain is relatively simple, there is considerable concentration at the 
later stages of the value chain giving rise to potential exercise of monopoly and 
monopsony powers. Second, as chain governance largely depends on the value in 
the chain (Swinnen, 2007), it is likely to be high for coffee given its value relative to 
other agricultural export commodities. Third, coffee has a production-consumption 
pattern whereby production takes place mainly in developing countries while 
consumption is mainly in rich countries.2  This implies that coffee producers depend 
on established supply networks to access the markets in consuming countries.  
 
Most coffee producers, especially in Africa are predominantly small-scale farmers, 
cultivating on less than 5 hectares. Farmers are mostly located in isolated remote 
areas (Ponte, 2002a, 2002b), such that a direct link between producers and 
consumers in rich countries does not exist. Given their small scale, they are required 
to sell through a complex of intermediaries that includes local traders, exporters, 
international traders, roasters and retailers before getting to the consumer. In view of 
the complexity of the coffee value chain and the increasing fragmentation in the 
geographies of coffee production, chain governance has strengthened in the last two 
decades (Bacon, 2004).  
 
The distribution of rents along the chain and subsequent effect on the incomes and 
welfare of small-scale farmers as well as on the export revenues of the producing 
                                                 
1
 By 2007, almost 40% of the global trade was being controlled by four companies: Neumann Kaffee Gruppe (A 
German Group with operations in 17 coffee producing countries): Volcafe Agroindustrial Corp Ltd (A Swiss-
Spanish Group with commercial operations in 13 coffee exporting countries); Dreyfus (a Global Conglomerate 
Group with operations in more than 53 countries and is engaged in processing, trading and merchandising a 
range of agricultural commodities).   
At Roasting stage, 4 roasters control 45% of the global market: Nestle SA (Switzerland), Kraft Foods Inc (USA) 
Procter & Gamble (USA) and Sara Lee Corporation (USA) which also brands as Douwe Egberts in Europe. 
 
2
 Europe accounts for 40% of the global coffee demand. The US accounts for 24% while Japan just over 10% 
(Fitter and Kaplinsky, 2001). More than 70% of the world’s coffee is produced in Latin America, Asia and Africa 
(Oxfam, 2001). 
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countries has raised concerns among researchers in recent years (see e.g Bargawi 
2008; Pelupessy, 2001; Kaplinsky, 2004; Oxfam, 2001; Ponte; 2002a; 2002b; 2004; 
Slob, 2006). Most studies argue that the largest shares of value chain rents accrue to 
the chain actors outside the producing countries, mainly to international traders, 
roasters and manufacturers/retailers (see Oxfam, 2002a, Bacon, 2004). While an 
average of 20 percent of total income was retained by producers in the 1970s, in 
2003/2004 only an average of 13 percent was retained and the remaining 78 percent 
accumulated in the consuming countries (Ponte, 2004).  
 
Large amount of work has been done on coffee markets, especially on the effects of 
deteriorating and volatile prices on the welfare of the producers (e.g. Ponte, 2004; 
Kaplinsky, 2004; Slob, 2006). However, literature focusing on issues of governance 
in coffee value chains, which may well provide insights into price movements and the 
distribution of rents along the chain and consequent effects on producer welfare, is 
limited. The study by Muradian and Pelupessy (2005) attempted to examine 
governance in coffee value chains focusing on the role of voluntary regulatory 
systems. The current paper focuses on changes in governance structures in coffee 
value chains and how this affects rent distribution along the chain, and subsequent 
effects on small-scale producer prices. The paper applies a global value chain 
approach because it enables us to decompose the total value chain returns into 
those arising from, for example, production, marketing, roasting and retailing. 
Essentially, we are able to explain how the returns accrue to which actors in the 
chain, and why. We hypothesise that, governance in value chains is a concealed 
factor, yet it has significant bearing on rent distribution and subsequently on producer 
prices.  Because it is a concealed factor in value chains, we observe that governance 
has been less investigated especially with regards to the coffee sector. As Newman 
(2005) explains, the understanding of factors behind changes in distribution of rents 
along commodity chains is critical to understanding the mechanisms of price 
determination in commodity markets. Similarly, Fitter and Kamplinsky (2001) argue 
that, entry into global markets that allows for sustainable income growth requires 
knowledge of dynamic factors within the whole value chain and not only profit 
margins. 
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For this study, we refer to two countries in Eastern and Southern Africa: Tanzania 
and Zambia. The rationale behind the selection of the two countries is to compare the 
types of value chains and governance forms between two different scales of coffee 
production. While Tanzania’s coffee is predominantly grown by small-scale farmers, 
Zambia, a neighbouring country to Tanzania, has 99 percent of the coffee grown on 
large estates. In fact, Zambia is a unique case in Africa where coffee production has 
barely been adopted by small-scale farmers. Second, Coffee marketing in Zambia is 
completely liberalised where producers sell directly to roasters. On the other hand, 
although Tanzania had liberalised its domestic coffee markets in the mid-1990s, 
cooperative unions still dominate the industry, with high government regulation 
through the Tanzania Coffee Board (TCB). The TCB is also mandated to conduct all 
coffee auctions (see Ponte, 2002; Baffes, 2005). Examining the two countries, with 
different scales of coffee production and different degrees and trajectories of market 
liberalisation, ensures a wider viewpoint.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two draws attention to the 
theory of value chains and governance in order to provide a background for 
understanding how coffee value chains operate and how they are governed. A 
description of international coffee markets and governance in value chains is then 
given in section three. In section four, we discuss Zambia and Tanzania coffee 
production and marketing focusing on how they fit into the global coffee value chains 
and how they are governed. In section five, we discuss and make conclusions on 
some constraints and opportunities for coffee producers based on how the value 
chain and governance theory relates to the situation in coffee markets in the two 
countries. Section six provides some policy recommendations.  
 
2.2 Background Information on Value Chain Analysis and Governance 
2.2.1 The Value Chain Theory 
 
The literature on value chains has expanded considerably both empirically and 
theoretically in last two decades. The theory of value chains can be traced back from 
Wallerstein’s concept of “world systems approach” to economic analysis (Wallerstein 
1974). Later, Porter (1985), took an intra-firm approach and introduced a new area of 
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attention, focusing on interrelations between intra-firm activities and resources that 
bring a product to its final form.  According to Porter’s definition, value chains are 
“systems of interrelated economic activities” within a firm. Based on Porter’s theory, 
economists embraced an inter-firm approach involving an analysis of whole range of 
activities and actors from production to consumption. A broader approach was 
necessary as more firms began to specialise in specific production activities linked to 
activities by other firms. In view of these developments, researchers like Gereffi 
(1994) suggested a Global Value Chain (GVC) approach, which has formed a 
foundation for most current value chain analyses. For example, Gilbert (2006) defines 
a value chain as “consisting of full range of interrelated productive activities 
performed by firms in different geographical locations to bring out a product or a 
service from conception to complete production and delivery to the final consumers.” 
A global value chain, therefore, consists of multiple business partners across 
countries that add on to the value that is ultimately presented to the buying public 
(Gereffi, 1994).  
 
Value chain analysis considers issues of market power, regulation and supply chain 
restructuring to study their implications upstream. The difference between a value 
chain and a supply chain analysis is that the value chain analysis is concerned with 
the added value at each node of the chain and how the actors interrelate in adding 
value. Supply chain analysis, on the other hand, is only concerned about how goods 
move from one actor to another.  
 
Gereffi (1994) and Gereffi et. al. (2005) identify three key dimensions of commodity 
chains: i) the input-output structure and geographical coverage; ii) the form of 
governance; and iii) the institutional framework.  While the input-output structure and 
the geographical structure help us understand the processing of the commodity and 
transaction costs, chain governance explains the level of firm concentration, 
providing insights into market power.  
 
2.2.2 Theory of Governance in Value Chains 
 
Governance in value chains is best described in terms of control and coordination of 
activities in the chain. The question of who coordinates and controls the value chain 
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and how the chains are coordinated and controlled could partly be understood 
through the two broad categories of value chains: i) ‘producer-driven’ value chain, in 
which the key governors are producers (suppliers) embedded in the production chain 
and commanding core technologies and; ii) the ‘buyer-driven’ value chain, where the 
reins of power are held by the key buyers also referred to as lead firms (Gereffi, 
1994; 2005). These categories determine the nature of the access of producers to 
final consumers. While producer-driven chains focus on attaining economies of scale, 
buyer driven chains are characterised by domination of retail companies and brand-
named merchandise. The key buyers or lead firms determine the nature of access of 
producers to final consumers. Hence they are the ‘governors’ of the chain. The 
decisions of lead firms (governors) create winners and losers in an industry. For 
example, research on the UK-Africa horticulture chain suggests that small growers 
are marginalised not because of the efficiency advantage of large growers but 
because of the lead firms’ sourcing strategies (Oxfam, 2002b). Traceability is critical 
for the lead firms if they are to meet health, safety, environmental, and labour 
standards demanded by consumers, NGOs and government agencies (Dolan and 
Humphrey, 2000; 2004). Small farmers often cannot get into these export markets 
because they cannot meet the demand for traceability. 
 
According to Humphrey and Schmitz (2001), the concept of governance is central to 
the global value chain approach as the term is used to express that some firms in the 
chain set and/or enforce parameters under which others in the chain operate. These 
parameters are: 1) what to produce? Referring to product design and specifications; 
2) how to produce it? This involves the definition of production process, which can 
include elements such as the technology to be used, quality systems, labour 
standards and environmental standards; 3) how much to produce? and; 4) when to 
produce? This is basically production scheduling and logistics. These parameters 
help to understand the influences of chain governance on producer activities.  
 
In view of variations of types of value chains and the chain actors, distinguishing 
between forms of governance (type of relationship) that exists within a particular 
chain becomes vital in value chain analysis. Gereffi et. al. (2005) and Schmitz (2004) 
distinguish between four types of chain relationships in global value chains: The first 
is “arm’s length” market relations, where enterprises deal with each other in “arms 
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length” transactions. Maradian and Pelupessy (2005) posited that this form of 
governance is no more than market transaction where coordination is low or missing. 
There is low information exchange mediated only by prices and standard attributes of 
products. Parties can easily switch to other commercial partners because the cost of 
switching is very low (Gereffi, 2005). However, high power asymmetry in the case of 
oligopoly and monopsony is likely to exist in market transactions, even when there is 
no coordination (Maradian and Pellupessy, 2005). The second category is “balance 
networks,” where enterprises co-operate and have complementary competences but 
have no control over each other. According to Maradian and Pelupessy (2005), 
balance networks are characterised by low monitoring costs for buyers and low costs 
of switching to other commercial partners (both for buyers and suppliers). The third 
category is “captive networks” in which lead firms set parameters under which others 
in the chain operate – this relationship is quasi-hierarchical (Gereffi et al, 2005). 
According to authors, suppliers in captive networks face significant switching costs 
and are, therefore, held ‘captive’. These relationships are characterised by a high 
degree of monitoring. Besides, captive suppliers are confined to a narrow range of 
tasks and are dependant on the lead firm for complementary activities. In this case 
mutual dependence is likely.  The fourth category of chain relationships is “hierarchy 
governance,” where the lead firm takes direct ownership of some operations in the 
chain. The case of intra-firm trade between transactional companies and their 
subsidiaries falls into this category.  
 
Recently a term referred to as “homologation” has been closely linked to global 
governance in value chains. The term refers to a system, where uniform global rules 
are applied to the small-scale producers by the lead firms. These rules include quality 
measures, specific grades of products and environmental standards. Kamplinsky 
(2004) argues that these rules govern the integration of small producers into the 
global value chain.  
 
It is also important to note that, in addition to lead firms’ governance, there are 
several agents external to the chain that regulate product design and manufacture, 
not only with a view to consumer safety, but also to create transparent markets (e.g. 
by defining standard weights and sizes, technical norms). It is argued that, where 
clearly defined standards and systems are enforced (for example, certification 
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systems) the need for governance by lead firms is reduced (Swinnen, 2007). Instead 
of monitoring performance along the chain, buyers can rely upon external monitoring 
and verification to guarantee product and process standards. In many cases, network 
actors control opportunism through the effects of repeat transaction and reputation 
that are embedded in particular geographic location or social groups (Gereffi et. al, 
2005).   
 
2.2.3 Theory of Income Distribution in Value Chain 
 
The theory of income distribution along value chains is adequately explained in 
Schumpeter’s theory of entrepreneurship and barriers to entry (Schumpeter, 1961).  
According to Schumpeter’s theory, “the ability to insulate activities can be 
encapsulated by the concept of rent, which arises from the possession of scarce 
attributes and involves barriers to entry” and that “scarcity can be constructed 
through purposive action. In that way, an entrepreneurial surplus can accrue to those 
who create this scarcity.” This implies that, the primary returns to value chain rents 
accrue to those parties, who are able to protect themselves by creating barriers to 
entry. Thus, income growth can be sustained through an enduring barrier to entry for 
some chain activities. This is closely related to roasters and manufacturers in coffee 
value chains. The changes in governance structure of the chain are a result of 
struggle for rents as actors attempt to increase the income and profit derived by 
participation (Muradian and Pelupessy. 2005). Thus the degree of vertical 
coordination in supply chains influences economic outcomes, in particular efficiency 
and equity (Swinnen et. al, 2007).  Besides, this could also lead to a large value 
added accumulating in those segments obtaining a lower share of the total retail 
value through producer upgrading. Rents can be related to product and marketing, 
technology, financial, resource, infrastructural and policy (Newman 2005).   
 
In this study, the focus is on governance in coffee value chains because it determines 
the extent to which producers can participate in the chain. For example, involvement 
in roasting adds value to green coffee. Schmitz (2005) explains that working to the 
specifications of large global buyers often provides a fast track to upgrading 
processing and products. This subsequently influences the price of a commodity. In 
addition, the forms of governance in value chains determine the speed and 
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magnitude of price transmission along the chain. As North (1995) argues, price 
formation and transmission are not only influenced by supply and demand but also 
institutional structures. If market institutions allow efficient transmission of price, 
producers can then take advantage of the opportunities to increase their production. 
Therefore, the analysis of forms of governance in value chains establishes the 
industry’s attractiveness and provides insights into how prices will evolve in the 
future.  
 
2.3 Coffee International Markets  
 
Coffee is possibly the most traded perennial crop in the world. The commodity is 
broadly categorised into two species: Arabica (Coffea Arabica) and Robusta (Coffea 
Conefora). The beans of the two varieties differ  considerably in taste and flavour. 
Arabica bean is considered to produce better quality coffee than the Robusta bean, 
and therefore, fetches a higher price (Figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1: Arabica and Robusta coffee prices (1980 to 2009) 
 
 
Source: Own Presentation based on Data from ICO(2010).  
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The two species also vary in their agro-ecological requirements. While Arabica coffee 
grows better in higher altitudes of semi-tropical climates, Robusta coffee is mainly 
produced in low laying areas in tropical climates. Arabica is further differentiated into 
three flavours; Brazilian Arabicas, Columbian Milds, and Other Milds. Each type 
makes different blends and fetches different prices. For example, Zambia’s Other 
Milds is used as a tastemaker and it is highly priced (Pelupessy, 2001).  Certified 
coffee such as Fair Trade, Organic, Utz Kapeh, Bird Friendly, Rainforest Alliance-
certified and many other certifications, have slowly gained market shares in the 
coffee world market. The success of speciality coffee on the world market is largely 
associated with new consumption patterns, such as ‘ethical’ consumerism, that have 
emerged in the industrialised countries (Ponte, 2004).    
 
Coffee is produced in 85 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Australia. Brazil, 
which produces Arabica coffee, is the largest coffee producing country in the world 
accounting for 31.5 percent of the total volumes of coffee produced globally based on 
2009 estimations by the International Coffee Organisation (ICO) data3.  By the year 
2000, Vietnam emerged to be the second largest coffee producing country in the 
world after Brazil, surpassing most Latin American countries such as Costa Rica and 
Columbia. Currently, Vietnam produces 17.7 percent of the total global production 
according to ICO production data and it only produces Robusta coffee. Ethiopia, the 
largest coffee producer in Africa accounts for only 2 percent of the total global 
production. Tanzania has only 1.2 percent, while Zambia has 0.02 percent share of 
the total global production. 
 
Coffee consumption is mainly in the industrialised countries. The United States of 
America (USA) is the largest consumer of coffee accounting for 18 percent of the 
total global consumption. Brazil, the second largest, consumes 13 percent of the 
global coffee consumption. Germany is the third largest with 9 percent share of all the 
coffee consumed worldwide. Although, the demand for coffee has stagnated over the 
last few years, demand for high quality coffee has increased considerably (Slob, 
2006). The later observation is still growing across the sector but it is estimated to be 
less than 10 percent of the total coffee produced on the world market. Recently, there 
has been a growing demand for specialty coffee by China as a result of a growing 
                                                 
3
 www.ICO.org/m1.htm downloaded on 4th February, 2010.   
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middle class. The Chinese demand was expected to increase the world demand for 
coffee by 70 percent by 2008 (Slob, 2006). 
 
In the last two decades, coffee exporting countries have faced a crisis as a result of 
low world producer prices. The world price of green coffee between 1998 and 2002 
dropped from US$1.20/lb to between US$0.40 and US$0.75 (Bacon, 2005). In 
February 2002, the prices reached the lowest levels since 1930s. It is estimated that 
the price fell by 25 percent between late 1990s and early 2000’s (Common Fund for 
Commodities, 2000).  In contrast, retail prices of coffee in high income countries 
increased over the same period. As the coffee bean price fell by 25 percent, the 
margins of coffee roasters rose by more than 50 percent (Common Fund for 
Commodities, 2000). This trend is attributed to increased market power, which 
originates from firm consolidation at manufacturing and retail stages resulting in 
oligopoly markets in the coffee industry (see e.g. Fitter and Kamplinsky, 2001; Slob, 
2006). It is often argued that, as a result of loss of bargaining power by the farmers 
following the abolishment of the cooperative boards, incomes which accrued in the 
producing countries have been transferred to rich countries (Kamplinsky 2006, Ponte, 
2004). Similarly, coordination and control of coffee supply shifted from the 
government-run cooperatives to multinational companies (See Swinnen et. al. 2007). 
 
2.3.1 The International Coffee Value Chain  
 
Unlike many other agricultural commodities, most of the post-harvest processing of 
coffee takes place on the farm. The farmers harvest red (ripe) coffee cherries which 
are either wet processed or dry processed. Wet processing is typically applied to 
Arabica coffee. It involves soaking and fermenting the cherries in order to remove the 
coffee bean. The bean is then dried in the sun to a certain moisture level. Tanzania 
and Zambia both apply wet processing, which yield a better quality. The coffee bean 
is then sold as parchment coffee to private buyers, cooperatives (as in the case of 
Tanzania) or directly to exporters or roasters based in the consuming countries.  
 
The major players in the global coffee value chain are producers, cooperatives or 
associations, local traders, international traders (exporters), importers/roasters, 
manufactures/retailers and the consumers. Most of the intermediaries like local 
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traders, cooperatives or exporters do not add any significant value to the coffee bean 
other than incurring transportation and other transaction costs. It is not until the bean 
reaches the roasters that it is roasted and blended with other varieties according to 
consumer preferences. The roasters then sell the coffee either as roasted beans or 
as ground coffee to manufacturers/retails or direct to coffee outlets such as 
supermarkets, restaurants and cafés.  
 
Coffee processing differs from several other commodities like cotton, in that the large 
part of coffee processing is done by the farmers themselves. However, several 
studies have shown that despite most of the processing taking place on the farm, the 
producers receive a very small share of the retail price, such that in some cases it is 
only 9 percent (e.g. Oxfam, 2002b; Kaplinsky, 2004). The studies show that 
approximately 30 percent of the value of the retail price goes to the roasters. The 
local traders and exporters’ together get approximately 15 percent share of the retail 
price while retailers may retain up to 15 percent. Figure 2.2 shows coffee prices at 
producer level for Zambia and Tanzania in comparison to world producer prices and 
retail prices taking the Germany retail prices.  
 
Figure 2.2: Producer and retail coffee prices in US$ cents per pound 
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Source: Author’s Presentation based on Data from ICO 
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2.3.2 Governance in International Coffee Value Chains 
 
The International Coffee Agreement (ICA), which was basically a set of agreements 
on production and consumption quotas, governed the global coffee industry for most 
of the period from 1962 to 1989. The primary objective of the ICA was to raise and 
stabilise prices in member producing countries that comprised 99 percent of the 
coffee exporters. The idea was to raise prices in consumer countries which 
subsequently raised prices in producing countries (Bohman and Jarvis, 1990). When 
the producer price indicator calculated by the ICO rose over the set price, quotas 
were relaxed; when it fell below the set price, quotas were tightened. In some cases 
when prices rose extremely, quotas were abandoned until prices dropped back within 
a certain band (Ponte, 2001b).   
 
It is often argued that the breakdown of the ICA in 1989, combined with the collapse 
of government-run cooperatives in most developing countries following liberalisation 
policies, led to the drastic drop of coffee producer prices in the early 1990s (Bacon, 
2004). The prices improved in the period 1994-1998, and then plummeted again in 
the early 2000s before surging during the second half of the last decade. Brown et.al 
(2008) argue that although the ICA was relatively successful for two decades with 
active supply management objectives, it eventually succumbed to common flaws 
such as insufficient financing and unrealistic price targets in extended periods of low 
prices and increasing supplies.   
 
During the ICA regime, the global coffee chain was not controlled or ‘driven’ by any 
actor (Ponte, 2002b). In principle, neither the producers nor consumers controlled the 
coffee value chain. However, during the post ICA period, the coffee value chain has 
mostly exhibited characteristics of a ‘buyer-driven’ chain. To be more specific, Ponte 
(2002b) refers to it as a ‘roaster-driven’ chain. Following trade liberalisation in most 
coffee producing countries that led to the withdrawal of ministries and government-
owned marketing boards from coordinating coffee production, marketing and quality 
control, governments lost international negotiating power (producer drive). 
Kamplinsky (2004) argues that the aggregated producer power which had been 
reflected in these marketing boards has weakened, and small-scale producers, who 
previously linked to final markets through the various forms of marketing boards, 
found themselves selling directly into volatile world markets. Large-scale 
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transnational traders and roasters quickly moved in to fill the gaps left by the 
governments’ marketing board, while gaining negotiating power. Swinnen et. al. 
(2004) observes that the combination of market liberalisation and increased coffee 
production coincides with rates of transnational corporation concentration. Notably, 
most roasters have moved to dealing with only a few traders who abide by their 
conditions. The adaption of supplier-managed inventory (SMI) has been stiffened by 
the requirements that traders have to abide by if they have to qualify to supply coffee 
to the roasters. These requirements have led traders to have more supervision over 
producers. Furthermore, at the roasting stage, there are various strategic barriers 
such as setting of minimum quantities needed for a particular type of coffee to be 
included in a certain blend or patent rights to certain processing technologies that 
have been created in the last ten years (Ponte, 2002b).   
 
In addition, the ICO, the International Coffee Council and several other regional and 
national bodies play an important role in setting standards for coffee production and 
marketing. In some countries, the government has specific standards set with 
regards to consumer safety (e.g. EurepGAP).  
 
2.4 Tanzania Coffee Value Chains  
2.4.1 On-farm Processing  
 
Coffee in Tanzania is harvested by hand as red ripe cherries grown on small plots of 
1 to 5 acres. The bean is removed from the cherries using a hand pulping machine. 
The two halves of the seed, referred to as the coffee beans are then dried for 
approximately 11 days before it is sold as parchment coffee to the primary societies.  
In its green coffee form, the coffee can stay up to 12 months before it can start 
deteriorating in flavour. Roasting reduces shelf life; a reason for most roasters 
preferring to carried it out shortly before consumption, preferably in the consuming 
countries.  
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2.4.2 Coffee Cooperatives 
 
Coffee in Tanzania has a production and marketing system which is historically and 
closely linked to cooperative movements. Currently, Tanzania’s coffee industry is 
dominated by a two-tier cooperative system, whereby farmers from multiple village 
level primary societies (groups of 100 to 1,000 persons) form cooperative unions. 
The unions have the primary responsibility of input supply (as loans), free extension 
services and purchase of produce. In addition, the unions are responsible for 
financing, transporting, marketing and supervising the sale of coffee supplied by their 
primary societies (Parrish et. al., 2005). The cooperatives buy, store and process 
coffee using their own facilities. Prior to economic reforms (before 1991), all 
cooperatives were government-owned and all small-scale farmers were obliged to 
belong to one. Presently, the cooperatives operate as private entities, owned and 
managed by members, and are suppose to compete with private traders. 
Membership of the cooperatives is not mandatory anymore, while a lot of services 
such as input supply and extension services have been withdrawn (Chachage, 2004; 
Cooksey, 2004 cited in Mhando and Mbeyale, 2010). Presently, most farmers rely on 
government paid extension agents, which has also drastically reduced from three in 
1985 to one per four villages of about 1,200 households in 2007 (Mhando and 
Mbeyale, 2010).  
 
After the primary societies have purchased a minimum required quantity of 
parchment coffee, it is sold to the cooperative unions such as the Kilimanjaro Native 
Cooperative Union (KNCU). After market liberalisation in 1994, private traders were 
allowed to buy coffee directly from the farmers, thereby competing with existing 
cooperatives in the purchase of the crop at village level (Bargawi, 2008).4 The private 
traders purchase directly from farmers and some of them even process it in their own 
factories before sending it to the TCB operated auction. However, despite the market 
liberalisation, only 20 percent of the farmers sell directly to private traders, the 
remaining 80 percent sell their coffee to cooperative unions or to small private local 
traders (Newman, 2006, Bargawi, 2008). In some areas like Mshiri in Kilimanjaro 
                                                 
4
 In the 2001, the Coffee Industry Act, private traders were mandated to choose only one licence; 
purchasing parchment coffee from the farmers, curing or exporting. However, in reality these traders 
have designed a mechanism whereby they operate at many stages of the along the through partner 
companies (Mhando and Mbeyale, 2010).   
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region, 94.1 percent of the farmers sell to cooperatives and only 5.9 percent sell to 
private traders (Mhando and Mbeyale). 
 
 A major reason for the farmers’ preference to sell their coffee to cooperatives is that 
the cooperatives pay in three instalments (September/October, December/January 
and February/March). Farmers who go for this choice also avoid storage costs such 
that awaiting further payment from the cooperatives unions may only be an option for 
the most affluent coffee producers (Bargawi, 2008). Even when private traders offer a 
higher price than the initial price offered by the cooperatives, most farmers still prefer 
the instalment payment system by the cooperatives because prices tend to increase 
for the second and third payments. The second and third payments also help the 
farmers meet other cash needs later in the season such as payment of school fees 
for their children or purchase of inputs for the next season (Bargawi, 2008). In 
addition, cooperatives also pay a premium on top of the best price offered. Bargawi 
(2008) noted that the continued functioning of the cooperative unions is seen as 
medium of stability to the producers with a more stable producer price. However, in 
some cases, for example, in Kiruweni and Wanri villages in Kilimanjaro region, 
private traders have resorted to compete with cooperatives on quality rather than 
price, such that the poor grades that are rejected by the cooperatives is what the 
private traders buy (Bargawi, 2008). Primarily, the choice to sell to private traders is 
linked to urgent cash needs as most private traders bought the coffee early in the 
season, when the prices are still low. 
 
2.4.3 Exporting Stage 
 
At the cooperative union level, the parchment coffee is milled and re-graded before it 
is taken for curing and re-grading at the curing factories.5 Recently, vertically 
integrated exporters working as subsidiaries of multinational companies have 
emerged in Tanzania and now own all the processing factories in the country (Temu 
et. al 2001 cited in Maradian and Perupessy, 2001). At these curing factories, the 
                                                 
5
 The coffee in Tanzania is graded into classes ranging from 1 to 13. The best grade is 1 while 13 is the worst 
grade (Mhando and Mbeyale, 2010).  
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coffee is dehulled and re-graded in readiness for the weekly coffee auction. The TCB 
organises and facilitates the coffee auction and sends graded samples to licensed 
exporters, before conducting auctions through the Moshi Coffee Auction, a private 
company owned by the TCB. The auction company buys coffee from cooperatives, 
private traders or directly from the famers. The TCB auction is primarily a marketing 
agent charging 1.6 percent of the auction sale (Baffes, 2005). Figure 2.3 shows the 
value chain structure in Tanzania. 
 
2.4.4 Governance Structures and Price Shares  
 
The exporters coordinate and control all the value adding activities along the value 
chain within the country on behalf of the large multinational roasting companies 
based in the consuming countries. The exporters decide the quality of coffee to buy 
and how it should be produced. The exporters are the ones who bid at the auction 
with capability to influence the prices. Moreover, it is estimated that the largest share 
of the coffee export price goes to the exporters as they are well informed of the price 
being offered by the roasters (Mhando and Mbeyale, 2010).6  
 
Although the TCB is the main regulatory body of the coffee sector in Tanzania, its 
monitoring of activities in the sector is not very effective (Mhando and Mbeyani). For 
example, the private traders are not allowed to buy parchment coffee from the 
farmers at the farm gate; instead they are supposed to set up purchasing points, 
where farmers could bring their coffee. However, this is not the case as the traders 
still buy at the farm gate.  In addition, private traders start buying coffee even before 
the buying season is officially authorized.  
 
In 2003/04, the TCB introduced direct sale of coffee to buyers oversees in order to 
eliminate intermediaries. However, direct sales seem to apply only to premium coffee 
or specialty coffee such as fair trade coffee. The rest of the producers largely sell to 
cooperatives and private traders, who tend to make profits without necessarily adding 
any value to the commodity. Most farmers cannot sell directly to roasters in 
developed countries because they are not able to meet the exporting costs involved, 
i.e. curing, transportation, communication, packaging and export duties. Additionally, 
                                                 
6
 The exporters sell their coffee to roasters mostly in Germany, Netherlands and Japan. The three countries 
constitute 75% of Tanzania’s exports. 
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issues of traceability become critical if small-scale farmers have to deal directly with 
retailers or consumers. Most roasters and manufactures in the consuming country 
own property rights for certain processing technologies creating barriers for entry for 
coffee producers. 
 
As private traders were allowed to purchase directly from farmers at the village level, 
the cooperatives that provided inputs to the farmers lost the monopsony purchasing 
power. Farmers obtained subsidised inputs from the cooperatives, but then sold their 
crop to private buyers offering higher coffee prices. The desertion by the farmers left 
the cooperatives with large debts, unable to continue with the input provision services 
(Bargawi, 2008). This coupled with the removal of fertilizer subsidies by government 
from 70 percent (of the total fertilizer requirement by the farmers) in 1990/91 to zero 
in 1994/95 drastically reduced fertilizer application and pesticide use. Estimates show 
that, while 51 households used pesticides, insecticides and herbicides in Kilimanjaro 
region in 1994/95, the number had reduced to 35 by 2002/2003 (United Republic of 
Tanzania, 1996; United Republic of Tanzania, 2006 cited in Bargawi, 2008). 
Consequently, the quality of Tanzanian coffee has significantly reduced following 
economic reforms (Baffes, 2005). Some researchers relate the declining prices of 
Tanzania coffee to low quality of coffee produced (e.g Baffes, 2005, Ponte, 2002).  
Quality is also lost through processing when small-scale producers use dry 
processing instead of the wet processing which yields better quality. 
 
2.4.5 Tanzania fair trade coffee 
 
Fair trade is a commercial partnership aimed at creating greater equality in the 
current liberalised markets through offering a minimum price. A guaranteed minimum 
price of $1.26/Ib for trade fair coffee was agreed upon between producers and Fair 
Trade Organisations (FTO) in June 1995. On top of that, a price premium of 5 to 10 
percent is paid above the fair trade price. The premium price is meant for community 
development programs. Despite the fact that it was the first country in sub-Saharan 
Africa where it was introduced in 1990 However, fair trade coffee represents only a 
small fraction of the total coffee production in Tanzania (Pirotte et. al. 2006). The two 
largest co-operatives which are active in fair trade coffee production are: Kagera Co-
operative Union (KCU) and Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU) account 
for only 5 percent of the country’s coffee exports (Pirotte et. al, 2006). The amount of 
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coffee exported to fair trade market significantly dropped in the last few years from 
52,380kg in 2006/07 to 32,760kg in 2007/08 (Mhando and Mbeyale (2010). Although 
all coffee exports in Tanzania have to go through the auction, the TCB recently 
adjusted some rules to allow fair trade coffee producers to export directly to roasters 
by passing the auction (Parrish et al, 2005).  
 
2.5 Zambia Coffee Value Chains 
 
The coffee value chain in the case of Zambia is less complex than the Tanzania 
value chain (see Figure 2.3). For Zambia, Parchment coffee from the farmers is 
exported directly to roasters in the consuming countries through the Zambia Coffee 
Growers Association (ZCGA). Unlike the case of Tanzania, Zambia produces mainly 
speciality coffee and does not rely on the large TNC’s roasters for its markets. The 
producers have established relations even with some small buyers in the consuming 
countries. The coffee marketing in Zambia is completely liberalised and government 
does not interfere in price setting. All coffee producers (large- and small-scale 
producers) are, by law, members of the ZCGA which provides marketing, quality 
control, milling, warehousing, shipping, extension and secretarial services to the 
growers. Although the ZCGA has been delegated marketing functions by the Zambia 
Coffee Board (ZCB), the former also gives licences to some members that want to 
market their own products. The association also issues certificates of quality to all 
export shipments. The ZCGA is an operating wing of, and supervised by the ZCB, 
whose members represent the government, small-scale farmers, large-scale farmers, 
and agricultural research and extension services.  
 
On-farm coffee processing in Zambia is similar to Tanzania’s wet processing. 
However in the case of Zambia, the parchment coffee is washed, sorted, graded and 
bagged right on the farm, before being taken to the ZCGA for auctioning. At the 
ZCGA, the coffee undergoes milling and re-grading before the samples are sent to 
the roasters to prepare for the auction.  The grading and export presentation is in 
grades AAA, AA, AB, AB, PB and many small grades making up to twelve coffee 
grades. The grades are based on bean size with AAA being the largest size achieved 
through using proper field management practices.  
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Figure 2.3: Coffee value chain in Tanzanian and Zambia 
 
a. Zambia Coffee Value Chain        Tanzania Coffee Value Chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own design based on discussions with the Zambia Coffee Growers Association (ZCGA) and the Zambia Coffee Board (ZCB) as well as various 
other literature sources.  
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All physical exports are, however, handled by the ZCGA and are usually routed via 
Durban in South Africa or Dar es Salaam in Tanzania using road and rail. As a land 
locked country, Zambia uses the ports of its neighbours for exporting its coffee. 
Ultimately, a large share of profits is used to pay international transport services and 
duties. Zambia’s coffee exports go to Europe (94%), the United States (1%) and the 
remaining 5% is exported to South Africa, Australia, and Japan (ZCGA, 2007).  
 
The pricing system at the ZCGA organised auctions are based on the trading price at 
the New York Board of Trade (BOT)7. At present, the association uses a silent 
telephone auction system. This system, however, is not only expensive, but also 
limits the number of bidders. Most buyers tend to know each other whereby 
transparency can be limited. The most important setback of this system is that 
bidders can collude and avoid high bids.  
 
However, Zambia’s coffee is one of the highly priced coffees in Africa and portrays 
closer movements to the world price as shown in Figure 2.2 above. In 2009, Zambia 
received the highest producer prices in the whole of Africa (Mafusire et. al., 2010).  
Traditionally, Zambian coffee farmers grow a variety of Arabica coffee called 
Bourbon, which, despite being highly susceptible to pests and diseases, produces 
high quality speciality coffee. Because of Zambia’s late start in the coffee industry, 
the growers immediately adopted some latest technologies for cultivation practices 
including composite manual from the coffee pulp and pest management through 
chemical and biological methods. In addition, they use sophisticated methods for 
irrigation, fertilization, and chemical application. The application of the appropriate 
technologies and good management practices has enabled the country to produce 
high quality speciality coffee and to penetrate niche markets in Europe, USA and 
Japan. In 2007/2008 the ZCGA sold 74 metric tonnes to specialty markets (ZCGA, 
2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Renamed Intercontinental Exchange in September 2007. 
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2.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The paper has analysed value chains and governance structures in Zambia and 
Tanzania and how producers access world coffee markets. Despite the differences 
(in quality and value chain structure) between the two countries, which are largely 
due to differences in scales of production and levels of market liberalisation, there is 
commonness in the two countries in that coffee producers in both countries feed into 
a concentrated world coffee market. However, the characteristics of governance 
structures in Tanzania’s value chain reflect that of captive relations. In these types of 
relationships, lead firms set the rules under which others operate and the costs of 
switching to other buyers is very high. The producers, as seen in the case of 
Tanzania’s small-scale production are confined to narrow tasks, which is basically 
production of parchment coffee while the curing companies have dominated the 
industry at processing level. Essentially, there are high barriers for producers to 
move up the chain. Even if the Tanzania coffee marketing system is supposedly a 
competitive market, where cooperatives compete with private traders in purchasing 
coffee at village level, farmers prefer to sell to the cooperatives because the system 
allows them to access second and final payment, taking advantage of any seasonal 
increases in coffee prices. The strategy by the cooperatives to pay the farmers in 
instalments, have earned them comparative advantage over the private buyers. This, 
in a way, hinders the private traders from purchasing directly from the farmers, on the 
grounds that they cannot compete with cooperative unions on issues of stabilising 
seasonal prices. Evidently, between the first and second actors in the value chain, 
i.e.; the famers and the cooperatives; the cooperatives are the price setters.  
 
At the second level of the value chain, i.e.; between the cooperatives and the 
exporters/international traders, the price setters are the exporters/international 
traders acting on behalf of roasters that are based in the consuming countries.  An 
important observation in Tanzania’s value chain is the emerging of vertically 
integrated curing companies and exporters, working on behalf of multinational 
companies, who now own all the coffee processing companies in the country. The 
exporters, through their large investment in processing machinery, benefit from 
economies of scale, creating barriers for producers to engage into processing. In so 
doing, they manage to capture the largest share of the retail price in comparison to 
other actors operating within the country. 
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Turning to Zambia coffee markets, the interpretation of relations between the famers 
and the roasters is close to free market or arm’s length. In free markets, standards 
and price become the medium of communication between the suppliers and the 
buyers. There is very little supervision from the buyers because the supplier meets 
the required standards, which determine the price. An essential observation in the 
Zambia coffee value chain is the small number of actors which has enabled high 
prices received by the producers in comparison to other countries on the continent.  
Much of the success of the coffee markets in Zambia is due to a well organised 
institutional set-up consisting of the ZCGA, which represents the private sector and 
the ZCB which represents the public sector. Given that the ZCGA provides most 
services including transportation, the number of actors in the chain is reduced. As the 
coffee is sold directly to roasters in the consuming countries, the cost of switching to 
other roasters is low and the farmers can sell to any buyer depending on the price 
offers. Thus, the farmers are able to sell at prices that reflect world producer prices. A 
visual inspection of price movements for Zambian coffee over the past twenty years 
shows that the prices move closely with world producer prices, an indication that the 
price changes for Zambian reflect changes in world. Since Zambia’s coffee is usually 
of good quality, there is always demand for it, such that bidders are forced to bid 
higher prices. However, one shortcoming in the Zambia auction system is the auction 
method. Telephone auctions limit the number of roasters participating, consequently 
limiting higher bids.  
 
At international level, the market structure for coffee beans is in general oligopolistic 
in nature, where growers have little power and are therefore unable to capture large 
parts of the generated surplus. The high level of concentration at the roasting stage 
gives the roasters a leeway to be slow to pass on price increases to producers. This 
ultimately explains the ever widening gap between producer prices and retail prices.  
As observed in the case of transnational buyers, who have increasingly, began to 
operate in the producing countries, now capture large shares of the value of the 
commodity slowly gaining monopoly of the industry.  
 
Power asymmetry, which is largely supported by high market concentration at the 
roasting and manufacturing stages, is evident in coffee markets. This article supports 
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previous assertions that market power in the coffee industry has resulted in 
imbalances of rent distribution along value chains (e.g. Kaplinsky, 2004). In 
consequence, the price for green coffee, rather than being determined by market 
forces, is largely determined by the roasters in the chain. In the case of Tanzania for 
example, whether farmers sell to the cooperatives or private traders, the world price 
is determined by large transnational roasting companies through the national auction 
market. The cooperatives and private traders offer prices according to how they 
anticipate offer prices by exporters/international traders at the bi-monthly coffee 
auctions.  
 
As often argued, private regulatory systems should lead to stronger coordination, 
since they increase the amount and complexity of non-market information exchange 
although these result in reduced rents at the lower levels of the chain.  In comparison 
to large-scale producers in Zambia, coordination for small-scale farmers in Tanzania 
is high, the effect being unequal distribution of rents across the chain. As often 
argued (e.g. Oxfam, 2002b), the price captured by the farmer largely depends on 
how much processing is done at a local level, hence the power shifts and production 
trends have drastically reduced producing country’s share of the final retail price. 
However, going into processing to consumer specifications for small-scale farmers is 
often faced with several barriers such as lack of capital, equipment and the required 
skills. Such barriers to entry create imbalances in rent share distribution as explained 
in the Schumpeter theory. 
 
2.7 Policy Recommendations 
 
As discussed in the theory section above, in order to understand the rent distribution 
along value chains, it is vital to map out which activities sustain high incomes in the 
chain. Given the high profitability at the later stages of the value chain (roasting and 
manufacturing); carrying out these activities by the producers would create value 
added for the producing countries. This would not only increase economic activities 
in the producing countries but also raise export revenues. However, the paper has 
shown that there are high barriers for the producers to go into these activities. The 
roasters, through their subsidiaries based in the producing countries, have dominated 
the processing, including tacit knowledge of processing and intellectual property 
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rights as most of them own patents on processing technologies. Other limitations to 
producers going into processing include the lack of capacity to source other types of 
coffees from other parts of the world for blending to consumer specifications. Further, 
issues of traceability become critical for consumers dealing directly with small-scale 
farmers. Therefore, government policies on improving coffee incomes through value 
addition should be directed towards removing such barriers, especially reducing 
transportation costs by improving infrastructure. In addition, capacity building for 
producers in terms of building skills and developing technology for various value 
adding activities should be a priority. 
 
A more equal distribution of profits along value chain can be achieved if cooperatives 
manage to break these barriers and are able to compete successfully with the local 
subsidiaries of TNC. Alternatively, primary cooperatives can mobilise themselves to 
sell directly at the auction like in the case of Mruwia and Materuni primary 
cooperatives in Kilimajoro. In addition, fair-trade coffee growing should be 
strengthened among small-scale farmers in Tanzania. The fair-trade markets must 
be strictly monitored to ensure that agents buy all the fair-trade coffee produced and  
avoid cases where fair-trade coffee is sold at the lower conversional prices due to 
lack of demand.   
 
Another strategy would be to strengthen coordination among producers within the 
countries or across countries with common coffee varieties. For example, 
strengthening south-south relationships in order to gain bargaining power through 
agreeing on a minimum price becomes necessary. The already existing coffee 
producing countries association would be a starting point of discussion 
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Chapter 3: 
 
Asymmetric Price Transmission in Coffee Markets: Impacts of 
Economic Reforms for Zambia and Tanzania 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Abstract 
 
Applying threshold autoregression models, we examine effects of market 
liberalisation on coffee price transmission from world prices to grower prices in 
Zambia and Tanzania. Contrary to previous studies, structural breaks due to 
agricultural policy shifts have been identified endogenously to determine the true 
effects on the data. Generally, results confirm that price transmission improved in the 
case of Zambia where coffee marketing is fully liberalised although the transmission 
is asymmetric. In that case, producer prices are able to adjust to correct price 
decreases more than price increases over an identified threshold. Results indicate 
that examining price transmission without taking into account structural breaks 
inevitably leads to false rejection of the null hypothesis of symmetric transmission. 
 
Key words 
 
Economic Reforms, Coffee Markets, Asymmetric Price Transmission, Threshold 
Autoregression, Endogenous Structural Breaks. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa undertook 
extensive economic reforms to move to a more market-based development strategy 
(White and Leavy, 2001). Because agriculture plays a significant role in most of the 
countries, market reforms in the agricultural sector took a key position in the 
economic reforms (FAO, 2003). The reforms which included removal of price 
controls, trade liberalisation, and privatisation of government owned agricultural 
enterprises, were aimed at improving producer prices and enhancing trade efficiency. 
However, the poor performance of the agricultural sector (stagnant growth, poor and 
volatile prices, unstable markets) coupled with increasing poverty levels on the 
continent, has raised questions about the effects of the reforms (see e.g. White and 
Leavy, 2001; Widner, 1994). While some studies have maintained that trade 
liberalisation has led to improvements in the agricultural sector, there is growing body 
of literature stating that the reforms have, inevitably, led to the current hardships in 
Africa. Others argue that the reforms paid less attention to fundamentals of market 
functioning, which the poor, often uneducated farmers, could inexorably be exposed 
to.  
 
In the Coffee industry particularly, most empirical studies have found that although 
economic reforms have improved price transmission from world prices to producer 
prices, the transmission has become more asymmetric with price decreases in the 
world price being transmitted to producer prices faster than price increases 
(Krivonos, 2004; Warako, 2008, Fafchamps and Hill, 2008). Others have argued that 
coffee market liberalisation has led to increased producer prices, though the prices 
have become more volatile (Hill, 2010). On the contrary, other studies have linked 
market liberalisation and fall of cooperatives to reduced farmers bargaining power, 
leading to low producer prices which do not reflect changes in world prices 
(Kaplinsky, 2004; Slob, 2006). In theory, when price adjustments are not efficiently 
conveyed to producers or consumers, market intermediaries are benefiting from 
imperfections and are reducing market transparency (Le Goulven, 2001). Particularly 
the ever widening gap between coffee retail prices in the high income countries and 
producer prices in the growing countries means that either the producers are not 
benefiting from price increases or the consumers are not benefiting from price 
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decreases. The fact that coffee is mainly produced in low income countries while 
consumption is mostly in the high income countries means a more complex price 
pass through that involves the north and the south.    
 
Although the number of studies on the impact of economic reforms on producer 
prices has increased in the recent past, many price transmission articles published 
over the past two decades have not paid attention to possible anomalies, such as 
structural breaks and asymmetries (Abdulai 2007). Even though there is high 
evidence of asymmetric price transmission (APT) in agricultural commodities (Meyer 
and von Cramon Taubadel, 2004), there has been very little empirical investigation in 
the coffee industry. The few studies that have attempted to discuss APT in coffee 
include Krivonos (2004), who investigated impact of economic reforms on price 
transmission from world to various producing countries. Krivonos found that the 
speed of adjustment of coffee producer prices improved in sub-Saharan Africa 
following economic reforms compared to South America though price increases were 
transmitted slower than price decreases- an indication of APT. Another study by 
Fafchamps and Hill (2008) on Uganda’s Robusta coffee found evidence suggesting 
that price increases in the international market were transmitted to local traders but 
not to producers. Warako et. al. (2008) found that the share of producer prices in 
world price substantially increased for all types of coffee in Ethiopia since the 
introduction of economic reforms although the transmission was symmetric.  
 
However, the studies motioned above did not take into account the fact that a 
threshold value may have to be reached before price changes in one market are 
provoked in another market, considering that transaction costs such as menu costs 
prevent agents from adjusting prices continuously. Second, the studies paid no 
attention to possibilities of endogenous structural breaks in the data.  This study fills 
in these gaps by first identifying thresholds in the price movements that can 
potentially alter the speed and magnitude of the transmission.  Thus, the price 
transmission is examined according to whether the prices are increasing or 
decreasing. Second, this study identifies the economic reform periods using 
structural break unit root tests. This is based on the understanding that structural 
breaks can lead to more rejection of the null hypothesis of symmetric transmission 
than appropriate (von Cramon-Taubadel and Meyer, 2004).  
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This study specifically examines the impact of the policy changes on the rate and 
magnitude of price transmission in a completely liberalised coffee industry country 
Zambia as well as Tanzania, a country that is still under considerable marketing 
regulations in the industry (Baffes, 2004). Given that policies were implemented over 
a period of time, we identify the structural breaks endogenously to ensure the correct 
effect of policy shifts on the data. As literature would reveal, this is the first study that 
has employed endogenous structural breaks in asymmetric price transmission 
analysis.    
 
Different sources of APT have been examined in the literature. Market power that 
rises from imperfect markets is the most widely sited source of APT. Rationally, 
under imperfect markets; any price movement that squeezes the margin is 
transmitted more rapidly than any price movement that enlarges the margin (Meyer 
and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). Depending on the price relationship, two types of 
APT can be observed. Either market agents transmit price decreases from world 
prices to producers faster than they transmit price increases or a situation where 
price increases from the producers are transmitted faster to the consumers than price 
decreases. In this case of coffee, price decreases from the world market are 
expected to be transferred faster to the producers than price increases. The high 
level of market concentration at the roasting and trading stages of coffee pave way 
for roasters to be slow or less likely to pass on price decreases to consumers or retail 
price increases to producers. The international coffee market is highly concentrated 
such that, the top five importers, i.e. Kraft General Foods Jacobs Suchard, Nestle, 
Douwe Egberts, Tchibo and Eduscho, account for over 40 per cent of total global 
trade, while the top ten account for more than 60 per cent (Fitter and Kamplinsky 
2001; Slob, 2006). Ward (1982) also argues that market power can lead to APT if the 
oligopolistic traders are reluctant to risk losing market share by increasing outside 
prices.  
 
Another form of APT arises from high transaction costs, particularly menu costs that 
prevent economic agents from adjusting prices continuously. Adjustment only takes 
place after a certain threshold. Threshold price transmission is based on the 
understanding that prices in one market may not be transferred to another, vertically 
or horizontally connected market until the price difference reaches a certain threshold 
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(Enders and Granger, 1998). A related cause of APT is asymmetric movement of 
information from a central market to peripheral market (Abdulai, 2000).  By virtue of 
being at the centre of the network of information, the central market price may tend to 
be less responsive to price changes in the peripheral markets.  
 
3.2 Modelling Asymmetric Price Transmission  
 
Various economic models for examining APT have been employed in Literature. The 
models can broadly be classified into two. The first class of models are those that 
segment the price variables into positive and negative regimes. Houck (1977) 
introduced this class of models using a static model. One shortcoming of Houck’s 
procedure is that it implicitly assumed that the properties of the series included 
linearity and stationarity, in such a way that, where those properties did not apply, the 
results would carry incorrect implications for inference about market symmetry 
(Gauthier, 2003). Although Houck’s model was later modified by Ward (1982) to 
include lagged values of the independent variable in order to account for dynamic 
responses, it still assumed stationarity and linearity in the data. Studies that have 
applied this class of APT models include von Cramon (1998) and Aguiar and 
Santana (2002).  
 
The second class of APT models include those that are extensions to the basic 
cointegration theory and deals with nonlinearities in cointegration relationships. The 
models take into account time series properties of stationarity. They include threshold 
autoregression models (TAR) with its extensions; SETAR (self exciting threshold 
auto regression) which distinguishes regimes in time series dynamics with potentially 
different parameters (and thus dynamic properties) of each regime; STAR (smooth 
adjustment autoregression) which allows for smooth transition of adjustments 
between regimes (Chan and Tong, 1986); and the MTAR (momentum threshold 
autoregression) which allows the degree of autoregressive decay to depend on the 
state of the first difference of the variable in a model.  While the TAR model can 
capture asymmetrically ‘deep’ movements in a series, the MTAR captures the 
possibilities of asymmetrically sharp or steep movements in a series (Enders and 
Granger, 1998). In this study, both TAR and MTAR models are employed and 
compared. Several studies including that of Enders and Siklos (2001) and Abdulai 
 51
(2002) found the power of the MTAR test to be many times higher than that of the 
symmetric Enders-Granger cointegration tests.   
 
Cointegration models are based on the theoretical understanding that explains 
convergence of residuals of a pair of prices to long run equilibrium (Granger, 1983). 
The models imply that two or more integrated time series of any order have a linear 
combination of a lower order of integration. That is, if two or more series, each of 
which are I(1) are cointegrated then there exists a stationary representation that is 
called the error-correction representation (Engle and Granger,1987). The models 
suggest that prices move closely in the long run, although in the short run they may 
drift apart. The Engle and Granger (1987) discuss a symmetric cointegration model 
that includes an error correction model to examine short run adjustments to the long-
run equilibrium.  
 
Taking tP1  as producer price in Zambia or Tanzania at time t and tP2  as world prices 
at time t, the Engle granger two-step symmetric cointegration model is represented 
as: 
 
ttot PP µββ ++= 211           (1) 
 
Where itP  must be non-stationary and integrated of the same order e.g. I(1), iβ  are 
the parameters to be estimated, and iµ  is the disturbance term that may be serially 
correlated.  
 
In the second step, the residual from equation (1) are used to estimate ρ  in the 
following relationship;  
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Where, tv is a white noise process. It then follows that, if 0=ρ  the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration is not rejected while if 02 <<− ρ , then the residuals in (1) are 
stationary with mean 0. In this case (1) is an attractor such that its pull is strictly 
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proportional to the absolute value of tµ  (Enders and Siklos, 2001). Testing the null 
hypothesis of ‘no cointegration’ is similar to testing for unit root. Enders and Siklos, 
2001 introduce several statistics to test the residuals of the OLS regression of the 
levels’ data for unit root.  
 
Error correction model supplements the cointegration model by capturing the effect of 
adjustment of the dependant variable when it deviates from the long run equilibrium. 
We present the error correction model in two simultaneous equations taking each of 
the two prices as a dependant variable. The model is presented as:  
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where tv  is a white noise disturbance term, k is the lag length and the error 
correction mechanism is given by the term in parenthesis. tP1  and tP2 are coffee 
producer and world prices respectively. The k lag is set to correct for serial 
correlation using a combination of methods such as the Akeike Information Criteria 
(AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criteria. A model with smaller values of AIC is 
considered better than one with a larger value. The AIC values from the TAR and 
MTAR models are therefore examined to establish the best model. The Durbin 
Watson (DW) value is used to check if there is no serial correlation. Ideally, when 
there is no serial correlation, the DW value should be around 2. Values greater than 
2 indicate negative serial correlation, and those below 2 are an indication of positive 
serial correlation.       
 
A major limitation to the Granger and the Engle-Granger cointegration models is that 
they implicitly assume a linear adjustment mechanism which could lead to misleading 
results in the presence of asymmetric adjustments (Enders and Siklos 2001). The 
models assume that tendency to move towards long run equilibrium is present every 
time which may not be the case. According to Enders and Granger (1998) the 
cointegration tests from Engle-Granger are misspecified if the adjustment to long run 
equilibrium is asymmetric. Another weakness of the symmetric cointegration model is 
that a statistically significant coefficient may be due to common trends in the price 
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pairs from factors such as population growth, inflation or climate patterns rather than 
price integration (Abdulai, 2007).  
 
To exploit the possibility of asymmetries in price cointegration, we employ a threshold 
cointegration model that recognises the fact that a shock may have to reach a 
significant level before a response is provoked. A threshold regime switching model 
known as the threshold autoregression was first proposed by Tong (1978) and later 
discussed in detail by Tong and Lim (1980), Tong (1983), Balke and Fomby (1997), 
Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001). Later important 
application of the model in the form of auto regression to account for potential 
nonlinearities and asymmetries in the adjustment of individual prices and providing 
more information regarding the dynamics of the data include Abdulai 
(2000,2002;2007), Strikholm and Teräsvirta (2005), Hansen and Seo (2002) and 
Gonzales et. al. (2003). A detailed explanation of the model is found in Enders (2004) 
and Zapata and Gauthier (2003).   
 
TAR is a nonlinear regime switching model that allows the researcher to differentiate 
between two periods when the spread is away from the long run equilibrium, that is, 
when the system diverts to levels above or below the equilibrium, which is 
essentially, the estimated threshold value (Enders, 2004). Threshold models assume 
that tendency to move to long-run equilibrium is not always present due to the 
presence of transaction costs that may prevent economic agents from adjusting 
continuously (Abdulai, 2002). The model suggests that adjustment towards 
equilibrium takes place only if the equilibrium error gets larger than a certain 
threshold value. In other words, as long as the deviations from equilibrium are small, 
the variables evolve independently and become cointegrated once the disequilibrium 
is substantial.  
 
Balke and Fomby (1997), Enders and Granger (1998) Enders and Siklos (2001) 
introduce a two-step approach to examine threshold cointegration; residuals are 
obtained from a linear cointegration analysis in the first step and in the second step, 
threshold auto-regression is employed to take into account asymmetric movements 
of the residuals. To account for short term dynamics, a test for cointegration with 
asymmetric error correction model (ECM) can be employed. Granger and Lee first 
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introduced asymmetric error correction specification where they segment positive 
and negative components of the first differences. Later extensions of the ECM to 
threshold adjustments have been discussed by Enders and Granger (1998) and 
Enders and Siklos (2001), and more recently Wolffram (2005).  
 
Again using the residuals from equation (1), a 2-regime TAR model can be presented 
as; 

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In this regard, the first lag of the residuals is taken as the threshold variable, where 
the system will be 1 when the deviations from long-run equilibrium is above the 
threshold or equal to the threshold and 0 when the deviation is below the threshold. 
There are several techniques developed to estimate a consistent threshold (e.g Tsay, 
1998; Chan, 1993; 2004) 
 
Modifying equation (4) to fit in the first difference of the lagged variable, the MTAR 
model is given by: 
 



=
0
1
I    if   
τµ
τµ
<∆
≥∆
−
−
1
1
t
t
         (6) 
 
Similar to the Engle-Granger cointegration model, an error correction model can be 
estimated once threshold cointegration is confirmed. We present the threshold ECM 
as follows: 
 
 
= =
−−−−
++∆+∆=



∆
∆ k
i
k
i
ttitiiti usZplusZPPP
P
1 1
121121
2
1
min__ γγβα     (7) 
Where plusZ _ and usZ min_  are dummy variables representing the state when 
price differences are above and below the threshold respectively. iα , iβ , 1γ  
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and 2γ  are parameters to be estimated. 1γ  and 2γ  represent the speed of 
adjustment of the dependant variable in each state. tv  is a white noise 
disturbance term, k is the lag length. tP1  and tP2  are producer and world prices 
respectively.  
 
Many researchers set Zero as a threshold coinciding with long run equilibrium, but 
Enders (2004) points out that a non-Zero threshold has an advantage in that it 
captures strategic behaviours and adjustment costs that are rarely observed with 
small changes. He argues that a TAR model with threshold equal to Zero does not 
display significant degree of asymmetry, possibility that the threshold could not be 
Zero. Chan(1993) introduces a method of estimating a consistent threshold through 
grind search over all possible values. Enders (2004: pp 413) explains the application 
of the Chan procedure TAR models. First, the threshold variable is sorted in 
ascending order. Ideally, the first and last 15 percent values of the threshold variable 
are excluded such that the search is limited to the middle 70 percent. Then a search 
is done over the potential threshold in order to minimise the Sum of Squared 
Residuals (SSR). The estimated threshold that minimises the SSR is the optimal 
threshold as illustrated in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1 A threshold of 0.04 identified from the minimum RSS 
Residual Sums of Squares
threshold
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Source: Own computation based on MTAR estimation for Tanzania and World Prices 
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If there are more than one threshold (more than two regimes) then there will be 
several minima of the SSR (Strikholm and Teräsvirta, 2004).  
 
3.3 Data Description  
 
Monthly coffee prices are employed to examine price transmission. The series’ 
include monthly observations of Arabica coffee producer prices for Tanzania and 
Zambia, measured in U$ cents per pound (lb)8. The producer price is the actual price 
received by the farmers which have been obtained from the international Coffee 
Organisation (ICO). The response of producer prices is examined in relation to the 
world prices taking the producer composite indicator prices (CIP)9. The CIP is 
calculated by ICO based on market share of exports of each group of coffee 
weighted. All the price series have 273 monthly observations covering the period 
January 1986 to September 2008. During this period, world prices had an average of 
$1.10 per pound, which was much higher than the two producer prices.  Zambian 
prices had an average of $0.80 per pound while Tanzanian prices have been the 
lowest with an average of $0.58 (see Figure 3.1 and 3.2).  
 
For Zambia, coffee marketing has been fully liberalised where producers sell directly 
to traders. Even before the economic reforms, Government intervention in the coffee 
industry was very limited. Nevertheless, reforms in other sectors of the economy 
could have some direct impact on the coffee industry, such as currency liberalisation 
and the restructuring of Government institutions. Therefore, changes in price 
transmission from world prices are expected over the observed period. The pre-
economic reforms in Zambia have had negative implications on agriculture during 
1980s due to several exogenous and domestic policy components that had a strong 
anti-trade bias and an estimation of the real exchange-rate distortion (IFPRI, 1993).  
 
 
                                                 
8
 Lb is the abbreviation for Libra which is the roman word for pound. One pound is 0.453 592 37 kilo 
grams (kgs). 
 
9
 CIP is the price calculated based on market share of exports of each group of coffee weighted in accordance 
with Annex 1 of EB-3776/01 rev. 1 of the International Coffee Organisation (ICO). 
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Figure 3.2 Zambia and CIP price trends showing the structural break in 1998:05 
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Figure 3.3 Tanzania and CIP price showing the structural breaks in 2000:06  
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For Tanzania, although the reforms led to improvement of private sector participation, 
the functioning of input markets deteriorated as provision of credit declined. This, 
coupled with the decline in quality and quantity of services such as research and 
extension, resulted in drastic decline of overall quality of coffee. As a result 
Tanzanian coffee prices continue to trail far below world prices and remain the lowest 
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in sub-Saharan Africa. Krivonos (2004) notes that Tanzania is the only country where 
the target share of producer prices in the world market price did not increase after 
market liberalisation.  
 
Prior to the economic reforms, farmers had been required to sell their export coffee 
through the Government-run Moshi Coffee Auction. USAID (2006) described the 
Moshi Coffee Auction as impractical because of its 22,000 pounds export minimum 
which effectively barred small farmers from participating as individuals10. In 1994 
cooperatives lost their monopoly after the Government passed a legislative to allow 
multinational and domestic buyers from Individual farmers. However in 1999/2000, 
the Government reversed the liberalised trade policies as it was felt that the policies 
did not benefit the small scale farmers (Baffes, 2004). Currently, all the coffee 
produced is Tanzania is traded through the Government-run auctions. The issuing of 
trading license also remains restrictive (Krivonos, 2004). 
 
3.4 Results and Discussion 
 
The sequence of reporting the results are as follows: In the first part the results of 
unit root tests are discussed. Next, the results from the Engle and Granger 
cointegration and ECM are discussed before turning to the results of the TAR and 
MTAR models and the threshold ECM. The last part examines impulse response of 
the producer prices to a shock provoked by changes in the world prices.  
 
3.4.1 Unit root tests 
 
The hypothesis that the price series are nonstationary is tested using both the 
Augmented Dickey-Füller (ADF) and Lee and Stracizichi Lagrange Multiplier (LSLM) 
structural break unit root tests suggested by Lee and Stracizichi (2004). The Akaike 
information criterion was employed to determine the appropriate lag length which 
varied across the series. The DW values also confirmed absence of autocorrelation. 
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All the series were non-stationary at level but stationary at first difference from both 
the ADF and the LSLM tests. The identified structural break for Zambia is May 1998 
which coincides with the completion of economic reforms in the agricultural sector. 
For Tanzania a structural break is affected in the data in June 2000, a period when 
the coffee market liberalization policy was reversed giving back to the cooperatives 
the monopoly of purchasing coffee from the farmers. This implies that, the actual 
liberalisation policies that took place in Tanzania in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
did not have significant effect on the coffee price movements. Therefore, the 
identified structural break in the case of Tanzania is actually the reverse of 
liberalisation policies. For World prices, a structural break occurred in June 1989 
coinciding with the liberalisation of the international coffee market following the 
collapse of the international coffee agreement in 1989 which had regulated 
international coffee supply and price. The results of the unit root tests with structural 
breaks are presented in Table 3.1 together with the results of normal ADF tests. 
 
Table 3.1: Unit root test results 
 
 ADF(Intercept, no trend) LSLM (Intercept no trend) 
 Level 1st 
difference 
Structural 
Break 
Level 1st 
Differences 
      
 Log Zambia 9 lags -2.470 -7.656*** 
 
1998:05 -2.586 -7.308*** 
Log Tanzania 13 lags - 2.162 - 4.627*** 2000:06 
       
-2.511 -4.681*** 
Log World Price (CIP) 
10 lags 
-2.287 -4.723*** 1989:06 -2.2415 -4.974*** 
 
***, **,* denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of stationarity at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively.  
Critical values for ADF tests are from MacKinnon (1996).  
Critical Values for LSLM Unit Root Test (Crash model) are from Schmidt and Phillips (1992)  
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3.4.2 Results of the symmetric cointegration model 
 
Table 3.2 reports results of the Engle-Granger symmetric cointegration model 
estimation (equation 1). For Zambia, the null hypothesis of no cointegration between 
the Zambian price and the world price is overwhelmingly rejected in the full sample. 
The t-statistic value of -3.595 is much higher than the 1% critical value of -3.44 
indicating rejection of the null hypothesis. However, examining the relationship while 
taking into account the economic reforms, the results show that in the first sub-
sample, the two price series did not co-move. The t-statistic value of -2.029 is lower 
than the 10% critical value of -2.57; hence the no-cointegration null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. A long-run relationship is however observed after economic 
reforms. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is highly rejected at 1% given a t-
statistics value of -3.845. The results indicate that economic liberalisation, which 
included trade and currency liberalisation, among other reforms, has led to 
improvements in price transmission. These finding support most findings from other 
coffee producing countries showing improvement in price transmission after 
economic reforms (see Krivonos, 2004). The Estimated 1β  coefficients shows that in 
long-run a one unit change in the world prices leads to a 0.998 increase in the 
Zambian coffee prices after the economic reforms. However, in the pre-reform 
period, the change only led to a 0.428 increase.   
 
Table 3.2: Results of the Engle and Granger cointegration  
***, **,* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.    
CIP is Composite Indicator Price calculated by ICO representing world producer prices 
Zambia-World Prices  
Sample a
0β  1β  2R  b1ρ  DW 
1986:01-
2008:09 
2.690 
(5.433)*** 
0.330 
(3.096)** 
0.978       -0.124*** 
(-3.595) 
2.006 
1986:01-
1998:05 
2.000 
(2.616)* 
0.428 
(2.667)* 
0.967       -0.091 
(-2.024) 
2.022 
1998:05-
2008:09 
-0.042 
(-0.127) 
0.998 
(13.705)*** 
0.998      -0.332*** 
(-3.845) 
2.006 
Tanzania-World Prices 
Sample 0β  1β   b1ρ   
1986:01-
2008:09 
-0.661 
(3.039) 
1.001 
(21.389)*** 
0.995       -0.117*** 
(-4.093) 
1.985 
1986:01-
2000:06 
0.285 
(1.193) 
0.816 
(16.210)*** 
0.997       -0.150*** 
(-3.301) 
1.974 
2000:06-
2008:09 
-1.088 
(-2.320) 
1.068 
(10.145)*** 
0.994 -0.111 
(-2.422) 
2.051 
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Z represents the Tanzanian coffee price and Z represents the Zambian coffee price 
 
Turning to Tanzania, there is a long-run relationship with world prices in the entire 
sample. When this relationship is examined in two sub-periods, the estimations show 
that the two prices are cointegrated only in the first sub-sample and not the second 
sub-sample. According to the Tanzanian coffee trade policies, the first sub-sample is 
the period the government allowed the private traders to buy directly from the 
farmers, reducing the monopoly of cooperatives. The coffee market became 
liberalised during this period. However, for the period between 2000:06 and 2008:09, 
there was no long-run relationship between the two price series. This could be due to 
the fact that, in the year 2000 the government reversed the liberalisation policy, 
giving back the monopoly of buying coffee to the cooperatives. As discussed earlier, 
high government intervention in commodity markets prevents price transmission.   
 
The high r-squared values indicate that the models have a good fit, while the Durbin 
Watson (DW) values, which are close to 2, are an indication that there is no 
autocorrelation in the residuals.  
 
3.4.3 Threshold Cointegration Results 
 
This section presents cointegration and error correction results for both the TAR and 
MTAR model. However examining the AIC and BIC values for both models shows 
that the MTAR model provides a better fit than the TAR model. Therefore, 
conclusions of this study are drawn only from the results of the MTAR cointegration 
and ECM. Supply response functions are also examined based of the rate of 
adjustment from the TAR model. 
 
TAR Model Results 
 
Results for TAR which are presented in Table 3.3 indicate that Zambian Coffee 
producer prices and world prices are not cointegrated over the entire sample. 
However, the null hypothesis of no-cointegration is strongly rejected in the post-
reform period, but could not in the pre-reform period. This means that after the 
reforms the prices changes in world prices are transmitted to the producers while 
prior to the reforms this transmission was not significant. The coefficients on both 
negative and positive shocks show that adjustment improved after the reforms. For 
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example, while the Zambian coffee prices adjusted by 0.15% to correct a deviation 
from long-run equilibrium due to a decrease in the world prices prior to the reforms, 
this adjustment increased to increase to 2.45% after the economic reforms. This 
implies that economic reforms improved price transmission. Test for symmetry in the 
adjustment was done only for the post economic period in which the cointegration 
test is significant. According to the F-statistic value of 22.817, which is way above the 
1% critical value of 8.35, the null hypothesis for 21 ρρ =  could not be rejected. In that 
case price transmission is asymmetric (indicating presence of a threshold). These 
results confirm the importance of taking into account structural breaks in the data. 
Making conclusions based only on results from the entire sample which show no 
price transmission, would be misleading as the transmission is, in actual fact, 
established in the post economic reform period.  
 
Table 3.3 Threshold Autoregression Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. 1ρ  and 2ρ  are the estimated coefficients from the threshold cointegration regression. The 
numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.   
b. φ are F-statistics testing the null hypothesis of no-cointegration (i.e.   021 == ρρ ) 
c.     Are F-statistics testing the null hypothesis of symmetric cointegration (i.e. 21 ρρ = ) 
*, **, *** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  Critical 
values at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance are 8.35, 6.29 and 5.39 respectively for a 
model with consistent threshold (Enders, 2004) 
--- indicates that no tests was carried out because there is no cointegration between the price 
pairs. 
 
Zambia-World Prices  
Sample τ  a
1ρ  2ρ  
bφ  c21 ρρ =  DW 
1986:01-
2008:09 
-0.567 -0.124 
(-2.348) 
-0.219 
(-2.000) 
4.502 --- 2.020 
1986:01-
1998:05 
-1.006 -0.074 
(-1.128) 
-0.160 
(-0.518) 
0.780 --- 2.007 
1998:05-
2008:09 
-0.235 -0.217 
(1.990) 
-2.541 
(-5.220) 
14.605*** 22.817*** 1.944 
Tanzania-World Prices 
Sample τ  a
1ρ  2ρ  
bφ  c21 ρρ =   
1986:01-
2008:09 
0.030 -0.258 
(-3.265)   
-0.204 
(-2.921) 
8.604*** 0.299 1.977 
1986:01-
2000:06 
-0.030 -0.157 
(-2.452) 
-0.678 
(-4.157) 
11.451*** 8.976*** 1.985 
2000:06-
2008:09 
-0.268 0.024 
(0.218) 
-0.034 
(-0.205) 
0.051 
 
--- 2.054 
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For Tanzania, results show evidence of a long-run but symmetric relationship with 
world prices in the full sample. The F-statistics value of 8.604 indicates rejection of 
the null hypothesis of no-cointegration at 1% significance level. On the other hand, 
the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment could not be rejected at conversional 
levels over the entire period. However, the tests from the first sub-sample, during the 
time that the coffee trade was liberalised, show a long-run and asymmetric 
relationship between Tanzania and world prices. On the contrary, the results from the 
second sub-sample, the period when the liberalisation trade policy was reversed, 
shows no-cointegration between the two price series. Again these results indicate 
that economic reforms that support trade liberalisation lead to improvement in price 
transmission from world prices. 
 
TAR ECM results 
 
Table 3.4 shows the results of the short-run adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. 
Since the error correction estimations examine rate of adjustments were price pairs 
are cointegrated, only the full sample for Zambia, the full sample for Tanzania and 
the first sub-sample for Tanzania are examined as reported in Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4 TAR Error Correction Model results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results indicate quicker adjustment for negative deviations from long-run 
equilibrium in all the three cases.  It is also quiet evident that the Zambian prices do 
Zambia-World Prices  
 Zambia World Prices 
Sample PlusZ −  usZ min−  PlusZ −  usZ min−  
1998:05-
2008:09 
-0.393(-2.608) -0.551(-3.266)** -0.061(-0.807) -0.001(-0.019) 
Tanzania-World Prices 
 Tanzania World Prices 
Sample PlusZ −  usZ min−  PlusZ −  usZ min−  
1986:01-
2008:09 
0.016(0.519) -0.075(-2.203) -0.866(-1.877) -0.149(-2.915)** 
1986:01-
2000:06 
-0.121(-1.900) -0.236(-3.422)** 0.081(1.963) -0.141(-3.148)** 
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not influence world prices but the other way round given the insignificant results from 
the model when the world price is the independent variable.  Without even carrying 
out causality tests, it can be concluded that causality is in one direction with Zambian 
prices being caused by world prices. This is as expected because Zambia, being a 
very small exporter of coffee, is not likely to have significant influence on the world 
price. For Tanzania, there is causality in both directions given the significant 
coefficients from the model when the world price s the independent variable. 
However, as mentioned earlier, this study also examines the MTAR where the overall 
conclusions are drawn from. 
 
MTAR Results 
 
From the MTAR model, unlike in the TAR model, the null hypothesis of 021 == ρρ  
(no cointegration) is rejected in every case. Similarly, the null hypothesis of  21 ρρ =  
(symmetric adjustment) is rejected, apart from the pre-reform period for Zambia.  
 
Table 3.5: MTAR model estimation results 
 
***, ** and * represents significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
z-plus are F-statistics value testing the hypothesis  that all lagged price increases above the threshold 
are jointly equal to 0 
Zambia-World Prices  
Sample τ  a
1ρ  2ρ  
bφ  cϕ  DW 
1986:01-
2008:09 
-0.149 -0.094** 
(-2.702) 
-0.327*** 
(-3.869) 
10.535*** 6.760** 2.039 
1986:01-
1998:05 
-0.159 -0.1003* 
(-1.988) 
-0.348** 
(-2.897) 
5.787* 3.806 2.019 
1998:05-
2008:09 
-0.167 -0.127 
(-1.235) 
-0.753*** 
(-4.315) 
9.399*** 11.467*** 2.049 
Tanzania-World Prices 
Sample τ  a
1ρ  2ρ  
bφ  c21 ρρ =   
1986:01-
2008:09 
-0.040 -0.207** 
(-3.546) 
-0.055 
(-1.249) 
6.532* 5.048* 1.990 
1986:01-
2000:06 
-0.098 -0.089 
(-1.639) 
-0.393*** 
(-4.331) 
9.982*** 9.191*** 2.032 
2000:06-
2008:09 
0.042 -0.280** 
(-3.692) 
-0.018 
(-0.337) 
7.353** 6.043* 1.995 
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z-minus are F-statistics value testing the hypothesis  that all lagged price decreases below the 
threshold are jointly equal to 0 
The same results are observed in the first sub-sample for Tanzania. However, 
different results are observed for Tanzania in the full sample and the second sub-
sample where 
`1ρ is larger than 2ρ . These results mean that negative shocks are not 
passed on to the producers due to price stabilisation policies. In that way the shocks 
are absorbed by Government which may not be sustainable in the long-run.  
The estimates for Zambia in the full sample and the second sub-sample show that 2ρ  
is more persistent than 
`1ρ  an indication that negative shocks are more persistent 
than positive shocks. 
 
MTAR ECM 
 
Having established the long-run relationship as well as the symmetry of adjustment, 
the rate of adjustment is examined using the ECM. The results, which are presented 
in Table 3.5 indicate that adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium is quicker when 
the price spread deviates below the equilibrium for Zambia in the entire sample and 
the second sub-sample. For Zambia, the pre-economic reform period, threshold ECM 
was not estimated because there was no evidence of asymmetric adjustment. As 
expected, the rate of adjustment to negative world price shocks is quicker than to the 
positive shocks in entire sample and the post-economic reform period. While 
negative shocks in the world price are transmitted at a rate of 30% to producers, 
positive shocks are transmitted much slower at a rate of 10%.  Similarly for the post-
economic reform period, negative shocks are transmitted at a rate of 75 percent, 
while price increases are transmitted at 31% percent speed in every period. These 
finding suggest that due to market power and high transaction costs, agents are 
more likely to pass on negative price changes while reluctant to pass on price 
increases to the producers.  
 
On the other hand, the results for Tanzania-World markets are quite different with the 
exception of the second sub-sample, the liberalized period. Whereas 21 percent of a 
positive deviation is eliminated within a month, the corresponding figure for negative 
deviations is just about 5 percent, suggesting that positive deviations are eliminated 
faster than negative deviations. However, when the policy reforms are considered, 
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the results appear to differ for the different policy regimes. Specifically, the estimated 
parameters for the pre-reform period indicate that only 8 percent of positive 
deviations are eliminated within a month, while 39 percent of negative deviations are 
eliminated. After the reforms, as much as 28 percent of positive deviations appear to 
be eliminated within month, while just about 2 percent of negative deviations are 
eliminated.  
 
Table 3.6: Results of ECM for MTAR 
 
***, **,* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.    
τ
 is the threshold value determined along with the values 1ρ  and 2ρ  
φ
 are F-statistics values for TAR and MTAR with unknown threshold testing the null hypothesis 
021 == ρρ  
21 ρρ =  are F-statistics values testing the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustments i.e. 21 ρρ =  
CIP is Composite Indicator Price calculated by ICO representing world producer prices 
Z represents the Tanzanian coffee price and Z represents the Zambian coffee price 
 
The results are in line with the policy reforms in the two countries. In Zambia, reforms 
were implemented to ensure privatization of the coffee sector and to allow private 
firms to purchase coffee from producers and sell on the world markets. In Tanzania, 
Zambia-World Prices  
 Producer price World Prices 
Sample PlusZ −  usZ min−  PlusZ −  usZ min−  
1986:01-
2008:09 
-0.106 (-2.918)** 
 
-0.302  (-3.416)** 
 
0.002(0.245) -0.048(-1.827)* 
1986:01-
1998:05 
-0.135(-2.477)** -0.072(-0.727) 0.013(0.869) 0.023(0.879) 
1998:05-
2008:09 
-0.319(-2.233)** 
 
-0.747(-4.146)*** 
 
-0.033(-0.518) 0.001(0.014) 
Tanzania-World Prices 
 Producer price World Price 
Sample PlusZ −  usZ min−  PlusZ −  usZ min−  
1986:01-
2008:09 
 -0.163(-3.298)** 
 
-0.112 (-3.235)** 
 
0.0137(0.439) -0.142(-1.552) 
1986:01-
2000:06 
 -0.087(-1.811)* 
 
-0.523(-6.033)*** 
 
0.024(0.672) -0.161(-2.450)** 
2000:06-
2008:09 
-0.427(-3.046)*** 
 
-0.191(-1.202) 
 
-0.161(-1.703) -0.197(0.052) 
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reforms that took place in 2000 rather reversed the previous privatization policy, and 
rather introduced policies to ensure stable prices for farmers. This involved ensuring  
that farmers benefitted from higher world market prices, while price declines on the 
world market were absorbed by the government through stable prices.  
Like the error correction estimations from the TAR models, MTAR error correction 
coefficients presented in Table 3.5,  show faster adjustments at a rate of 33.3 percent 
for price negative shocks than positive shocks where adjustment is only by 10.7 
percent in the entire sample. 
3.4.4 Impulses response 
 
Impulse response measures the time profile of the effect of a shock on the 
behaviours of a series (Koop et. al, 1996). Therefore, the interpretation of dynamic 
interrelations among prices in different markets can be best analysed through 
impulse response functions (Porter, 1995). Impulse response is examined if price 
relations are found to be cointegrated in order to examine how producer prices 
respond to negative and positive deviations from the long-run equilibrium. In this sub-
section, the impulse response is examined only for the price relations that are 
cointegrated in the MTAR model and exhibit asymmetric price transmission. These 
include the Zambia- world price cointegration in full sample and in the second sub-
sample (after economic reforms) and the Tanzania-world price in the full sample and 
both sub-samples.  
 
Figure 3.4 shows the response of Zambian coffee prices to negative and positive 
shocks as a result of changes in coffee world prices. Although the impulse is 
observed over 100 months, the prices revert back to the normal trend within the first 
50 months (5 years). Response is however asymmetric in that, a negative shock in 
the world prices is fully transmitted to the producers within 16 months while it takes 4 
years (48 months) for the producers to fully adjust to a positive shock in world 
markets. The magnitude of the positive shocks is, however, larger than the 
magnitude of the negative shocks. This is an indication that the Zambian prices are 
likely to rise by a larger value when they are hit by a positive shock but decline by a 
smaller value if hit by a negative shock of the same magnitude. As discussed earlier, 
 68
it is important to note here that, asymmetry exists in the form of speed and 
magnitude and also varies whether the shock is positive or negative.   
 
Figure 3.4 Response of positive and negative shocks for Zambia- full sample 
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The impulse response of the Zambian prices after the economic reforms has a 
similar picture. As shown in Figure 3.5 the negative shocks are larger in magnitude 
and are more persistent than the positive shocks.  
 
Figure 3.5 Response of positive and negative shocks for Zambia after economic 
reforms 
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While it takes approximately 5 months for price decreases in world prices to be 
transmitted to the coffee producers in Zambia, the price increases take up to 15 
months before they are transmitted. This affirms assertions that prices tend to be 
stickier downwards than upwards in liberalised markets. As discussed earlier, 
following international coffee market liberalisation after the collapse of the ICA, the 
markets have become oligopolistic whereby a few firms dominate the industry.  
 
Turning to Tanzania, the impulse response of the coffee prices to deviations from 
long-run equilibrium differs from the response in the case of Zambia in the full sample 
as illustrated in Figure 3.6. While negative shocks are more persistent than positive 
shocks in the Zambian case, positive shocks tend to persist more than the negative 
shocks in the case of Tanzania.  This implies that, for Tanzania, positive deviations 
from the long-run equilibrium are corrected faster than the negative deviations. It 
takes 27 months for producer prices to react to price world price increases and up to 
37 months for price world price decreases to be transmitted. In such cases, the price 
decrease from world prices tend to be absorbed by Government in order to achieve 
price stability policies. 
 
Figure 3.6 Response of positive and negative shocks for Tanzania- full sample 
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The pattern of the price impulse response to deviations from long-run equilibrium for 
Tanzania before economic reforms is different from the pattern in the full sample 
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(Figure 3.7). While in the full sample positive shocks tend to persist over a longer 
period, in the pre-economic reform period, negative deviations from long-run 
equilibrium persist longer. Whereas positive shocks only take about 9 months to 
return to equilibrium, positive shocks take up to 50 months (more than 2 years) 
before the prices get back to the normal trend. It should be noted that, for Tanzania, 
this is the period when the coffee trade was liberalised and the cooperatives lost the 
monopoly of purchasing coffee.  
 
Figure 3.7 Response of positive and negative shocks for Tanzania before economic 
reforms 
 
-0,200
-0,100
0,000
0,100
0,200
0,300
0,400
0,500
0,600
0,700
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81
 
 
Like in the case of Zambia, the results strongly demonstrate asymmetries in the 
transmission of world price to producer price, a reflection of imperfect markets among 
other factors.  
 
In the post-economic reform period, when the liberalisation policy was reversed, the 
Tanzanian prices react slowly to world price decreases but swiftly to world price 
increases. As illustrated in Figure 3.8, price increases are fully transmitted to the 
producers within 9 months while price decreases take up to 22 months before they 
are transmitted. 
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Figure 3.8 Response of Positive and Negative Shocks for Tanzania Post Economic 
Reforms 
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3.5 Conclusion  
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the results of the study. First, it has come out 
clearly that when data is examined without paying attention to structural breaks, 
coffee producer prices in Tanzania and Zambia are found to move together with 
world prices. However, when the sample is divided according to the pre and post-
economic reforms period, estimations from the TAR model show that signals from 
world prices were not being transmitted to Zambia prices in the pre-reform period. As 
price transmission was only established after economic reforms, it clearly shows that 
trade liberalisation does connect producer prices. As demand for coffee is likely to 
increase, following China’s economic boom, the producers are in this regard likely to 
benefit from increased prices in the long-term. If Governments want to aim at 
improving prices, especially in the case of Tanzania, less control of the marketing 
system should be considered. However, policies should take into account the fact 
that improved transmission also means exposing the prices to the volatility of the 
world price. Therefore, measures should be put in place to ensure that farmers take 
advantage of market-based risk minimising strategies for coffee prices.  
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Overall, the study has found that asymmetric price adjustments evident in coffee 
markets. In Zambia’s case, the study has shown that although market liberalisation 
policies improve price transmission from world prices, price decreases are 
transmitted faster than price increases. High transaction costs and lack of market 
information are some of the factors that lead to asymmetric price transmission. As an 
intervention to ensure efficient price transmission, farmers need to be informed on 
time, the world market changes. This can only be possible if infrastructure is 
developed especially in the rural areas where the coffee is grown. Infrastructural 
development also reduces the transaction costs, another important factor contributing 
to asymmetric price transmission. In the case of Tanzania, the study has shown that, 
controlled market policies, although could lead to stable prices, do not help producers 
benefit from price increases because price transmission is either slow or non-
existent. Trade policies that encourage greater integration with world prices can be 
beneficial to the producers in the long-run, although short-run price volatility can 
discourage the producers.  
 
Second, our study found MTAR with more power to reject the hypothesis as 
compared to TAR and the Engle-Granger symmetric cointegration tests. The AIC and 
SBC values also confirm that the MTAR is a better model. However, both threshold 
models provide better explanation of short run adjustments and asymmetries 
compared to the symmetric Engle-Granger cointegration model. In any case, 
researchers should apply both models because while the TAR model can capture 
asymmetrically ‘deep’ movements in the series, the MTAR captures the possibility of 
asymmetrically sharp or steep movements in a series. A combined application of the 
two models has been missing in most articles of asymmetric price transmission that 
have been published in the recent empirical literature.  
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Chapter 4: 
 
Impact of Economic Reforms on Coffee Price Volatility in Zambia 
and Tanzania  
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Abstract 
 
During the 1990s, Zambia and Tanzania both implemented economic reforms that 
included agricultural market liberalisation with differing levels of depth and impact on 
coffee markets.  This paper investigates the effects of these economic reforms on 
coffee producer price volatility in the two countries. Unlike most previous work which 
employ only symmetric GARCH models, this paper employs Threshold GARCH 
(TGARCH) models to examine asymmetric effects of shocks on volatility, taking into 
account the fact that positive and negative shocks may not have the same effect on 
volatility. This is essential for price interventions policy. The results show that market 
libearlisation led to an increase in coffee price volatility in Zambia. The volatility is 
asymmetric such that negative shocks lead to more volatile prices than positive 
shocks of the same magnitude. On the contrary, in Tanzania where coffee market 
liberalisation has been inconsistent, the reforms have had no significant effects on 
coffee price volatility.  
 
Key Words: Volatility, Coffee Markets, GARCH, TGARCH, Economic Reforms  
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Designing economic policies to achieve price stabilisation has long been a challenge 
for most countries in Africa. Agricultural commodity prices have continuously 
remained unstable, leading to devastating effects on food security and the general 
welfare of the producers, who are mostly small-scale poor farmers (World Bank, 
2009). Low-income countries tend to be vulnerable to price volatility in their export 
commodities as they have limited ways to protect themselves from global price 
volatility (Akiyama et. al, 2003). High price volatility makes it difficult for producers to 
plan production since they do not know in advance how international prices will be. 
Consequently, governments cannot predict export revenues, and hence, cannot 
engage in stable socio-economic policies. 
 
Economic reforms in Africa significantly changed the way primary agricultural 
commodities were marketed (Akiyama et. al, 2003). While price stabilisation was the 
policy objective prior to the reforms, the main objective after the reforms was to 
enhance private sector participation in order to enable farmers receive a larger share 
of the export price. The agricultural reforms introduced by world bank and IMF aimed 
at reducing state control of agricultural markets thereby opening up to the private 
sector, thus fostering competitive markets which would lead to increased agricultural 
production. In general, the reforms included 1) liberalisation of input and output 
prices by eliminating subsidies on agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and credit, by 
bringing domestic crop prices in line with world prices, and by ending the practice of 
imposing a single price for all regions and seasons; 2) reducing overvalued exchange 
rates by partially liberalising the market for foreign exchange; 3) encouraging private-
sector activity through removal of regulatory controls in input and output markets; 4) 
restructuring and/or privatising public enterprises and restricting marketing boards’ 
activities such as providing market information and maintaining security stocks 
(Kherellah, 2000, pp9).  
 
Whether producer prices essentially improved in magnitude and stability in the post 
reform era is a question that most economists have attempted to address in recent 
studies. Although in-depth empirical studies on coffee price volatility are few, the 
evidence available shows that price volatility significantly increased after economic 
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reforms despite the fact that farmers’ shares of the retail prices considerably 
increased (e.g. Karanja et al., 2003 Krivonos, 2004; Newman, 2006; Gemech and 
Struthers, 2007; Hill, 2010). In other countries such as Uganda, studies show that 
coffee prices became very vulnerable to internal price fluctuations (Fafchamps and 
Hill, 2008). In general, the economic reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s 
were less restrictive than elsewhere, resulting in sudden dissolution of producer 
cooperatives and consequent reduction in the producer’s bargaining power, such that 
farmers were now exposed to price risks that were previously absorbed by the 
government (Krivonos, 2004). However, for commodities that were taxed prior to 
reforms, the welfare consequences of reform may be offsetting, that is, the reforms 
that boost producers share of export prices may well compensate for increased price 
volatility (Akiyama et al. 2003).   
 
Crop commodities in particular, are highly susceptible to price volatility because of 
the nature of the production and marketing cycle.11 When prices increase, farmers 
are motivated to increase production, such that excess production may lead to price 
decline. When prices decline, farmers get discouraged from investing in production, 
leading to low yields and less supply. In the end, prices rise again due to low supply. 
In the case of Coffee, volatility is exacerbated by the fact that coffee is a perennial 
crop with lags between plantation and harvesting varying between 18 to 24 months.  
Peak yields are only experienced after 5 to 7 years. This implies that, while input 
investments respond quickly to price changes, supply response in coffee markets is 
very slow. Consequently, additional supply tends to reach the market when prices 
are on the decline, leaving the farmers with no choice but to sell at any price. 
Moreover, following the fall of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA)12 in 1989, 
which had put in place a pricing mechanism to stabilise prices, coffee producer pries 
at international level became very volatile (ICO data). Some researchers have also 
linked the deregulation of the international coffee market to increased coffee supply 
                                                 
11
 There are various other factors associated with coffee price volatility. Three factors have come out 
strongly in literature; 1) Market deregulations- at domestic and international levels, 2) failure of 
international cooperation to stabilise prices 3) the development of commodity exchange markets- with 
future deals making up to 80% of coffee trade. It is agued that price volatility encourages futures 
trading, which in turn magnifies volatility (Gilbert and Brunetti,1996).   
 
 
 82
on the market, especially after the emergence of Vietnam as second largest producer 
after Brazil. Consequently, international coffee prices fell drastically in the last two 
decades hitting lowest prices in 1992, a situation which severely affected many 
producing countries. In Tanzania, many producers were forced to diversify their 
income-generating activities from coffee in order to reduce price risks (Pirotte et al., 
2006; Newman, 2006).  In some cases, coffee trees were being uprooted and the 
fields replaced with other crops such as maize. Similarly for Zambia, a number of 
large estates closed down, leaving tens of thousands of the rural population out of 
employment. Zambia’s coffee production also drastically declined from approximately 
7000mt to less than 2000mt in the last four years.13  
 
While the body of literature on commodity price volatility has increased in the last two 
decades, specific literature on coffee price volatility is rather scanty. Currently there 
are only two studies that have empirically examined coffee price instability and the 
causes;  Newman (2006) studied the extent to which changing market structures 
have caused rise in coffee price volatility while Krivonos (2004) investigated the 
impact of trade reforms on coffee price movements. Krivonos concluded that, the 
improvement in coffee price transmission from world markets has exposed producer 
prices to the risk that was previously absorbed by the government. The Newman 
(2006) study even included a volatility analysis in the case of Tanzania but did not 
provide statistical evidence of increased price volatility in the post economic reforms 
as compared to the pre-economic reform period. While the Krivonos (2004) study 
only carried out price transmission analysis but did not examine the volatility.  
Further, none of these studies considered threshold or asymmetry effects of volatility.  
 
Ever since Glosten et. al. (1993) introduced asymmetry volatility models, most of its 
application has been confined to financial data save for a few studies that have 
extended the model to commodity markets. One example is the study by Guilda and 
Mtringe (2004) that applied symmetric and asymmetric volatility models in financial 
and commodity price series. They found that asymmetric models led to better 
forecasts than the symmetric one.  Another interesting study was by Shively (2001) 
who examined threshold volatility in spatial maize markets in Ghana. He found that 
grain prices in Ghana followed a threshold process characterized by low variance 
                                                 
13
 www.zcga.co.zm 
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and high variance regimes. In this study, auto-regression conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH)-type models are employed, particularly the Threshold 
Generalized ARCH (TGARCH) in order to examine asymmetric effects of shocks on 
volatility. There has been very little application of asymmetric models in volatility 
analysis in most economic literature, despite evidence of asymmetric price 
transmission in agricultural commodity markets (See e.g Krivonos, 2004). More over, 
the TGARCH model enables the assessment of asymmetric effects of the shocks on 
price volatility, an aspect that most studies have overlooked.   
 
Volatility of coffee prices for Zambia and Tanzania is examined paying attention to 
asymmetric behaviour and the impact of coffee market liberalisation. In both 
countries, significant market reforms occurred especially in agricultural commodities. 
However, the liberalization process, particularly in the coffee industry, varied between 
the two countries, both in the scope of the reforms and their consequences (Akiyama 
et. al. 2003). While Zambia’s coffee market is fully liberalized where producers sell 
directly to traders, Tanzania’s coffee market still has some government intervention 
such as mandatory coffee auctioning (Jeffes, 2004; Akiyama et al. 2003; Newman, 
2006). The diversity between the two countries provides a better understanding of 
impacts of economic reforms under different market structures. Coffee is Tanzania’s 
largest agricultural export commodity with half a million small scale farmers directly 
earns their living from the commodity.  For Zambia, coffee has a very small share of 
agricultural exports, although it counts as one of the top ten non-traditional exports. 
Zambian coffee (a mild Arabica variety) fetches very high but unstable prices 
compared to coffee from most African countries.  On the other hand, Tanzanian 
coffee prices (both for Arabica and Robusta varieties) are among the lowest on the 
continent but very stable (See Figure 4.2 in section 4.5). Moreover Tanzania is the 
only country in Africa where the target share of producer prices of the world market 
price did not increase following liberalization (Krivonos, 2004).  
 
This study investigates price volatility in coffee markets for Zambia and Tanzania. 
The analysis includes an examination of the effects of economic reforms on coffee 
price volatility in the two countries. More important, the study examines the impact of 
negative and positive shocks to the prices on price volatility. 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In the next section, an overview of 
economic reforms in Zambia and Tanzania is given, particularly those that directly or 
indirectly relate to the agricultural sector and the coffee industry in particular. Section 
three discusses the conceptual framework including a discussion of the models used 
and the methodology of this study.  Section four describes the data and the results 
are discussed in section five. The last section gives a conclusion.      
 
4.2 Economic Reforms and Coffee Markets in Tanzania and Zambia 
 
Prior to the 1990s economic reforms in Tanzania, all coffee marketing was handled 
by the Tanzania Marketing Board (TMB) and the cooperative unions, who also 
provided inputs, transportation and processing services. In 1990, Tanzanian 
government took the first steps in restructuring the coffee industry. A notable 
improvement of the reforms was the prompt payment (within three weeks) to the 
unions by the Coffee Board (Baffes, 2005:25). By 1992 the cooperatives were 
allowed to decide prices paid to growers. In 1993 legislation allowing private sector 
participation in marketing and processing coffee was passed, which also further 
reduced government’s control of pricing. In 1994 cooperatives lost their monopoly 
after the Government passed a legislation to allow multinational and domestic buyers 
to buy directly from individual farmers.   
 
Although this move led to improvements in private sector participation, the 
functioning of input markets deteriorated as the provision of credit declined. This, 
coupled with the decline in the quality and the quantity of services such as research 
and extension, resulted in a drastic decline in the overall quality of coffee. 
Subsequently, in 1999/2000, the Coffee Board adjusted the policies in order to help 
the small-scale farmers, who, it seemed, had not benefited from trade liberalization. 
Currently only about 20% of the coffee is sold directly to international traders (mainly 
by large estates), while 80% has to go through the government run auctions 
(Newman, 2006).    
 
For Zambia, prior to economic reforms, the Zambian economy was characterized by 
strong state intervention in agricultural markets, which involved the fixing of producer 
prices, the provision of transportation, storage and inputs, and subsidizing of credit 
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for agricultural  commodities (Wichern and Hausner, 1999). The exchange rate was 
also constantly overvalued, which had an indirect impact on the producers of tradable 
commodities. Private traders of all agricultural commodities were not allowed and 
even discouraged by the fixed market margins by the Government. After 1990, 
government implemented a series of liberalization policies that aimed at decontrolling 
prices, privatization of state-owned enterprises, reducing inflation and introducing 
market-based exchange and interest rates. The privatization included large scale 
coffee estates, which under government management had become insolvent as 
mentioned above. Although the liberalization policies were constantly reversed for 
some crops (especially for maize after some shocks such as droughts), the coffee 
industry in Zambia remained fully liberalized where producers sell directly to traders. 
 
It is quiet evident that coffee price volatility in the two countries is influenced by the 
trade policies. Since the policies determine how price shocks in world markets are 
transmitted to producer prices, the level and persistence of the volatility will largely 
depend on the market policies.  In order to understand how the level and persistence 
of volatility is measured, the next section gives a theoretical background for 
understanding volatility in commodity markets. 
 
4.3 Theoretical Framework for understanding commodity price volatility 
 
Most commodity price data tend to exhibit volatility persistence, leverage effects14  
and the tendency of large residuals to cluster together in such a way that large 
changes follow large changes and small changes follow small changes- a fashion 
known as volatility clustering. The changes are largely unpredicted both in the 
magnitude and the sign. Large disturbances become part of the information set used 
to construct the variance forecast of the next period’s disturbances. As a result, large 
shocks either negative or positive can persist, influencing future prices for several 
periods. Therefore, volatility shows the variance/standard deviation of the error term 
and what makes them large.  
 
                                                 
14
 Leverage effects are a kind of asymmetric effects of the previous periods’ variance on volatility. It is 
a situation where negative return sequences are associated with increases in the volatility of the 
prices. 
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Commodity price volatility is modelled using Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (ARCH)-type models such as the Generalised Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) (Bollersler, 1986). Ideally, the goal of the 
ARCH/GARCH model is to provide a volatility measure, such as the standard 
deviation, that can be used for making decisions concerning risk and derivative 
pricing (Engle, 2001). ARCH/GARCH models consider the variance of the current 
errors to be a function of the actual size of the previous errors. Enders (2004) 
explains that since the conditional heteroskedasticity of { tε } in equation (1) will result 
in heteroskedasticity in { ty }, ARCH-type models are able to explain periods of 
volatility and tranquillity. Because of the presence of heterosdasticity in the error 
term, ARCH-type models have an advantage over other volatility measuring 
mechanisms such as the coefficient of Variation (CV).15 ARCH-type models have 
widely been used in different studies (e.g. Boleslaw, 1990; Shivery, 2001; Brooks, 
2002 and Linton, 2008).  
 
Contrary to the homoskedasticity assumption,16 ARCH/GARCH models are based on 
the expectation that not all data have all error term values that are the same at any 
given time. Especially for agricultural commodities and in particular producer prices 
that rely on external markets, the variance of the error term is not likely to be 
constant over time. In this case a problem would arise as heteroskedasticity or data 
in which the variances of the error term are not equal, resulting in errors and 
confidence intervals estimated by least squares being narrow, giving false sense of 
precision (Engle, 2001). To avoid this problem, ARCH models treat 
heteroskedasticity as a variance to be modelled. In this way, the deficiencies of least 
squares are corrected and a prediction is computed for variance of each error.  
 
The basic ARCH-type model is the ARCH model itself and is composed of two 
equations, which are estimated simultaneously. The first equation is the conditional 
mean equation which describes the expected value of the stochastic process ty . It is 
                                                 
15
 The CV is the absolute value of ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. 
16
 For a homoskedasticity innovation, the error term, with mean zero is assumed to have a constant 
variance over a period of time, presented as: t
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assumed that the time series ty  is stationary with constant variance. The second 
equation is the conditional variance equation and the variance is assumed to be 
heteroskedastic.  Since volatility is unobservable characteristic of a series, a proxy is 
chosen for it which is the variance tσ . 
 
ttt Xy εθ += '   where ),0(~ 21 ttt N σψε −         (1) 
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While in the ARCH model, the conditional variance depends on the squared residuals 
of the last period, in the GARCH model the conditional variance term will depend 
upon the lagged variances as well as the lagged (squared) residuals. This allows for 
persistence in volatility with a relatively small number of parameters.  Presence of 
ARCH effects does not imply absence of GARCH effects. ARCH effects indicate 
presence of autocorrelation, such that, high order models are required. To 
circumvent such misspecification, volatility is better modelled using GARCH models, 
which combines the ARCH (q) and variance (p) equation into a non-linear ARMA 
(p,q) process presented as:  
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It follows that, if there are no GARCH effects the sum of the coefficients should be 
equal to zero, i.e.  
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In that case, the long run variance 2tσω = .  
Since variance is strictly positive, sufficient conditions to ensure non-negativity are; 
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arbitrage will not be able to adjust the level of volatility to a long run equilibrium. 
Engle and Bollerslev (1986) refer this to Integrated GARCH (IGARCH). Due to non-
linearity of most time series data, ARCH/GARCH models are estimated using the 
maximum likelihood.17  
 
A challenge facing the ARCH/GARCH model is the implication that positive and 
negative residuals have a symmetric impact on the conditional variance. GARCH 
models assume that good and bad news have the same effect on volatility, an 
assumption which is often violated (Black, 1976). Glosten et al. (1993) and 
Rabemanayjara and Zakoian (1993) discuss threshold models that allow for negative 
residuals to affect the conditional variance differently from the positive residuals. 
Noticably, ever since Glosten et al. (1993) introduced asymmetry volatility models, 
most of its application has been to financial data analysis, except for a few studies 
that extended the model to commodity markets. One example is the study by Guilda 
and Matringe (2004) that applied symmetric and asymmetric volatility models to 
financial and commodity price data. They found that asymmetric models led to better 
forecasts than the symmetric one, based on values of various model fit statistics. 
Another study examined threshold volatility in spatial maize markets in Ghana 
(Shively, 2001). The study found that grain prices in Ghana followed a threshold 
                                                 
17
 The maximum likelihood is given by: 
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 89
process characterized by low variance and high variance regimes. The Threshold 
GARCH model is specified as:  
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where iλ  is the parameter capturing asymmetric effects in the model such that tests 
for asymmetry include a test of all iλ . If the iλ is statistically different from Zero, the 
data contain a threshold effect. The threshold in this case is 01 =−tε  such that the 
effects of the shocks greater than the threshold will be different from those below the 
threshold. 1−td  is an indicator function for 1−tε  such that 11 =−td  when 1−tε  is negative 
and 01 =−td  when 1−tε  is positive. That means that negative values of 1−tε  tend to 
increase the variance more than positive values. This is because the effect of the 
shock on the variance when 1−tε  is negative and 11 =−td  will be ii λα + but when 1−tε  
is positive and 01 =−td , the effect will be only the iα . Therefore a positive value of iλ  
means that a past negative return has a larger impact on conditional volatility than a 
past positive return of the same amplitude- a situation commonly referred to as 
leverage effect (Enders, 2004: pp. 141). This implies that the bad news has more 
effect on the variance than the good news.  
 
To examine the effect of economic reforms on volatility while at the same time, taking 
into account possibility of asymmetric movements, I modify the TGARCH model to 
include a dummy variable for the period of the economic reforms as identified 
endogenously using Lagrange multiplier unit root tests. Because the reforms were 
implemented over a period of time, the structural break is identified endogenously to 
ensure the true effect of the reforms on the data generating process. Equation (4) is 
therefore modified as; 
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where RF  is a dummy variable for Economic reforms such that 1=δ  for the period 
before the reforms and 0=δ  for period after the reforms.  
(8) 
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4.4 GARCH Model Estimation Procedure 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the methodology for estimating GARCH models as suggested 
by Moledine et al. (2007). The first step is unit root testing. Ideally, stationary series 
should be used in modelling volatility in order to meet the time series modelling 
assumption of zero mean. If the series is non-stationary, then it should be differenced 
to attain stationarity.  
 
Figure 4.1: Steps in Modelling Volatility 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Moledine et. al. 2007 
 
The second step is the identification of the model (number of lags) using Box-Jekins 
approach along with information criteria such as the Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC). After identifying the number of lags, the model is tested for ARCH effects. If 
the hypothesis of ‘no ARCH’ effects is rejected, then there is heteroskedasticity in the 
error term. It is then clear that the model should not be estimated with ordinary 
ARMA models, rather, with GARCH models which do not assume homoskedasticity 
(Engle, 2001).  
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4.5 Data Description 
 
The study uses monthly observations of coffee prices measured in US$ per pound 
(lb) for Tanzania and Zambia.  Both series have 273 monthly observations covering 
the period January 1986 to September. The price series’ are presented shown in 
Figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2: Coffee Producer Prices for Zambia and Tanzania in UD$/ per Lb 
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Source: Author’s Presentation based on Data from ICO 
 
In order to compute the data in a continuous way as well as ensure stationarity, 
prices are in natural logarithms of returns. The price return is calculated as logarithm 
price at a given time less the logarithm price at the previous time presented in  
 
1−−= ttt InPInPR           (9) 
 
Where tR  is the price return, tP  is price at time t and 1−tP  is price at the previous 
period. In this way the variance of the price return is taken as the risk level of the 
returns (Engle, 2001). Presence of heteroskedasticity therefore implies that some 
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time periods are riskier than others, where the magnitude of the variance is higher in 
some periods and lower in other periods. 
 
A visual inspection of price return series (Figure 4.3) shows some evidence of 
heteroskedasticity given that the variance is not the same over time. The amplitude 
of the variance is higher in some periods while very low in other periods. For 
example, the both producer prices experienced very high volatility around 1994, a 
time when major economic reforms were taking place.  
 
Figure 4.3 Price returns for Zambia and Tanzania 
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Statistical properties of the series are reported in Table 4.1. If the standard deviation 
is taken as a measure of volatility, Zambia prices are the most unstable with a 
standard deviation of 0.297.  Tanzania series is less volatile than Zambia prices but 
its standard deviation is 0.03 higher than world price. Additionally, all the three 
producer price series show evidence of fat tails since they are all above the normal 
 93
distribution value of 3. Retail prices on the other hand show evidence of normal 
distribution with kurtosis less than 3. Since volatility clustering, which is a type of 
heteroskedasticity, is responsible for excess kurtosis (fat tails), high volatility for the 
three producer prices compared to the retail price is expected but not for retail prices. 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for the series 
 
 Zambia Tanzania World 
Mean 0.007 -0.001 -0.002 
Std Dev. 0.297 0.112 0.082 
Skewness  0.833 2.0533 0.563 
Kurtosis (excess) 7.169 13.010 3.669 
 
Skewness is positive and significantly different from zero for Zambia and world 
prices, an indication that there are more values above the zero mean than below. It is 
somehow abnormally high in the Tanzania series, probably due to non free trade 
policies in that country during most of the time period under review. It is also positive 
but relatively smaller for retail prices compared to producer prices, an indication of 
normality.  
 
4.6 Results 
  
Volatility analysis requires that the variables are stationary in order to obtain 
meaningful results. Unit root tests to examine stationarity were performed using 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test and Lagrange multiplier structural break tests. It 
was necessary to apply structural break unit root tests because the observed period 
experienced policy changes at domestic and international level, which could result in 
structural breaks in the data. Lee and Strazichich (2004) structural break unit root test, 
which simultaneously indentifies a structural break and tests for unit root, was applied 
to all the four series.  Results show that all series are non-stationary at level while 
stationary at first difference (Table 4.2).   
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Table 4.2: Unit root tests 
 
Coffee Prices 
1986:1 to 2008:9    
ADF LSLM (Intercept no trend) 
 Level 1st 
difference 
Structural 
Break 
Level 1st 
Differences 
 
 Log Zambia 9 lags -2.470 -7.656** 
 
1998:05 -2.586 -7.308** 
Log Tanzania 13 lags - 2.162 - 4.627** 2000:06 
       
-2.511 -4.681** 
Log World Price (CIP) 
10 lags 
-2.28700 -4.7236** 1989:06 -2.2415 -4.9736** 
 
According to Lee and Strachizic structural break unit root tests, Zambia coffee prices 
experienced a structural break in May, 1998. Given the occurrence of agricultural 
market policy changes, 1998 coincides with completion of agricultural liberalisation 
initiated around 1991 (Rainer Wichern, 1999). In Tanzania’s case, a structural break 
occurred in June 2000. From the occurrence of coffee trade policy changes, 
Tanzania adopted liberalised trade system in 1991. However, in 2000/2001 the 
coffee Board revoked the buying licenses of private traders, effectively handing the 
monopsony power back to the unions (Krivonos, 2004).  
 
To establish the number of lags to include in the model, we examine the 
autocorrelation using Box-Jekins model. As presented in Figure 4.4, the series have 
the p-values which are almost zero, apart from the first lag which is almost one.  In 
this case, the models should include one lag to account for the autocorrelation. The 
models are then GARCH (1, 1) and TGARCH (1, 1). 
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Figure 4.4: Autocorrelations of price returns 
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Statistical analyses of ARCH effects confirm heteroskedasticity for both Zambia and 
Tanzania at 1% significance level. The ARCH results are presented in Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.3: ARCH test results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The F-statistics show that Zambia experienced the most volatile coffee producer 
prices over the observed period, which is even more than world prices. However, 
Tanzania prices are less volatile than world prices. The volatility is significant in all 
series, an implying presence of heteroskedasticity. GARCG models can then be 
applied to examine volatility. For this study, GARCH (1, 1) and TGARCH(1,1) models 
are estimated for Zambia, Tanzania and world prices, to establish impact, 
persistence and symmetric effects of price shocks on volatility. The value of α  
parameter (the ARCH component of the model) in equation (8), which is the sum of 
squared residuals, measures the impact of price shocks on volatility. The variance 
parameter β  (the GARCH component of the model) and the threshold parameter λ  
show persistence and symmetry of the price shocks respectively.  
 
The results of the estimation and the statistical verification of the two models 
(GARCH and TGARCH) are summarized in Table 4.4. The estimated coefficients for 
GARCH(1,1) have the correct sign for Zambia and are all statistically significant. 
Ward tests for the restriction 1=+ βα  which tests the null hypothesis of ‘no GARCH’ 
effect is rejected at 1 percent for all the three producer prices. The estimated 
coefficients affirm preliminary results discussed earlier, which show evidence of high 
volatility for Zambia compared to the other price series. Any shock to the system 
triggers 58 percent volatility in the case of Zambia. The shocks hardly have any 
effects on Tanzania prices, where a shock to the prices, leads to only 0.08 percent 
volatility. However, even if Zambia experiences the largest impact, persistence of the 
volatility is relatively low. The price volatility due to a shock persists for only 15 
 F-statistic Significance  
Zambia  7.233 0.000*** 
Tanzania 3.689 0.006*** 
CIP 4.997 0.001*** 
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months before disappearing. Volatility persistence is however very high in the case of 
Tanzania lasting up to 51 months. The coefficient for the domestic economic reforms 
is not significant in both countries in the GARCH (1, 1) model.  
 
The results from the TGARCH present a different picture. For Zambia, almost all the 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant. Unlike in the GARCH estimation, 
the impact of the shocks on volatility is very low for Zambia in the TGARCH (1, 1) 
estimation. The shocks trigger only 0.04 percent volatility which is not statistically 
significant. The volatility is however more persistent such that the prices remain 
volatile due to a shock in one period for the next 59 months (almost 5 years). In that 
case, persistence of even small impacts is very high. Similar to GARCH results, the 
impact of shocks on volatility of prices in Tanzania is very low in TGARCH compared 
to Zambia. In Tanzania’s case any shock triggers only 0.8 percent, although that 
persists up to 38 months. Again, a plausible explanation for the differences could be 
the extent of liberalisation (although that could not be the only factor).  The sign for 
the dummy variable representing economic reforms is positive and statistically 
significant for Zambia in the TGARCH model but not in the GARCH model. The 
results indicate that price volatility increased after the economic reforms. However, 
for Tanzania, the impact of the economic reforms is not significant probably due to 
the fact that the reforms have been constantly reversed as discussed earlier.   
 
The λ  parameter in the TGARCH models is significantly different from zero for 
Zambia confirming existence of asymmetric effects. Since the coefficient is positive, a 
conclusion can be made that bad news (negative shocks) has more effect on 
volatility than good news. However, the hypothesis of ‘no asymmetric effect’ is not 
rejected for Tanzania, an indication that positive and negative shocks had the same 
effect on volatility. Again this could be explained by high government intervention in 
setting prices, which does not reflect the actual movements of world producer prices.  
 
To verify previous empirical findings that Asymmetric TGARCH models are better 
than symmetric GARCH model (Guida and Matringe, 2004) different statistics that 
explain the best fit for the model are examined. 
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Table 4.4: Volatility estimates of GARCH and TGARCH models 
 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses while f-statistics are given in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient 
Zambia 
GARCH 
Zambia 
TGARHG 
Tanzania 
GARCH 
Tanzania 
TGARCH 
World  
GARCH 
World 
TGARCH 
 
Mean  
 
-0.004(-0.234) 
 
-0.038(-2.369) 
 
0.008(0.849) 
 
0.008(0.718) 
 
-0.005(-1.142) 
 
-0.005(-0.965) 
 
C 
 
0.036(7.421)*** 
 
0.010(3.177)** 
 
0.018(4.206)*** 
 
0.017(2.616)* 
 
-0.014(-1.23) 
 
0.003(2.955) 
 
α
 
 
0.581(3.510)*** 
 
0.037(1.217) 
 
0.077(1.231) 
 
0.377(3.293)**   
 
0.309(3.178) 
 
0.387(2.767) 
β  0.148(2.099)* 0.594(10.012)*** -0.506(-1.820) -0.593 (-0.918) 0.378(3.112) 0.324(2.242) 
λ  --- 0.830(3.311)** --- 0.020(0.336) --- --- 
Reform 
 
F-stats( 0=++ λβα ) 
-0.015(-0.571)   
 
30.43(0.000)*** 
0.074(2.970)** 
 
64.66(0.000)*** 
-0.014(-1.227) 
 
55.54(0.000)*** 
-0.013(-1.047) 
 
5.470(0.004)** 
--- 
 
18.165(0.000) 
--- 
 
12.835(0.000) 
LL 
 
AIC 
 
SBC 
-18.55 
 
0.173 
 
0.239 
-9.800 
 
0.116 
 
0.196 
217.453 
 
-1.562 
 
-1.495 
218.096 
 
-1.560 
 
-1.480 
309.89 
 
-2.2492 
 
-2.196 
310.87 
 
-2.2490 
 
-2.183 
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Figure 4.5: Volatility of Zambia and Tanzania prices compared to the world price 
 
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
 
a. Volatility of Zambian and World Prices     b. Volatility of Tanzanian and World Prices 
                  
          World Prices          Zambia                Tanzania               World Prices 
 
 
 
 101
The three include the Log Likelihood (LL), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). In this case, a lower statistic in absolute values is 
an indication of a better model fit. Results (presented in the last 3 rows of Table 4.4) 
show that in each of the three price series, TGARCH has lower values compared to 
GARCH models.  Thus the best results are achieved by TGARCH, which also takes 
asymmetric effects of shocks into account.  
Overall, the study has confirmed that coffee producer prices at producer level and 
world market level are more volatile than retail prices. Visual inspection of price 
volatility in Figure 4.5 above, shows that whereas the volatility of the Tanzanian 
prices are relatively on a rather constant low level, the volatility of the Zambian prices 
shows huge up-and down turns. On the hand the volatility for world prices is more 
constant compared to Zambia, but less so compared to Tanzania.    
 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
This paper has investigated the impact and persistence of shocks on coffee price 
volatility in different markets. Special attention was given to the impact of economic 
reforms that included coffee market liberalization in Zambia and Tanzania. Structural 
breaks around the times of economic reforms were identified using endogenous 
Lagrange multiplier unit root tests. Although the paper applied two ARCH-type 
models (GARCH and TGARCH), the conclusion is mainly drawn on the results of the 
TGARCH model, which was found to provide a better fit of the model, based on 
absolute values of the log likelihood, the AIC and BIC.  
 
TGARCH results show discernible effect of economic reforms on price volatility in 
completely liberalised markets. It is evident that producer prices in Zambia, which 
has a completely liberalized coffee market, showed lower impact but longer 
persistence of shocks on volatility compared to producer prices in Tanzania. The 
persistence of shocks on volatility in the Zambian case was even longer than for 
world prices. However, world prices had a higher impact of the shocks on volatility 
than Zambia and Tanzania. Although certainly not the only factor, economic reforms 
have inescapably exposed coffee producer prices to world prices, as concluded by 
several earlier studies. Other factors could be that, small producers like Zambia, are 
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inevitably price takers with neither capacity nor government interests in controlling 
price movements. 
 
On the other hand, the Government in Tanzania pays much attention to ensuring 
price stability, even after the implementation of economic reforms, given the 
significant role coffee plays on the economy (as the second export commodity).  
Although price stability could be to the advantage of the producers for stable incomes 
in short-run, the price intervention policies have negatively affected Tanzanian coffee 
prices in the long-run. As the study has shown, Tanzanian prices have in the long-run 
lagged far below world producer prices, and are even much lower than Zambian 
prices (again there could be other factors such as quality of coffee produced that 
could contribute to price levels and volatility).  Moreover, this study found that the 
effect of economic reforms was not significant for Tanzania, indicating that continued 
government intervention in price stabilisation prevented the intended economic 
reforms to have any impact on price volatility.  
 
What governments should focus on is a holistic approach to ensuring price stability – 
especially market based price stabilisation policies. The direct Government 
intervention in price stabilisation may not be sustainable in the long-run. In addition, 
infrastructure developments in order to improve communication and information 
dissemination become important in minimising price volatility. Current price 
interventions in coffee markets such as Fair trade initiatives are another option that 
can enable farmers obtains a fair share of the retail prices.  
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Chapter 5: 
 
Response of Coffee Supply in Zambia: Implications for Policy 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines coffee supply response to variance incentives in Zambia. 
Results show that in the long run coffee supply does not respond to coffee prices, but 
that it responds negatively to local currency (Kwacha) appreciation.  At the same 
time, economic reforms which were implemented in 1998 have had a positive effect 
on coffee supply. Vitally, results show that in the long-run, real exchange rate has 
had the highest impact on coffee supply. This implies that currency liberalisation has 
positive effect on coffee production in Zambia. To examine asymmetric short-run 
supply adjustments, unlike previous research, this study employs a dynamic 
threshold error correction model based on threshold auto regression estimation.  
Results confirm asymmetric short-run adjustment to long-run equilibrium. Particularly 
supply response is significant for positive shocks while insignificant to negative 
shocks. These results show that coffee supply does not adjust immediately, until the 
shocks reach a certain threshold.  This study fills in a gap in the supply response 
literature, which has virtually failed to analyse asymmetric supply response so far. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
High and sustainable agricultural growth, mainly driven by agricultural productivity is 
needed for African countries to reduce poverty and foster economic development. 
Agricultural growth in Africa remains a key factor in economic development as it 
accounts for large shares of national income, employment and foreign trade (Forum 
for Agricultural Research in Africa, 2006, pp.7). The growth in agricultural productivity 
is likely to depend on, among other things, adequate access to productive resources, 
well functioning markets, infrastructure, and a conducive policy environment (e.g. 
stable macro economic policies). In the last two decades, many countries in Africa 
implemented structural adjustment programs, which included agricultural policy 
changes, in the effort to provide conducive environment for increasing output. 
Despite these economic reforms, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including 
Zambia, continue to face the challenges of declining agricultural productivity 
compared to other continents, raising concerns on supply responsiveness.  
 
Coffee, an essential export commodity in most eastern African countries, has 
suffered declining levels of production amidst declining and unstable prices.18 
Zambia, in particular, experienced drastic decline in coffee production from about 
6800 metric tonnes (mt) in 2005 to less than 2000 metric tonne in 2009 (Figure 5.1). 
The causes of the decline in coffee production in the country have never been 
investigated. A plausible explanation could be the decline in coffee producer prices or 
the strengthening of the Zambian currency (Kwacha) in the last decade. Despite the 
fact that, economic policies in Zambia have, for a long time, emphasised export 
diversification from the traditional export commodity, copper, to non-traditional 
exports like coffee, there has not been any study that has looked into the economic 
aspects of coffee.  To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to examine 
supply response of an agricultural export commodity in Zambia.  Despite an 
increasing body of literature on supply response in sub-Saharan Africa in the recent 
past, very little similar work has been done for Zambia. The few supply response 
studies in Zambia focused on Maize, obviously because it is the largest produced 
crop as well as the staple food (see e.g. Wold, 1997, Xu et. al. 2006; Nyairo, 2009). 
 
                                                 
18
 International Coffee Organization (ICO) price data. www.ico.org 
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Figure 5.1: Coffee Production in Zambia  
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An understanding of agricultural commodity supply responsiveness becomes a useful 
guide in economic policy formulation, particularly those relating to incentives for 
production. It is important for policy makers to know precisely the supply responses 
of commodities if effective policies are to be implemented. Supply response studies 
become relevant in providing empirical evidence for policy makers to identify key 
variables that are important in determining agricultural commodity supply.  Basically, 
agricultural supply response explains the elasticity of output adjustment to various 
policy and other production incentives. As Rao (1989) explains, the extent to which 
farm production decisions respond to information on various incentives should be 
central in policy planning.  The rational expectations of supply utilises all information 
to generate predictions of production incentives. For example, high prices should 
provide incentives for more production such that quantity supplied should move 
linearly and in the same direction as price.  
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However, with recent revelation of asymmetric behaviour of most economic and 
financial time series, the theoretical assumptions of linear adjustment of supply to 
price or other incentives become inappropriate and may lead to misleading 
conclusions. The implication of a linear adjustment is that a shock to the price is 
assumed to lead to the same response in the output, regardless of whether the shock 
reflected a price increase or a price decrease.  Yet in most cases, the reaction of 
commodity supply to increases in incentives is different from its reaction to decreases 
in the incentives. It is in this regard that this study focuses on asymmetries in supply 
response, a missing subject matter in most supply response literature.   
 
A large body of literature exist on symmetric supply responsiveness for different 
agricultural commodities across Africa.  Presumed factors affecting supply response 
vary widely across commodities as well as across countries.  Abdulai and Rieder 
(1995) concluded that cocoa supply in Ghana is significantly influenced by real 
producer prices of cocoa, real maize prices (as a substitute crop), real exchange rate 
and supply of manufactured goods. Muchapondwa (2009) found that price incentives 
did not affect aggregate agricultural supply in Zimbabwe between 1970 and 1999. In 
his/her study, Molua (2010) found that irrigation, export promotion and access to 
affordable finance significantly affect productivity and supply of rice. Rahji and 
Adewumi (2007) attribute the increase in local rice supply in Nigeria to a ban on rice 
importation coupled with provision of production incentives especially of certified 
seeds, fertilizers and agro-chemicals. In Uganda coffee farmers were responsive to 
producer prices, such that when prices increased, they responded by raising 
production (Otim and Ngategize, 1993). Kidane (1999) argued that coffee supply in 
Ethiopian was actually responsive to the real exchange rate, despite arguments by 
some economists that small scale farmers in developing countries do not respond to 
price incentives in a rational and predictable manner. In view of the outcome of 
theses studies, it is quiet evident that factors that influence supply vary widely 
depending on the commodity as well as the country. 
 
The methodologies applied in these studies also vary widely. While most studies 
employ the Nerlove (1958) model, more recent studies (e.g. Abdulai and Rieder, 
1995; Alemu et. al. 2003) have adopted a modelling technique that recognises the 
use of cointegration and error correction to overcome the problem of spurious results 
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arising from the use of integrated series in the Nerlove model. As noted earlier, these 
studies employed linear cointegration and error correction estimation to arrive at 
conclusions of supply elasticity. Linear estimates cannot differentiate the effects of 
positive and negative price shocks on supply. As literature would reveal, very little 
attention has been paid to asymmetric supply response.  Shirvin and Wilbratte (1999) 
examined asymmetric response of domestic prices to import prices in different 
developed countries using asymmetric error correction models. Their study however, 
differs from this study in the segmentation of the error correction term. In this study, a 
threshold is identified in a threshold variable, which is the error term, using Threshold 
Autoregression (TAR) models to examine threshold cointegration. Short-term 
asymmetric supply adjustments are then analysed using threshold error correction 
models.   
 
The overriding objective of this study is to estimate an asymmetric coffee supply 
response to price incentives. However, it would be difficult to obtain robust results if 
other important incentives to supply are not controlled for. Therefore, the study 
includes prices of competitive crops (specifically maize) and real exchange rate 
(given that coffee is grown specifically for export) in an asymmetric autoregression 
model. Motivated by the work of Deaton and Laroque (2003), this study not only 
takes into account asymmetries, but also the nature of the coffee circle as a 
perennial crop. Thus, I include lags in the supply response analysis considering the 
fact that coffee takes up to four years before the first harvest as well as the fact that 
maintaining current trees may have implications on supply. Supply response is 
therefore, likely to go over one period. At the same time, it is important to note that, 
while economics and econometrics assume a stable policy structure, which clearly is 
not the case in Africa, where potential structural breaks in fundamental economic 
behaviour make modelling problematic. Unlike previous studies, this study pays 
attention to endogenous identification of structural breaks, particularly those relating 
to economic reform periods. The study is designed to provide necessary information 
for policy planning on the response of coffee supply to various incentives following 
policy regime changes in the agricultural sector.  The aim is to inform policy makers 
about the effects of an increase or a decrease in the price of coffee and other 
incentives will have on coffee supply.  
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The next section discusses the 
economic theory in which supply response is embedded. Section three describes the 
methodology used in modelling supply response, and is followed by a description of 
data in section four. The results of the analysis are presented and discussed in 
section five which is followed by a conclusion in section six.  
 
5.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
Modelling supply response has its roots in the partial adjustment, adaptive 
adjustment and rational expectation theories embedded in the theory of a firm19. The 
partial adjustment and adaptive adjustment model developed by Nerlove (1958) 
captures the dynamics of agricultural supply with regards to price and other 
expectation. Specifically, the models asses the farmers’ optimisation behaviour and 
how they react to changing targets with respect to changes in other incentives. 
 
The partial adjustment model shows a dynamic partial adjustment where an 
observable output variable ty  is adjusted, through time, to an expected or desired but 
unobservable output variable *ty  in the equation below: 
 
)( 1*1 −− −=− tttt yyyy β , 10 << β         (1) 
 
                                                 
19
 A profit maximising firm is observed how it adjusts its supply in response to price expectations. 
Given that supply response is only focused on the output supply function, and not necessarily on the 
demand function, the model only considers the firm decisions on output supply. Since any profit 
maximising firm assumes that output optimisation has already been achieved in the input space, it will 
produce output up to the point where it equates marginal revenue to its marginal cost. The cost 
minimising behaviour equates marginal costs to price, which the firm cannot influence in a competitive 
market, as the case is with farmers. Being a price taker, the firm sees the market price for its product, 
assumes it will remain the same regardless of how much or how little it sells and makes its plans 
accordingly. Since the main objective is to maximise profits, the firm chooses the level of output and 
the combination of factors that solve the equation Max )(ypf - =
n
i
ii xw
1
 subject to 0≥ix . The solution to 
the equation explains how much output the firm will sell and how much of which inputs it will buy. 
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Equation (1), postulates that change in output between the current and previous is a 
fraction of the difference between the output optimum level and the previous year’s 
output. In other words, at any particular time (period t), only a fixed fraction ( β ) of the 
desired adjustment is accomplished. Equation (1) shows that the adjustment of the 
output between period t and t-1 is equal to )( * itt yy −−β  where the coefficient β  
measures the speed of adjustment assuming the values between 0 and 1. The larger 
the value of β , the faster the adjustment such that when 1=β  adjustment is 
instantaneous and the smaller the value the longer it takes for output to adjust to the 
desired level, implying a higher adjustment lag. 
 
However, the targeted or desired output *ty  is not observed, but is influenced by 
various other observed factors tx  such that:  
*
ty = tx             (2) 
 
where tx  are current or lagged variables of other economically important variables.  
 
Substituting 2 into 1 gives  
 
)( 11 −− −=− tttt yxyy β          (3) 
 
where tx  is a vector of variables influencing the firms’ decision to invest in attaining 
the optimal or desired output. These variables could be lagged prices, lagged output, 
and lagged prices of substitute crops.   
 
A major limitation to the Nerlovean approach is the possibility of spurious regression 
arising from not taking into account stationarity properties of time series. 
Furthermore, the long run price elasticity cannot be estimated using the Nerlove 
model, unless assumptions of whether it is a partial adjustment or price expectation 
model are made. This implies no forward looking behaviour by the farmers. 
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Nerlovean model has been has been extensively applied in modelling supply 
response in a wide range of agricultural empirical research.20   
 
Nevertheless, the Nerlovean model is used in connection with the adaptive 
expectation. In adaptive expectations, the farmer makes his/her expectations based 
on what happened in the past. In the equation below, if *ty  is the expected value of 
some variable which is unobserved. In the adaptive expectation model, the 
adjustment of expectations from time t to t-1 is presented as: 
 
*
1
* )1(
−
−+= ttt yxy δγ where 0<δ <1       (4) 
 
Where tx  is the observed value of x  in period t, * 1−ty  is the target level of a particular 
ratio or the value of x  expected to prevail in the period t-1, *ty  is the value of the ratio 
for t or the value of x  expected to prevail in period t. δ  is the coefficient of 
expectations, the proportion of the current change in the industry mean/median taken 
to be permanent rather than transition.  
 
Unlike the adaptive expectations, in rational expectations theory, the farmer takes 
into account all information available to make his expectations. It is often argued that 
rational expectations are model consistent in that it assumes that market outcomes 
that are forecasted do not deviate widely from the equilibrium, but that the deviation 
becomes consistent with assumption of random standard error in modelling 
expectations (See Muth, 1961; Seay et. al, 2004).    
 
This study examines supply response in the framework of rational expectations 
theory. Supply response basically examines speed and magnitude of changes in 
planned output in response to anticipated output prices. However, neither planned 
output nor anticipated price is observable, because first, weather and other 
environmental factors can make observed output deviate from planned output and 
second, because the farmer only knows past and current prices (Rao, 1989). Proxies 
                                                 
20
 See Askari and Cummings (1977) for a survey of the supply response approaches 
in agricultural commodities.   
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for these variables, therefore, need to be employed, although having in mind that the 
choice of the proxy has significant bearing on the results. For example, several 
economists suggest the use of acreage as proxy for output because it is thought to 
be more subjective to farmers’ control (Askari and Cummigs, 1977; Rao, 1989). 
However, if yield improves given unchanged acreage, this proxy can be misleading.  
 
So far, empirical work of supply response to price of agricultural commodities is 
found to be consistent with rational expectation theory (Rao, 1989). In theory, a rise 
in market price of a commodity encourages producers to produce more, such that, an 
increase in price means a rise in supply. Most time series studies find positive supply 
response for specific crops with respect to relative price changes (Rao, 1989). In 
general, short-term supply elasticity of total agricultural output to changes in prices 
ranges from 0.1 to 0.3 (Meerman, 1997). In the long-run, because of the mobility of 
factors of production such land, labour and Capital, the production response to 
improved prices for the entire agricultural sector is much higher- 0.3 to 1.2 (Rao, 
1989). Such that, when prices are not attractive in the long-run, not only are the 
resources reallocated to other competing crops, but also to other uses. Abdulai and 
Rieder (1995) argued that if farmers receive high prices for their commodities relative 
to other goods, they would be encouraged to increase output within their limits.  
 
With regards to economic reforms, most empirical findings are consistent with theory 
depicting that agricultural production and exports increases in response to structural 
adjustment programs (Meerman, 1997). However, one constraint to faster production 
response is the inconsistence of the reforms. Meerman (1997) argues that, the 
private sector become reluctant to invest if Government “ownership” and the 
persistence of the reforms are in doubt, such as in situations where reforms have 
often times been reversed or halted and fall short of full liberalisation. Closely linked 
to economic reforms and commodity trade liberalisation is currency liberalisation. The 
theory of “getting the price right” through exchange rate devaluation implies an 
increase in prices and profitability of export crops relative to locally consumed 
commodities, hence an important incentives for increasing output supply (Meerman, 
1997). In a study of cocoa in Ghana, Abdulai and Rieder (1995) found that 
overvaluation of domestic currency serves as a disincentive to production of tradable, 
particularly export commodities. They argue that, to provide incentives to producers 
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of export crops, the general macro-economic environment that determines real 
exchange rate needs to be put on a sound base.   
 
 
5.3 Model Estimation 
 
In order to address the Nerlove model limitations and to give consistent estimation of 
short and long-run supply elasticity, this study applies cointegration and error 
correction models. Two models are estimated and results compared. The first model 
employed in the analysis i.e. the traditional cointegration and error correction model 
(ECM) models assumes linear or symmetric adjustment to long-run equilibrium, while 
the second model considers asymmetric adjustment. In the second phase, threshold 
cointegration and error correction models is employed to assess asymmetric 
adjustments of supply to various incentives. In general, error correction specifications 
examine short-run adjustments to a long-run equilibrium. Several researchers 
including Abdulai and Rieder (1995), Mc Kay (1999) and Thiele (2003), have applied 
cointegration and ECM in supply response analysis in different commodities. Unlike 
the Nerlovean model, cointegration models demand that the variables in question 
must be integrated of the same order in order for the long-term relationship to be 
established without giving spurious results. According to Engle and Granger (1987), 
two or more non-stationary variables may wonder apart in the short-run, but in the 
long-run there exists a relationship which itself is stationary. The long-run relationship 
between coffee supply and coffee price, maize prices, real exchange rates and policy 
changes is given by: 
 
tt
m
t
c
tt RFRERPPQ εβββββ +++++= 43210       (4) 
 
where: tQ  Logarithm of coffee production at time t 
c
tP =  Logarithm of coffee prices at time t 
m
tP = Logarithm of maize prices at time t 
tRER = Logarithm of real exchange rate for the kwacha dollar 
=RF Dummy variable for economic reforms    
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and iβ  are the parameters to be estimated. All the variables in equation (4) must be 
non-stationary and integrated of the same order e.g. I(1). tε  is a disturbance term 
that may be serially correlated. If a long-run relationship exists, then the error term tε  
is stationary even when the individual variables are non-stationary. The well known 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistic is used to ascertain whether the residuals tε  
are stationary in the following equation: 
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 where tυ  is a white-nose disturbance. The null hypothesis of unit root is not rejected 
if 0=ρ  against an alternative hypothesis of 02 <<− ρ . In the case of equation (4), 
the series are said to be cointegrated if the null hypothesis of unit roots in tε  is 
rejected. That means presence of a unique long-run equilibrium between coffee 
supply on the one side and coffee producer prices, real exchange rates and maize 
prices on the other side.  
 
The ECM is presented as; 
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The term  jtiECM −)(  represents the error correction term tυ  which is derived as the 
residuals from the cointegration estimation from equation (4). 
  
A major limitation of the linear cointegration models is that they implicitly assume a 
linear adjustment mechanism contrary to the characteristics of most time series data 
(Enders and Siklos 2001). According to Enders and Granger (1998) the symmetric or 
linear cointegration tests are misspecified if the adjustment to long run equilibrium is 
asymmetric21.  
 
                                                 
21
 A detailed discussion of symmetric and asymmetric cointegration methodologies is given in Chapter 
2. 
(6) 
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To account for asymmetric supply response, threshold error correction models 
(TECM) is applied within the framework of threshold autoregression (TAR). Building 
on the works of Enders and Granger (1998), Granger and Lee (1998), Enders and 
Siklos (2001) and Enders (2004), a multivariate threshold error correction 
specification is developed in this study to asses possible asymmetries of short-run 
supply adjustments to its long-run equilibrium based on changes in coffee prices, 
maize prices, real exchange rates and economic reforms.  
 
To examine threshold cointegration and error correction adjustments, the residuals 
( tε ) obtained from the long-run relationship (equation (4)) are used in the estimation 
of the TAR (equation (7)). To establish a threshold, this study follows the procedure 
by Chan (1990, 1993) and Enders (2004) where the threshold is selected from all 
possible values of a threshold variable by a grid search. The selection of the 
threshold is done alongside estimation of tβ  where all Sums of Squared Residuals 
(SSR) from the TAR models are recorded. The TAR model with a threshold that 
minimises SSR is selected.  
 
A TAR model is presented as follows: 
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where tI is the Heaviside indicator function such that: 
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tZ∆  is the fist difference of the residuals derived from the long-run cointegration 
estimation in equation (4); 1=tI  if τ≥−1tZ ; 0=tI  if τ<−1tZ . This implies that 
when ,01 ≤−tZ 0=tI  an d (1- tI )=1.  
 
Examining threshold cointegration is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration by testing the joint restriction that  021 == ii αα  in equation (7), based 
(7) 
 118
on F-statistics and its significance level. The F-statistics values are tabulated in 
Enders and Enders (1998).  If the null hypothesis of no-cointegration is rejected, then 
asymmetric adjustments can be tested. Examining asymmetric supply adjustments is 
equivalent to examining the presence of a threshold which is done by testing 
whether ii 21 αα =  in equation (7). If the hypothesis is rejected, then the system has 
asymmetric adjustment effects.  In that case, asymmetric short-run adjustments to 
the long-run adjustment are estimated using a Threshold Error Correction Model 
(TECM).  As suggested by the rationale expectation theory, asymmetric adjustment 
in supply response is treated as a short-run phenomenon. Therefore, the conclusions 
are mainly drawn on the short-run estimations.  
 
In order to render the results robust with respect to the asymmetric effect of the 
dependent variables on supply, this study develops a TECM for each regime, i.e. for 
the adjustments above the threshold and those below the threshold. Each model is 
then estimated as a normal symmetric ECM given in equation (6). The two models 
are represented as: 
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Where +
−1tZ  and −−1tZ  are derived from (7) depending on whether the system is above 
or below an estimated threshold. +
−1tZ  are positive shocks above a threshold and 
−
−1tZ are the negative shocks below a threshold. Similarly +λ and −λ represent the 
adjustment coefficients when the system is above and below the threshold 
respectively.  
 
5.4 Data Description 
 
Annual series data covering the period 1983 to 2008 is used for the empirical 
analysis. The variables include annual coffee production in metric tonnes, coffee 
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producer prices in US cents per pound (lb),22 real maize prices ZMK per kg and real 
exchange rate for the Kwacha currency. Coffee production and price data were 
obtained from the International coffee organisation (ICO), data on real exchange 
rates and maize prices (1994-2008) where obtained from Bank of the Zambia (BOZ), 
while the other part of the maize prices (1983 to 1994) where obtained from a study 
conducted by Wold (1997). A dummy variable identifying the economic reform is 
included to control for a potential structural break.  This structural break was 
determined endogenously using the Lee and Strazichici (2003) structural break unit 
root tests in the real exchange rates variable. I choose to use the exchange rate 
variable to determine economic reform because currency liberalization took a central 
stage during the economic reforms.  
 
The original data on exchange rate and for maize prices where in the local currency 
needed to be deflated with a price index. Consumer price index (CPI) with the year 
2000 as the base was used to deflate exchange rates for the entire period and maize 
prices for the period 1994 to 2008.  Maize prices which were obtained from the study 
by Wold (1997) covering the period 1984 to 1994 were already in real terms, deflated 
using low income CPI. Figure 5.2 plots these variables.   
 
Figure 5.2: Supply Response Variables 
                                                 
22
 Lb is the abbreviation for Libra which is the roman word for pound. One pound is 0.453 592 37 kilo 
grams (kgs). 
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Cprice are Zambian coffee prices in US cents/Ib; Cproduction is coffee production for 
Zambia in metric tonnes; RER is the Real exchange rate expressed as Zambian 
Kwacha (ZMK) per USD. 
 
 
5.4.1 Rationale for Variable Selection  
 
The selection of the variables was based on theoretical understanding of supply 
response discussed in section 5.3. In the first place, farmers make their production 
decisions based on past price information. As noted by Askari and Cummings (1997), 
crop specific price risk increases supply responsiveness particularly of peasants 
whose livelihood may be threatened by down-side risks. This is especially so with 
export crops like coffee which demonstrate acute period to period volatility. In theory, 
high prices are supposed to motivate farmers to produce more. Thereby, prices 
having a positive effect on production of a particular commodity.  However, in 
perennial crops, where supply tends to reach the market when prices are on the 
decline, the price coefficient may not be positive. For coffee in particular, when prices 
increase, farmers are motivated to increase production, such that excess production 
may lead to price decline. When prices decline, farmers get discouraged from making 
investments in new trees or maintaining the old ones, resulting in low yields and less 
supply. In the end, prices rise again due to low supply. This is exacerbated by the 
fact that coffee is a perennial crop with lags between plantation and harvesting 
varying between 18 to 24 months.  Peak yields are only experienced after 5 to 7 
years. This implies that, while input investments respond quickly to price changes, 
supply response is very slow. Consequently, additional supply tends to reach the 
market when prices are on the decline.  
 
Second, alternative crops prices may influence coffee production. As maize is 
Zambia’s main stable crop, its successes and failures in terms of yield and price may 
have a bearing on the farmers’ decisions to grow an alternative cash crop such as 
coffee. Askari and Cummings, 1997 explain that where multiple cropping is possible 
and rigid patterns of land use are not dictated by substitute requirements, farmers set 
of choices is wider. Hence, responsiveness is likely to be greater. In this case, coffee 
supply response to maize prices is expected to be significant but negative. 
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Third, Zambia embarked on economic reforms in the 1990s when agricultural trade 
was liberalised. The change from a controlled system that included price fixing could 
have significant effect on the coffee supply.  As explained by Rao (1989), the 
analysis of long-run response must distinguish changes in supply conditions that are 
brought about by the decentralised private actions from changes that result from 
centralised public actions. Given that trade liberalisation encourages private traders 
which could lead to increased and more efficient markets, the coefficient of the 
dummy variable for economic reforms is expected to be positive. Whether the 
coefficient would be significant is subject to investigation because trade liberalisation 
did not directly affect the coffee industry. Even before the reforms the government did 
not much control of the industry as it was relatively small and insignificant. However, 
the reforms in other sectors of the economic such as exchange rates, privatisation of 
state owned estates and decentralisation of the agricultural institutions could have an 
impact on the coffee industry.  
 
Fourth, exchange rates influence farmers’ decision to increase supply. A stronger 
currency makes exports more expensive than a relatively weaker currency relative to 
prices of locally consumed commodities. The trend in most cases is that a stronger 
currency results in a decline in exports.  Abdulai and Rieder (1995) argue that 
overvaluation of the domestic currency serves as disincentive to production of 
tradable, particularly of export commodities. In the last decade Zambian Kwacha 
steadily gained strength against the US Dollar. Hypothetically, a strong currency   
reduces profitability of exports crops. As such a positive coefficient for real exchange 
rate is expected in both the long and short-run model estimation. Figure 5.4 shows 
Zambia’s annual inflation rate in the last eight years. 
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Figure 5.3 Zambia Annual Inflation Rate (2003-2011) 
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Source: Bank of Zambia (BOZ) data at www.boz.zm 
 
5.5 Results 
 
The use of cointegration demands that the variables be non-stationary and integrated 
of the same order. To assess stationarity of each variable, the ADF tests (equation 5) 
unit root tests are employed.  The number of lags to include in the ADF model is 
selected using the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC).23 A general-to-specific approach 
is also employed to verify the AIC selection.24 The results presented in Table 5.1 
show that all variables are non-stationary in levels while their first differences are 
stationary.  
 
 
                                                 
23
 Akaike’s (1987) Information Criteria (AIC) and Schwarz’s (1983) Bayesian Criteria (SBC) are 
commonly used to determine the number of parameters to include in a model. The model giving the 
smallest value of AIC and SBC is considered best and most likely gives the best goodness of fit. 
Based on theoretical explanations and various simulation studies, SBC is preferred for large samples 
because the AIC tends to select models with too many parameters when the sample size is large. 
However, the number of observations in this study is 26 for all the variables justifying the use of  AIC.   
24
 In a general-to-specific approach, different lags are included in the unit root test until the appropriate 
lag is reached. The procedure involves starting with many lags and reducing until the appropriate 
number of lags is reached, based on the results of the unit root test as well other indicative values for 
autocorrelation such as the Durbin Watson (DW) value.  
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Table 5.1: Unit Root Tests for Supply Response Variables 
*,** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The number of lags for each variable 
are indicated in parentheses.  
 
According to the t-statistics, the null hypothesis of unit roots cannot be rejected at the 
1 percent level for all variables in levels. However, the null hypothesis of unit roots is 
highly rejected when applied to first differences of the variables. That means that all 
the variables are integrated of order one or are I (1).  
 
Cointegration analysis has been carried out using both the Engle and Granger (1987) 
and Johansen (1988) tests, which presumes a linear cointegration, and the TAR 
model which takes into account possibilities of asymmetric cointegration. Further, 
both symmetric and asymmetric error correction models are estimated to examine 
the short run adjustments to long run equilibrium.  
 
5.5.1 Symmetric Cointegration and Error Correction Results 
 
The Engle-granger cointegration procedure involves two steps. In the first step long-
run relationships are established between coffee supply at time t and the explanatory 
variables (coffee producer prices, maize prices, the real exchange rate and economic 
reforms) as specified in equation (4). The results are presented in equation (10) 
where t-statistics obtained from ADF distribution are given in parentheses.   
 
 
 With Constant With Constant and Drift 
 Level First difference Level First difference 
 
Coffee Production (2) 
 
-1.863 
 
-5.008*** 
 
-3.438* 
 
3.555*** 
 
Coffee Price(2) 
 
-2.217 
 
-5.176*** 
 
-2.739 
 
-5.035*** 
 
Maize Prices(5) 
 
-0.276 
 
-3.752*** 
 
1.130 
 
-4.490*** 
 
Real Exchange rates(1) 
 
-2.398 
 
-3.729** 
 
2.612 
 
-4.462*** 
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RFRERPPQ tmtctt 795.0331.0010.00421.0154.5 11 +++−= −−       (10) 
         (8.910)   (-0.317)  (0.086)      (9.031)       (2.373) 
 
2R = 0.9155 AIC = 1.0556   
 
The most significant variable in determining supply response is the exchange rate in 
real terms. A positive coefficient of the exchange rate means that when the Zambian 
Kwacha weakens against the dollar (an increase in the exchange rate) coffee supply 
increases. Given that coffee is grown solely for export, a strong currency makes the 
commodity less competitive, hence unattractive for farmers to plant more or invest 
more in the already growing trees. As equation (10) shows, one unit appreciation of 
the Zambia Kwacha leads to 0.33 percent increase in coffee supply in the long-run. 
Thus, the 2004 peak coffee production that Zambia experienced can be associated 
with the 21.4 percent annual inflation rate in the same year (Figure 5.4 above).  
 
In addition, the results show that economic reforms, which occurred in 1998 
(according to a structural break in the real exchange rate), have had a positive 
impact on coffee production. Since the t-statistic value of 2.373 on the economic 
reform coefficient is higher than the 5 percent critical value of 1.708, the impact is 
significant. The coefficient is positive, an indication that coffee production increased. 
 
On the contrary, the effect of coffee prices on coffee production in Zambia in the 
long-run is not significant. A plausible explanation for the insignificant coffee prices is 
that the prices are in dollars and that is what the farmers receive. Therefore, the 
incomes for the farmers, in the local currently, greatly depend on the exchange rate. 
As long as the local currency continues to weaken, coffee farmers will always find it 
attractive to produce more, even if price remains the same.  Similarly, price for 
maize, the competing crop with coffee, has no significant impact on supply. An 
explanation for this outcome is that land may not be a factor for the large scale 
farmers, such that maize is not grown as an alternative crop, but as complementary 
to maize.  
 
Nevertheless, the second step of the Engle Granger cointegration approach, is to test 
stationarity of the residuals tε  . As mentioned earlier, ADF tests are employed for this 
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test (equation (5)). The null hypothesis of non-stationary presented by 0=ρ  was 
rejected at 0.01 given a t-statistic of -3.759. This value is greater than the 1 percent 
critical value of -3.707 which justifies the rejection of the null hypothesis.25   
 
Given the possibility that there may be more than one cointegration vector, the 
multivariate cointegration approach proposed by Johansen and Julius (1990) was 
also applied to examine the number of cointegration vectors. Unlike the Engle and 
Granger cointegration test, the Johansen test does not assume a single cointegration 
relationship. It therefore becomes necessary to apply the Johansen test as well to 
establish the number of cointegration relationship. The results are presented in Table 
5.2. The procedure involved testing for the number of cointegration vectors between 
coffee supply on one side and coffee prices, real maize prices, real exchange rate 
and a dummy of economic reforms on the other. Results indicate two cointegration 
equations significant at 5 percent level. The Johansen results provide further 
evidence supporting the results of the Engle-Granger tests which shows evidence of 
cointegration between the variables as shown in equations (10).  As in the Engle 
granger cointegration test, the Johansen test shows that at most two variables have 
a significant effect on coffee supply.  
 
Table 5.2: Johansen Cointegration Test 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.875244  101.5900  69.81889  0.0000  
At most 1 *  0.696712  51.63643  47.85613  0.0212  
At most 2  0.434481  23.00272  29.79707  0.2459  
At most 3  0.218464  9.322430  15.49471  0.3364  
At most 4  0.132327  3.406570  3.841466  0.0649  
      
      
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
 
                                                 
25
 The critical values are for cointegration relationships for four variables with a constant in the 
cointegration vector. The values are tabulated in Enders, 2004 pp. 441 
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Having established the existence of a long run relationship, a symmetric ECM, is 
employed to capture short-run supply adjustments to the long-run equilibrium 
estimated using equation (4). The ECM presented in equation (6) estimates the 
short-run adjustments of supply toward the long-run equilibrium. The maximum order 
for the ECM, given the number of observations for this study, is two. The DW value 
confirms the absence of autocorrelation when one lag is included for each variable. 
As Deaton and Laroque (2003) have shown, coffee supply response to increasing 
coffee prices can occur within two years; hence a model with two lags is sufficient to 
capture coffee supply elasticity.   
 
Table 5.3 shows the short-run adjustments. The error correction term (ECT) is 
negative as expected from ECM and significant at the 15% level. This means that 
when all incentives increase, supply does not increase proportionally; instead it lags 
behind creating a negative disequilibrium which gets corrected over time. The 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium are short lived, such that 0.41% of the 
previous year’s disequilibrium from the long-run relationship is corrected in the 
current year.   
 
Table 5.3: Symmetric Error Correction Estimates 
 
iβ
 
t-statistics Standard Error 
1−∆Φ t
 
-0. 181*  -1.315* 0.313 
2−∆Φt
 
-0.173  0.718 0.305 
c
tp 1−∆
 
 0. 190  0.890 0.241 
c
tp 2−∆
 
   0.089  0.620 0.213 
m
tp 1−∆
 
  -0. 128  0.567 0.143 
m
tp 2−∆
 
    0.326  -0.142 0.226 
1−∆ tRER
 
   0.326* 1.575 0.285 
2−∆ tRER
 
   -0.126  -0.653 0.206 
1−∆ tRF
 
    0.237  0.652 0.194 
1−∆ tRF
 
    0.256  0.694 0.385 
ECT     -0.412*  -1.315 0.369 
C      0.097 0.773 0.126 
*’** Significance at 15%  
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The changes in the RER seem to have a larger impact on changes in supply, given a 
15% significant coefficient. The coefficient on the RER is also positive supporting the 
argument that a depreciation of the currency (as the exchange rate value increases) 
attracts investment in agricultural exports. The coefficient on price is positive 
although the short term adjustments for two lags are not significant. Similarly the 
short run adjustment for maize prices is not significant for the first lag although it has 
the expected negative sign. The previous period’s production has relative effect on 
current period’s production given the significant coefficient at 15% level.  
Detailed vector error correction estimation is presented in Table 5.4. The t-statistics 
on the estimated coefficients give an indication that coffee prices, exchanges rates 
and maize prices do not influence each other in the short-run.  
 
5.5.2 Asymmetric Cointegration and Error Correction Results 
 
The results discussed above do not differentiate between effects of positive and 
negative shocks on supply response. Due to a possibility of asymmetric supply 
movement, threshold cointegration was examined using the TAR model (equation 
7).26 The results indicate the existence of a threshold of 0.23367. The selection of 
this threshold was based on grid search for the smallest SSR computed from TAR 
estimations using all possible threshold values.  
 
The null hypothesis of no threshold cointegration, which is equivalent to a test that 
021 == ii αα  in equation (7) was strongly rejected at 5%. The test gives a P-value of 
5.204 with 0.016 level significance. This value is greater than the 5% critical value of 
3.55 with 2,18 degrees of freedom. A test of asymmetric supply response to the long-
run equilibrium involves a Wald test of the null hypothesis that ii 21 αα = in equation 
(7).  If supply response to all the variables is asymmetric, then it is expected that 
i1α differs significantly from i1α . The hypothesis is rejected at 5% giving a P-value of 
5.260 which is greater than 3.55. The results mean that coffee supply adjusts 
according to whether a deviation from the long-run equilibrium is above a threshold of 
0.233 or below the threshold.  
                                                 
26
 The TAR model was estimated using Regression Analysis for Time Series (RATS) program.  
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The results from the TAR model imply that positive shocks (represented as −
−1tZ  in 
the ECM) and negative shocks ( +
−1tZ ), have different impacts on the adjustment of 
coffee supply in the long-run. Therefore, short run adjustments to the long-run 
equilibrium can be determined based on estimations of the two ECMs presented in 
equation (8) and (9).27 Results, which are presented in Table 5.4 and 5.5 shows that, 
for all the variables apart from coffee prices, short-run adjustments of coffee supply 
to its long-run equilibrium tends to occur only when the shocks are above the 
threshold and not when the shocks are below the threshold. Regarding the changes 
in coffee prices, results show that about 0.26% of the deviations from long-run 
equilibrium are corrected back whenever the price changes move above the 
threshold. Below the threshold, maize prices do not have any significant effect on 
supply. What this means is that coffee price increases only lead to increases in 
coffee supply in the short run if the deviation from long-run equilibrium gets above the 
threshold.  However as explained earlier, given the nature of the coffee tree as a 
perennial crop, is best examined in a long-term.  Changes in maize prices do not 
seem to have any significant effect on coffee supply in the short run, whether the 
system is above or below the threshold. For real exchange rate, threshold short run 
adjustment results show that whenever the Zambian Kwacha depreciates by one unit 
above the threshold, coffee supply increases by 0.19%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 One lag each variable is included in the models. The model for positive shocks gives an AIC value 
of 0.449, SBC of   0.793 and a DW value of 2.24 while the AIC value for the negative shock model is 
0.516, the SBC is 0.859 and the DW is 2.23. Given that Coffee is a perennial crop which can take up 
to 4 years before the first harvest and that the trees can last up to 50 years, more lags would be 
needed to explain the adjustments to shocks that occurred several years back. However, the best 
model was selected for one lag. This could be partly because of the small number of observation in 
the sample. 
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Table 5.4: Error Correction Estimation above the Threshold 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics Standard Error 
1−∆Φ t
 
-0.527* -1.638 0.120 
+
−
∆ ctp 1
 
0.260* 2.578 0.020 
m
tp 1−∆
 
0.006  0.037 0.971 
1−∆ tRER
 
0.191* 1.348 0.195 
1−∆ tRF
 
0.330* 1.659 0.115 
+
−1tZ  0.216* 1.323 0.203 
C 0.790** 2.889 0.010 
Obs    24 
2R
   1.229 
DW   2.23 
 
Table 5.5: Error Correction Estimation below the Threshold 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics Standard Error 
1−∆Φ t
 
-0.240  -0.879 0.391 
+
−
∆ ctp 1
 
0.131 1.290 0.214 
m
tp 1−∆
 
-0.081  -0.462 0.650 
1−∆ tRER
 
0.134 0.952 0.355 
1−∆ tRF
 
0.107 0.569 0.577 
+
−1tZ
 
-o.144 -0.744 0.467 
C 0.501* 1.557 0.138 
Obs    25 
2R
   0.18 
DW   2.50 
 *, **, *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
This demonstrates that farmers find exporting profitable when the Zambian Kwacha 
depreciates against the US Dollar.  
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5.7 Conclusions 
 
The study investigated coffee supply response in Zambia using threshold error 
correction model. The main objective was to address the question of whether 
changes in coffee supply do respond asymmetrically to various incentives, thus 
departing from earlier studies on this topic that paid no attention to asymmetric 
adjustments. In this study asymmetric adjustments are examined both in the long-run 
and the short-run, such that the error term is split into two series; when the deviation 
from equilibrium is above the threshold and when it is below the threshold. Several 
conclusions are drawn from the results. 
 
First, there is robust evidence that a strong currency does not favour coffee 
production and export in both the long-run and the short-run.  The results have 
shown that when the Zambian currency (the Kwacha) appreciates, coffee growers 
receive less Kwacha for the same quantity of exports, although the value in US 
Dollars remains the same. This in return discourages the growers as most production 
expenses such as labour and other inputs are paid for in the local currency.  The 
results are consistent with theory of “getting the price right” through currency 
devaluation, which leads to profitability of export crops relative to locally consumed 
commodities. As such, policies should focus on putting in place a general macro-
economic environment that determines exchange rate needs. Over valuation of the 
exchange rate discourage the production of export commodities.  
 
Coffee prices which are hypothetically the main factor influencing production have 
been found to have no significant effect in the case of Zambia. A conclusion can be 
made here that in perennial crops like coffee, prices become endogenous to supply. 
The supply response to prices tends to be slow in that it reaches the market when 
prices are on the decline. Furthermore, the farmers are more concerned about the 
exchange rate in their production decisions and not on the prices per se. This is 
because they receive coffee revenues in US dollars while their expenses are in the 
Zambian Kwacha. In addition the coefficient for economic reforms, which is highly 
significant, demonstrates that a liberalised economy favours the production of coffee 
in the short run.  
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Regarding asymmetric supply response, the study found that positive shocks to the 
variables such as increase in coffee prices have more impact on coffee production 
than the negative shocks. Such asymmetric response cannot be captured in the 
linear cointegration models. The application of threshold cointegration models which 
has provided evidence that there is no reason for presumption that cointegration is 
linear. As observed in the study, supply may not continuously adjust to its long-run 
equilibrium until the changes in the influencing variables reach a certain threshold. 
Analysing supply response without taking into account asymmetric effects, can lead 
to misleading result.  Therefore, in comparison to the symmetric cointegration 
models, a conclusion can be made that the TAR mechanism provides a 
straightforward and a more meaningful explanation of time-series data adjustments 
to shocks due to changes in the exogenous variables.  
 
Estimates of a dynamic threshold error correction model with two lags have clearly 
shown that coffee supply adjusts to shocks in coffee prices above the threshold but 
not to shocks below the threshold.  Since the model is only lagged for one year, this 
result means that when coffee prices increase in year t-1, farmers increase their 
investment in maintaining the coffee trees to be harvested and exported in year t. 
Furthermore, coffee trees may be subjected to several shocks such as weather or 
pests over time, such that a longer lag operator can give misleading results, if such 
variables are not properly controlled for. Substantively, future research should 
consider a possibility of more than one threshold in the error correction term such 
that multiple regime analysis which be considered.  
Overall, the theory that supply adjusts to price incentives may not apply to export 
commodities where the farmers receive their incomes in a foreign currency. In that 
case the motivation to produce more highly depends on the exchange rate in relation 
to locally consumed goods and wages. In that case policies should focus on 
increasing non-price incentives and creating an environment for determines real 
exchange rates.   
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Chapter 6: 
Conclusion 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
This study examined coffee value chains, price transmission, price volatility and 
supply response in the presence of structural breaks arising from economic reforms. 
The main economic challenges facing coffee markets are asymmetric power 
structures arising from high firm concentration at the trading and roasting stages of 
the coffee value chain which prevent efficient price transmission from world prices 
thereby preventing the produces from benefiting from increases in world producer 
prices. While on the other hand, price decreases in world prices are quickly passed 
on to the producers. Consequently, coffee producers in the Zambia and Tanzania, 
like in many other producing countries, have experienced declining producer prices 
and extensive short-term producer price volatility in the last decade. These 
challenges affect production, incomes and consequently the welfare of the producers 
who are mostly poor small scare farmers fragmented across developing countries. 
The coffee value chain, like many other agricultural commodities, is buyer driven. 
This implies that producer prices are determined by forces at higher stages of the 
chain. This Chapter first gives an overview of the study by summarising the major 
findings. The conclusions are drawn based on the findings and the hypotheses of the 
study. The question of what the results mean for policies relating to the coffee 
sectors and the welfare of the growers is then addressed.  
 
6.1 Study Focus 
 
The analysis of the results reported in this section aimed at investigating the impacts 
of trade policy reforms on coffee price movements i.e. the stability and asymmetry of 
price transmission from international producer prices to grower’s prices in the 
producing country. The main motivation for studying coffee price movements is that 
while coffee remains the most important export crop in Eastern Africa, its prices 
declined the most in comparison to other export commodities in the last decade. 
Further, coffee producer prices have remained the most volatile compare other 
agricultural commodities. Undoubtedly, understanding the explanations behind the 
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price trends, other than basic market forces of supply and demand, which could have 
an effect on supply, becomes vital in price policy formulation. In order to achieve the 
objectives of the study, four specific studies have been done: i) value chain and 
governance structures and implications on producer prices, ii) asymmetries in Price 
transmission and the effects of economic reforms iii) price volatility analysis and iv) 
supply response to price movements.  
 
6.2 Summery of Results 
 
A review of the international coffee value chains and governance structures in coffee 
markets gives an indication that the coffee value chain is composed of complex 
interrelations among the actors. Despite Zambia and Tanzania having different 
degrees and trajectories of coffee market liberalisation, there is something in 
commonness in that both countries feed into a complex value chain that is governed 
by multinational corporations. In the case of Tanzania, where coffee is the main 
export crop is mainly produced by small scale farmers, the chain is even more 
complex as coffee has to pass through several of intermediaries that include 
cooperatives and traders. Despite the liberalisation of coffee marketing, by law, all 
coffee exports in Tanzania go through the government owned coffee auction. Due to 
high government intervention in marketing, large number of intermediaries as well as 
quality issues, Tanzania’s grower prices are far below the world producer indicator 
prices. In contrast, Zambia’s coffee from the farmers only go through the private 
Zambia coffee growers association before it is exported. As a result Zambia producer 
prices much higher than most countries in Africa albeit being very volatile. This 
however is a real reflection of world prices.  
 
To substantiate the findings of the qualitative analysis of coffee markets, an analysis 
of coffee price transmission from international markets to producers has been carried 
out. The study uses 273 monthly observations of coffee producer prices for Zambia, 
Tanzania and the world producer indicator price. The analysis has been done for the 
entire sample as well as for the two subsamples using threshold auto regression and 
the momentum threshold auto regression models. For each of the two producer 
prices, cointegrated with world prices is examined specifically, whether the 
transmission is symmetric or asymmetric. If the test for long-run relation (implication 
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of cointegration) is significant, asymmetry is tested to establish the nature of the 
transmission.  
 
The results from the threshold autoregression model indicate that price transmission 
for Zambia improved after economic liberalisation while in the case of Tanzania, the 
transmission has not improved. The TAR model specifically examines ‘deepness’ of 
price adjustments to long-run equilibrium, while the MTAR examines steepness of 
the adjustment. Comparing TAR and MTAR models, the results show evidence of 
high rejection power of the null hypothesis of symmetry for the MTAR model. In the 
second stage of the analysis, short run adjustments to long-run equilibrium are 
examined using threshold error correction models. Results show that, after the 
economic reforms in Zambia, price decreases have a larger impact on producer 
prices than the price increases. For example, a negative shock on Zambian prices 
led to the prices adjusting by 58.3 percent while a positive shock only led to 43 
percent adjustment in the Zambian prices. In most cases the adjustment for CIP in 
response for shocks initiated by changes in producer prices was not significant. For 
Tanzania, negative shocks lead to 30 percent price adjustment towards the long-run 
equilibrium while positive shocks only initiate 9 percent adjustment.  
 
Price volatility has been analysed to examine coffee price variations in Zambia, 
Tanzania, the international market price and retail prices in Germany.  The aim is to 
assess the effect of the fall of the ICA in 1989 and market liberalisation policies in the 
two producing countries. Retail prices demonstrated homoskedasticity such that 
GARCH models could not be estimated. It should be noted that the idea of GARCH 
models is to establish impact and persistence of shocks in variables with 
heteroskedasticity. According to threshold GARCH results, the impact of shocks was 
highest in world prices where a shock to the prices increased volatility by 35.2 
percent. On the other hand, a shock to the prices increased volatility by 3.5 percent 
in Zambia while it actually reduced volatility by 0.8 percent in Tanzania’s case. 
However shocks were most persistent in the case of Zambia such that it took up 
59.3months before dying away while it only took 32.7 months before it is eliminated 
in the world prices and Tanzania prices respectively. Results also show that volatility 
was asymmetric for Zambia and World prices while symmetric in Tanzania’s case. 
This means that in Tanzania’s case positive and negative shocks had similar effects 
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on volatility. Further, between TGARCH and GARCH models, the analysis finds 
TGARCH models to provide better fit for the results.  
 
The last part of the study examined supply response of coffee in Zambia. The 
motivation for this study is that coffee, despite its potential for increasing Zambia’s 
export diversification, is still a very small sector compared to other countries in 
eastern and southern Africa. Understanding the factors that influences coffee supply 
would render policy makers develop some pathways for increasing supply. Applying 
cointegration and threshold error correction methods, results show that all the 
independent variables i.e. coffee prices, maize prices, exchange rates and dummy 
variables apart from economic reforms have significant impact on coffee supply. As 
expected the price of maize the main competing crop and real exchange rates have 
negative effects on supply. This means that when maize prices increase farmers 
resent coffee and opt for maize. Coffee exported also become discouraged when the 
local currency gains against the dollar as exporting becomes more expensive.   
 
6.3 Policy Implications 
 
The results of the study have significant policy implications. First, the effect of value 
chain governance structures on producer prices is evident although it has been less 
investigated in economic literature. Producer price share of the final price is much of 
a consequence of value chain governance structures that producers find themselves 
in. Clearly, the rules for participation in the chain, which are set by the governors of 
the chain and the barriers to entry, determine the extent to which producers can 
participate, subsequently, the price that they receive. In addition, comparing the two 
value chain structures, i.e. the Zambian and the Tanzanian value chains, the study 
shows that the more the intermediaries in a given chain, the less price growers are 
likely to obtain. It is therefore important that government policies be directed towards 
having fewer but effective players at intra-country level. The cooperative unions 
arrangement in the case of Tanzania, if well organised like in Zambia’s case can help 
Tanzania’s coffee growers receive higher prices than what they are currently 
receiving. The cooperatives should however operate as private entities free from 
state interventions like in Zambia’s case.   
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Second, this study has confirmed assertions that commodity price movements are 
fundamentally asymmetric whereby positive and negative shocks to prices have 
different impacts on long-run adjustment to equilibrium as well as on volatility. As 
price decreases tend to have large impacts and persists longer in producer prices, 
any trade intervention policy should be directed towards working on modalities that 
help eliminate negative shocks quicker. Market-based price risk interventions like 
futures become ideal for preventing negative price shocks without distorting market 
functioning. Fair trade initiatives may also provide solutions to negative price shocks 
although empirical evidence of fair trade impact and extent is largely missing.  
 
Further, it has been established from the TAR model that, price transmission in the 
case of Zambia improved after economic reforms while it was not the case for 
Tanzania. These results confirm earlier findings that Tanzania was the only coffee 
producing country where price transmission did not improve after economic 
liberations. From the results, it can be concluded that economic liberalisation lead to 
improved price transmission. There is also strong evidence of negative shocks 
increasing the persistence of volatility more than positive shocks. Zambia which is 
more exposed to world markets experiences higher volatility than Tanzania and even 
more than the world prices. As negative shocks lead to more volatile prices than 
positive shocks, policies should be directed towards minimising the negative shocks 
if stable prices are to be achieved. Again, market-based initiatives are recommended.  
 
Investigating supply responsiveness of coffee becomes critical for Zambia where 
production significantly declined in the last 5 years. An important finding from this 
study is that, contrary to theoretical assertions that commodity production responds 
positively to prices, it is not the case with coffee in Zambia. Since coffee is mainly 
produced for export and the farmers receive their revenues in US Dallas, the 
exchange rate tends to play a key role in the farmers decisions to produce more 
coffee. Therefore, the study has shown that farmers have not taken advantage of 
price increases to increase production. For policy decisions, it is important to 
understand that non-price incentives play a key role in improving production.   
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APPENDICES 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Appendix A: Structural Break Unit Root Test Theory 
 
In Chapter 3, 4 and 5, structural break unit root tests have been employed to 
determine the structural break due to economic reforms in the data. This section 
discusses an endogenous unit root tests.    
 
Lee and Strazicich’s (2004) developed a Langrage Multiplier (LM) testing strategy 
(LSLM) that allowed for two structural breaks to be determined endogenously under 
both the null and the alternative hypothesis. The LSLM is based on Perron (1989)’s 
structural break unit root tests that follows three models: Model A allows for a break 
in the intercept, model B in the trend and model C in both the trend and intercept.  
The LSLM model is basically an extension of the Perron (1989) model, which also 
allows for a structural break under both the null and the alternative hypothesis. 
Considering data-generating process, the model is presented as;  
 
eZy tt += 'δ
    
ttt ee εβ += −1
  
 
Where tZ  is a vector of exogenous variables and tε  is an iid ),0( 2σN . The two 
structural breaks under Model C28 are described by, [ ]ttt DTDtZ 11 ,,,1=  for 1+≥ BTt  
and zero otherwise, for Bjt TtDT −=  j=1, 2 and zero otherwise. jtD  is the indicator 
dummy variables for a mean shift occurring at times jtTB . jtTD  are the corresponding 
trend shift variables. The DGP includes breaks under the null )1( =β . According to 
the LM (score) principle, unit root test statistics are obtained from 
 
 
tttt uSZy ++∆=∆ −1
'
~φδ                           10 
 
                                                 
28
 Lee and Strazicich’s (2003) model, like in the Perron C28
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where δψ ~~~ ZyS t −−=  δ
~
,,......2 Tt =  are coefficients in the regression of ty∆  on           
;tZ∆  xψ  is given by δ
~
11 Zy − ; The Unit root null hypothesis is described by 0=φ . 
Note that the testing regression (9) involves tZ∆  instead of tZ . To correct for serial 
correlation errors, the augmented terms 
,
~
jtS −∆ kj ...1=  are included to the equation 
using the general specific lag selection method suggested by Perron (1998). The 
method involves selecting a number of lags P from a more general structure length 
such that the coefficient of the last lag is significant, and that the coefficient in an 
auto-regression of order more than P is insignificant up to an optimal number of lag 
lengths- where the error term is stationary. Selection of lag length is critical as too 
few lags lead to auto correlation and too many lags will lead to inefficiency. The LM 
test statistic is given by:
,
~
jtS −∆ t-statistic for testing the unit root null hypothesis that 
0=φ . The location of the structural break ( BT ) is determined by selecting all possible 
break points for the minimum t-statistic as follows: 
 
  ),(~)~(~ λτλτ InfInf i = where TTB /=λ              
 
Lee and Strazicich (2004) argue that the LM unit root tests statistics which is 
estimated by the regression according to the LM principle will not spuriously reject 
the null hypothesis of unit root. That it is also invariant to nuisance parameter, as 
such it does not require the assumption of no break under the null. The advantage of 
the model is that the parameters do not change regardless of whether the series is 
stationary. 
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Appendix B: Threshold Vector Error Correction Results 
 
In Chapter 3, an analysis of short-run adjustments to long-run equilibrium has been 
carried out. The results presented in Table 3.4 and 3.5, are a summery of vector 
error correction estimation. Figure B1 and B2 presents the vector error correction 
estimations explaining how the Zambian coffee prices and Tanzanian coffee prices 
adjust to world prices and vice versa. The error term has been estimated from TAR 
and MTAR models presented in Table 3.3.  
 
The Table B1 shows the results for the Zambia-world price error correction 
estimation. Up to 12 lags for both variables have been included in the model. A 
general- to-specific lag selection procedure was used to select the 12 lags. The 
Durbin Watson (DW) value of 2.009 confirms absence of autocorrelation in the error 
term for the 12 lags.  The results of the error correction estimation from the TAR 
model indicate that world coffee prices (denoted as cipP∆ ) are not influenced by the 
Zambian coffee prices ztP∆ given the insignificant t-statistics for most of the lags in 
column 2 of Table B1. On the other hand, the Zambian prices are influenced by world 
prices for most of the lags. The Zambian prices also seem to be influenced by the 
prices in the previous periods.  Similar results are observed from the MTAR model 
such that when the t-statistics for the coefficients in the lat two columns of Table 3.5 
are compared, the coefficients for Zambia are more significant for almost all the lags. 
Asymmetric short-run adjustments have been observed where the Zambian prices 
adjust by 12.4 percent whenever the deviation is above the equilibrium while 
adjusting by 14.8 percent the deviation from long-run equilibrium gets below the 
threshold. This means that the negative shocks have more effect on the Zambian 
prices in the short run. 
 
For Tanzania, the coffee producer prices do not seem to be significantly influenced 
by the world prices in the short-run. This is confirmed the insignificant coefficients on 
the lags of world prices when regressed on Tanzania in the TAR model (Column 3 of 
Table B2). However the estimations from MTAR model show significant influence of 
world prices on Tanzania. The adjustments are also asymmetric where 22.7 percent 
of the deviation from long-run equilibrium is corrected back in the short run.  
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Table B1: Asymmetric ECM Results for Zambia and World Prices (Full Sample) 
 TAR  MTAR  
 
ciptP∆
 
ztP∆
 
ciptP∆
 
ZtP∆
 
Constant -0.000(0.151) 0. 029(1.396) -0.003(0.655) 0.0244(1.400) 
1−∆ ZtP
 
0.010(0.521) -0.272(4.06) 0.0216(1.085) -0.226(3.33) 
2−∆ ZtP
 
0.007(0.338) -0.108(1.566) 0.0156(0.764) -0.075(1.074) 
3−∆ ZtP
 
0.007(0.332) 0.-0.079(1.134) 0.005(0.251) -0.084(1.231) 
4−∆ ZtP
 
0.019(0.950) -0.136(1.99) 0.020(1.007) -0. 130(1.949) 
5−∆ ZtP
 
0.012(0.611) -0.095(1.388) 0.012(0.593) -0.096(1.419) 
6−∆ ZtP
 
0.024(1.203) -0.1322(1.960) 0.026(1.322) -0.125(1.866) 
7−∆ ZtP
 
0.034(1.741) -0.155(2.309) 0.037(1.878) -0.145(2.194) 
8−∆ ZtP
 
0.041(2.078) -0.022(0.331) 0.041(2.100) -0.021(0.321) 
9−∆ ZtP
 
0.031(1.600) -0.196(2.936) 0.034(1.731) -0.187(2.827) 
10−∆ ZtP
 
0.044(2.203 -0.075(1.100) 0.042(2.158) -0.079(1.169) 
11−∆ ZtP
 
12−∆ ztP
 
-0.014(-0.694) 
0.044(2.338) 
0.000(0.014) 
0.179(2.777) 
-0.011(0.55) 
0.046(2.457) 
0.013(0.191) 
0.186(2.918) 
1−∆ ciptP
 
0.212(3.207) 0.411(1.816) 0.200(3.055) 0.360(1.609) 
2−∆ ciptP
 
0.007(0.107) -0.079(0.343) 0.001(0.019) -0.101(0.451) 
3−∆ ciptP
 
0.078(1.194) 0.347(1.546) 0.070(1.081) 0.311(1.404) 
4−∆ ciptP
 
-0.095(1.452) 0.081(0.361) -0.094(1.442) 0.085(0.382) 
5−∆ ciptP
 
-0.099(1.519) -0.367(1.653) -0.089(1.388) -0.331(1.504) 
6−∆ ciptP
 
0.005(0.082) 0.079(0.353) 0.007(0.115) 0.090(0.407) 
7−∆ ciptP
 
0.009(0.135) -0.155(2.309) 0.014(0.220) 0.024(0.108) 
8−∆ ciptP
 
-0.067(1.024) -0.022(0.331) -0.089(1.365) 0.274(1.230) 
9−∆ ciptP
 
0.0138(0.209) -0.196(2.936) 0.009(0.139) 0.226(1.013) 
10−∆ ciptP
 
0.0178(0.269) -0.0749(1.100) 0.004(0.059) 0.038(0.170) 
11−∆ ciptP
 
0.080(1.218) 0.000(0.0147) 0.099(1.514) 0.289(1.295) 
12−∆ ciptP
 
-0.017(0.263) 0.1788(2.777) -0.028(0.441) -0.112(0.512) 
z-plus -0.011(0.684) -0.124(2.290) -0.001(0.171) -0.0107(0.918) 
z-minus -0.009(0.649) -0.148(3.027) -0.062(2.410) -0.333(0.775) 
Q(26) 1.693(0.0226) 3.518(0.000) 1.913(0.006) 3.823(0.000) 
DW 2.009 2.016 1.967 2.024 
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Table B2: Asymmetric ECM Results for Tanzanian and World Prices (Full 
Sample) 
 TAR  MTAR  
 
ciptP∆
 
tztP∆  ciptP∆
 
tztP∆  
Constant -0.0157(-2.156) -0.007(-0.011) -0.005(-0.941) 0.000(0.050) 
1−∆ TZtP
 
-0.027(-0.435) -0.081(0.843) -0.027(-0.577) 0.021(0.299) 
2−∆ TZtP
 
0.168(2.703) -0.019(0.197) 0.113(2.222) 0.047(0.670) 
3−∆ TZtP
 
-0.025(-0.405) 0.0328(0.338) -0.049(-1.045) -0.056(-0.782) 
4−∆ TZtP
 
0.018(0.290) -0.014(-0.141) -0.0247(-0.525) -0.0300(-0.422) 
5−∆ TZtP
 
0.019(0.325) 0.073(0.790) 0.012(0.260) 0.0140(0.201) 
6−∆ TZtP
 
0.123(2.151) 0.010(0.117) 0.095(2.169) -0.0196(-0.297) 
7−∆ TZtP
 
-0.025(-0.440) 0.049(0.561) -0.033(-0.763) -0.018(-0.230) 
8−∆ TZtP
 
-0.076(-0.56) 0.047(0.541) 0.0399(0.903) 0.002(0.034) 
9−∆ TZtP
 
-0.006(-0.121) 0.072(0.880) -0.019(-0.450) 0.017(0.259) 
10−∆ TZtP
 
0.035(0.669) -0.018(-0.225) -0.023(-0.539) -0.067(-0.018) 
1−∆ ciptP
 
0.233(2.513) 0.0090(0.063) 0.229(3.124) 0.078(0.707) 
2−∆ ciptP
 
-0.051(-0.545) 0.226(1.556) -0.000(-1.759) 0.185(1.652) 
3−∆ ciptP
 
0.027(0.287) -0.192(-1.347) 0.068(0.921) -0.097(-0.875) 
4−∆ ciptP
 
-0.197(-2.104) -0.082(-0.566) -0.158(-2.143) -0.084(-0.753) 
5−∆ ciptP
 
-0.0586(-0.635) 0.184(1.291) -0.081(-1.095) 0.219(1.953) 
6−∆ ciptP
 
-0.063(-0.681) 0.022(0.155) -0.023(-0.319) 0.067(0.609) 
7−∆ ciptP
 
-0.026(-0.283) -0.097(-0.687) -0.002(-0.378) -0.059(-0.538) 
8−∆ ciptP
 
-0.122(-1.335) -0.076(-0.542) -0.0539(-0.750) -0.044(-0.401) 
9−∆ ciptP
 
0.113(1.288) -0.151(-1.118) 0.028(0.394) -0.085(-0.807) 
10−∆ ciptP
 
0.065(-0.739) 0.167(1.230) 0.030(0.425) 0.183(1.732) 
z-plus -0.020(-0.382) -0.140(-1.770) 0.033(0.880) -0.147(-2.592) 
z-minus -0.227(-4.105) -0.293(-3.436) -0.075(-2.568) -0.114(-2.577) 
Q(22,222) 2.533(0.001) 1.979(0.009) 2.410(0.001) 2.248 
DW 1.935 2.003 2.035 2.021 
In parentheses are t-statistics values. 
ciptP∆  and tztP∆   denotes World market and Tanzanian coffee prices in their first differences. 
iciptP −∆  and itztP −∆ denotes first differences of lagged values of the prices.  
iciptP −∆ and prices at time t and world prices (the composite indicator price) at time t respectively.  
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Table B3: Symmetric Vector Error Correction for Supply Response below the 
Threshold 
Standard errors in () and t-statistics in [] 
 
Error Correction: D(LOGCPRO) D(LOGCPRI) D(LOGRER) D(LOGMPRICE) D(RF) 
      CointEq1 -0.412407 -0.049755  1.184124  0.005432 -0.076617 
  (0.31359)  (0.50945)  (0.59268)  (0.50575)  (0.25640) 
 [-1.31510] [-0.09767] [ 1.99793] [ 0.01074] [-0.29882] 
D(LOGCPRO(-1)) -0.181671 -0.430571 -0.531722  0.071455  0.267224 
  (0.30498)  (0.49545)  (0.57640)  (0.49186)  (0.24935) 
 [-0.59568] [-0.86905] [-0.92249] [ 0.14527] [ 1.07166] 
D(LOGCPRO(-2))  0.172989 -0.683077  0.368447 -0.332715 -0.173264 
  (0.24088)  (0.39132)  (0.45525)  (0.38848)  (0.19694) 
 [ 0.71816] [-1.74559] [ 0.80933] [-0.85645] [-0.87976] 
D(LOGCPRI(-1))  0.189898 -0.631559 -0.505632  0.114555  0.069163 
  (0.21259)  (0.34536)  (0.40179)  (0.34286)  (0.17382) 
 [ 0.89325] [-1.82868] [-1.25845] [ 0.33412] [ 0.39791] 
D(LOGCPRI(-2))  0.088893 -0.368863 -0.297847  0.176536  0.074882 
  (0.14334)  (0.23287)  (0.27091)  (0.23118)  (0.11720) 
 [ 0.62015] [-1.58402] [-1.09943] [ 0.76364] [ 0.63894] 
D(LOGRER(-1))  0.325969 -0.146920  0.279469 -0.210400 -0.025761 
  (0.20693)  (0.33616)  (0.39108)  (0.33372)  (0.16919) 
 [ 1.57528] [-0.43705] [ 0.71460] [-0.63046] [-0.15226] 
D(LOGRER(-2)) -0.126425 -0.105801 -0.813748  0.301328  0.135837 
  (0.19372)  (0.31470)  (0.36612)  (0.31242)  (0.15839) 
 [-0.65262] [-0.33619] [-2.22263] [ 0.96449] [ 0.85763] 
D(LOGMPRICE(-1)) -0.128435 -0.492271  0.171170 -0.043650  0.069299 
  (0.22649)  (0.36795)  (0.42806)  (0.36528)  (0.18518) 
 [-0.56706] [-1.33788] [ 0.39987] [-0.11950] [ 0.37421] 
D(LOGMPRICE(-2)) -0.325109 -0.407358 -0.154505 -0.021002  0.305409 
  (0.28479)  (0.46266)  (0.53824)  (0.45930)  (0.23285) 
 [-1.14157] [-0.88047] [-0.28705] [-0.04573] [ 1.31162] 
D(RF)  0.236686  0.640844  0.568730 -0.193735 -0.218893 
  (0.38492)  (0.62532)  (0.72748)  (0.62078)  (0.31471) 
 [ 0.61490] [ 1.02483] [ 0.78178] [-0.31208] [-0.69553] 
C  0.097026  0.490946  0.374581  0.149067 -0.035890 
  (0.12553)  (0.20393)  (0.23724)  (0.20245)  (0.10263) 
 [ 0.77294] [ 2.40748] [ 1.57890] [ 0.73633] [-0.34969] 
      
      
 R-squared  0.384587  0.793157  0.519701  0.272212  0.271069 
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Appendix C: Coffee Processing Stages 
$11.95
(1 lb) Roaster
$0.70/
Ib
Marketed on-line as Newyork
Zambia Coffee
Consuming Country
Producing Country
 
 
Source: Authors own presentation. The green coffee price of $0.70/Ib is Zambia’s average grower 
price from January 1986 to September 2008. The price for New York Zambia Ground Coffee was 
obtained from http://www.coffeeforless.com/product.asp?id=3925&CatID=523 (downloaded 
07.10.2010). A 5lb packet is selling at $53.73.  
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Farm Management/Extension Officer for Palabana Farm Power and Mechanisation 
Centre, Ministry of Agriculture Food and Fisheries, Lusaka, Zambia.  
 
Papers Presented and Studies Carried Out 
 
• Rhoda Mofya-Mukuka. “Incorporating Business Development Services (BDS) 
in Food Processing Entrepreneurship in Zambia: An Empirical Study of Food 
Processing SMSs in Zambia.” Thesis submitted to the University of Leipzig in 
partial fulfilment of the Masters Program in Small Business Studies. July 2004.  
• Rhoda Mofya and Henry Sichemebe. “Contribution of Farm Power to 
Smallholder Livelihoods in Zambia- Southern Province.”  Study carried out as 
Consultants for FAO. September 2001   
• Rhoda Mofya and Nelson Chisenga. “Gender and Animal Draft Power.” 
Paper presented at the 3rd ATNESA International Workshop, Mpumalanga, 
South Africa. September 1999. 
• Rhoda Mofya. “Approaches to Active Learning in Agricultural Extension.” 
Thesis submitted to the University of Larenstein in partial fulfilments of the BSc 
Program in Tropical Agriculture.  Deventer, Netherlands. June 1999 
• The Food and Agricultural Organisation. “Potential for Improving Production 
Tools used by Women Farmers in Chibombo district in Zambia.” As Research 
Team Member consulted by FAO and IFAD. July 1997 
• Rhoda Mofya. “Socio-economic Consequences of Donkey Traction in Areas of 
Introduction in Zambia.” Paper presentation at the Animal Traction Network for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (ATNESA) workshop, Debra-Zeit, Ethiopia, May 
1997. 
• Rhoda Mofya. “Cotton Production and Marketing in Zambia's Liberalised 
Economy.” Student project research paper submitted to the Natural Resources 
Development College in partial fulfilment of the Diploma in Agriculture.  Lusaka, 
Zambia. July, 1994. 
 
 
 
